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hearing describing the jury as the last "link-in-the-chain-of-Iaw-enforcement." 
Specifically, the prosecutor argued: 
In closing let me just say that you are part of a very important chain called 
the chain of law enforcement. And law enforcement and justice don't 
work in our country unless you do your part. The police officers can be as 
well trained as you want them and the forensic sciences can be as well 
trained as you want in the sciences. And they can go out an[ d] investigate 
crimes as competently and professionally as this group has done. And I 
think that Officer Robinson and those associated with him have done an 
excellent job. You can have the best prosecutors around. And I want to 
tell you that I believe Mr. Moss is one of the best prosecutors in the State. 
And they work together like this because they are part of the chain of law 
enforcement that keeps our community safe. But the third link in that 
chain is a jury, which when they're given the proper evidence and they are 
given the proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they have the fortitude to be 
able to act upon that and to preserve that chain unbroken. And the fourth 
link in the chain, of course, is the judge who has the courage and also the 
wisdom to impose the appropriate sentence. Now, none of this works 
unless you do your job. 
Id. at 834. The court found his argument trivialized the jury's importance because it 
suggested the jury is only the last link in a long decision. It found "[t]his suggestion that 
the jury is simply a link in a chain of law enforcement which includes the police, the 
prosecutor, and the judge is just plain wrong. It minimizes the important role of the jury 
and tends to align neutrals-judge and jury-with a party to the case-the state itself" !d. 
(internal quotations omitted). 
In this case, like in Leavitt, the comments made during closing arguments were 
improper because they trivialized the jury's role by linking them to the prosecution and 
taking the bulk of the weight of the decision to impose death off the jurors shoulders. 
<,~;jjr~ 
Here is the argument in all its glory: 
" A last few thoughts: If your verdict for death, saves just one person in the future, saves just one person in the future your sacrifice and your time will not have been 
in vain .... It's been a long journey from September 24th to October 27th. By my 
count it's almost 1500 days Dave Smith and Cory Stambaugh carried the ball for 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
most of those 1500 days. They waited during that time. They themselves 
gathered DNA from, I recollect, over 130 people, over two and a half years that 
they waited to solve this crime. They tested those people. They tested half a 
million people by running the DNA sample through COD IS. They never gave up. 
They kept trying. And if it weren't for those strands of DNA that gave you the 
insurance you need, Erick Hall would still be out there. He would still been out 
there. No they carried the baton. They did their job. For the last year and a half 
Mr. Bourne and I have done our job. And now it's time to end this and hand the 
baton to you. How many times have you sat? How many times have you sat at 
the breakfast table reading the newspaper and read about a horrible crime and 
said to your suppose, "Why don't they do something about this? This is our town. 
Why don't they do something about this?" Well the reversal of that is, now you 
are they. You are they. There is in your hands. Trust each other. You've run a 
long path together. Trust each other. Remember last week to. Take your 
common sense and your skepticism back into the jury room with you. Don't forget 
it. And finally the law is only as strong -- the law is only as strong as the weakest 
part on this jury which is heart. 
*** 
Well, for generations the citizens of our country have been asked to do 
hard things .... We'll wait for you. 
(Tr., p.5462, L.3 - p.5463, L.15; p.5512, L.24 - p.5513, L.14 (emphasis added).) The 
prosecutor, by using a baton analogy to describe how the case had passed from law 
enforcement, to the prosecutor, and now to the jury, improperly trivialized the jury's 
importance and created a link-in-the-chain argument that destroyed the neutrality of the 
jury and squarely aligned them on the side of the State. Further, this improper argument 
took the sole burden of imposing death away from the sentencing jury by implying the 
jury was working together with law enforcement and the prosecution; thus, the State 
made it easier for the jury in this case to impose a death sentence. Finally, the prosecutor 
applied the concept that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, analogizing the 
jury's heart, i.e., compassion and mercy, to the weakest link. Accordingly, this argument 
further undermines the jury's ability to meaningfully consider mitigation. See section a, 
supra. 
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h. The Prosecutor Expressed His Personal Belief And Opinion 
That The Death Penalty Was The Proper Punishment For 
Mr. Hall 
Prosecutors can appropriately argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or 
inadequacies of the defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the 
evidence. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing death sentence for 
prosecutorial misconduct in making improper arguments). However, prosecutors cannot 
put forth their opinions as to credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or 
appropriateness of capital punishment. ld. (emphasis added). This is because "the 
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the 
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." ld. 
(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. I, 18-19 (1985». 
During closing arguments, Ada County Prosecutor, Greg Bower, an elected 
official of Idaho State government, stated his opinion that the death penalty was the 
appropriate punishment for Mr. Hall, arguing, 
You said you could impose the death penalty in the right case, but what you 
wanted was overwhelming proof. And I think that this is the right case. And I 
think that you know this is the right case. 
(Tr., p.5445, Ls.14-18.) This represents an improper personal opinion of the appropriate 
punishment for this case, was improper, and warrants reversal on its own and in 
conjunction with all other claims raised by Mr. Hall. 
1. The Prosecutor Argued That Lethal Injection Is Painless 
And Humane 
The State argued that executing Mr. Hall would be a humane form of death, 
especially when compared to the asserted suffering of Ms. Henneman. 
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Are those things the same? Is execution the same as what he did to Lynn 
Henneman? It's not. It's not anything like it. It's nothing like it. Being 
executed is like going into a surgery and getting put to sleep and not 
waking up. Is that what happened the Lynn? 
(Tr., p.5511, L.24 - p.5512, L. 4.) 
Not only is this argument improper because it is not based any information in the 
record and because it calls for comparative justice which results in the death penalty 
regardless of mitigating circumstances, Mr. Hall further asserts that, rather than being a 
humane form of execution, the drugs used to kill death row inmates can actually cause an 
excruciatingly painful and protracted death. Indeed courts throughout the country are 
currently entertaining challenges to lethal injection, including the United States Supreme 
Court. See Claim AA. According to an April 2005 report by the British journal, "The 
Lancet," as many as four of ten prisoners put to death by injection in the United States 
may receive inadequate anesthesia, causing them to remain conscious in tremendous 
pain. (Exhibit 81.) Therefore, Mr. Hall claims that the State's argument was improper in 
three ways: 1) it was based upon an assertion of fact not supported by evidence in the 
record; 2) it was based on the false assertion that Mr. Hall's execution will necessarily be 
painless; and 3) it distracts the jury from its obligation to conduct an individualized 
sentencing by urging the choice of punishment based on irrelevant considerations. This 
argument violated Mr. Hall's rights to a due process, his right to a fair trial and his right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishments as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
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J. The Prosecutor Argued That A Life Sentence Would Be 
Too Lenient And Urged The Jury To Speculate As To 
What Might Happen To Mr. Hall If A Death Sentence 
Were Withheld 
The State argued that a life sentence would be too lenient, in part by, speculating 
as to what might happen to Mr. Hall if a death sentence were withheld, and by 
speculating as to what the Court might impose for Mr. Hall's other crimes. The State 
argued: 
You heard the instructions and you know what the potential sentences are 
for these cases. You know that the defendant's given life without parole 
that he can be in general population in five years. You know that in 
general population he'll have access to a number of things television, gym, 
contact visits, he'll have access to sunshine. Remember the last picture 
that -- go down. But the last picture that Mickey showed you of Lynn 
sitting in the sunshine? She won't sit in the sunshine again. You give the 
defendant life without parole, he will. 
(Tr., p.5460, Ls.9-20.) This statement encourages the jury to discount a life sentence as 
minimal punishment and violates the principle in capital cases that jurors must be able to 
give legitimate consideration to life sentences. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 
(1987); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 
(1989), Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Simmons v. South Carolina, 111 S.Ct. 
2187 (1994). 
The prosecutor went so far to argue that that imposing a life sentence was the 
equivalent of imposing no punishment at all: 
Counsel says give life. Here's the deal. You know that Judge Neville can 
give the defendant life on the rape, a life on the kidnapping. You know 
he's got one and so he's going to go to prison for life. He's got two rapes 
now that one prior conviction, he's going to go to prison for life. And so 
when Counsel says give him life, what he's really saying is give him 
nothing. Because the Ada County Prosecutor could stand up right now 
and say to Judge Neville, "We move to dismiss the murder charge. 
Dismiss it, we're done." And Judge Neville could give the defendant a life 
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sentence for rape and a life sentence for kidnapping and the dismissal of 
the murder charge would not add a minute's time because he only has one 
life. And so when Counsel says "give the defendant life." And what he's 
really saying is give him nothing because he's already been -- going to get 
life so don't do anything else to him. Let's just let that go. Give him 
nothing. I think you ought to know that because that's the point of this. Is 
Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss worth nothing? Did we go through all 
this for nothing? What about retribution to her family? What about the 
protection of society? What about deterrence of others? What about the 
punishment for the defendant that he knows he deserves, that he earned, 
that he worked on, that he knew he had coming when he talked to the 
detectives back in March of 2003. What about those goals of society? 
Are we just going to give him nothing? We have talked about the 
minimum sentence and maximum sentence, but it isn't life. Giving him 
life is nothing. It's Brere Rabbit don't throw me in the brier patch because 
I'm already there. That's the deal. 
(Tr., p.5510, L.l - p.5511, L.12.) 
This was again, pure speculation. While the sentences for rape and kidnapping 
have a maximum of life imprisonment, they do not carry mandatory minimums. For the 
prosecutor to tell the jurors that the Court would impose life sentences for the rape and 
kidnapping was not only outrageous, it fundamentally altered the only decision properly 
before the jury-the proper sentence for murder, and only after finding at least one 
statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. It focused the jury's attention on matters 
not within their concern. The prosecutor in effect told each juror that his or her only 
moral choice was death, when the law requires each juror to make a "reasoned moral 
response." See Penry, supra; Mills, supra; Simmons, supra. Mr. Hall asserts that the 
prosecutor's misconduct warrants reversal of his death sentence. 
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k. The Prosecutor Argued That Mr. Hall Committed Post-
Mortem Acts To The Victim's Body In Arguing That The 
Jury Should Find The "Especially Heinous, Atrocious And 
Cruel" Aggravating Factor 
During closing argument, the State suggested that Erick Hall committed unspecified, 
depraved acts to Ms. Henneman's body. The argument was unsupported by the evidence, 
authorized the jury to consider post-mortem conduct in finding the "heinous, atrocious 
and cruel" aggravator, and the prosecutor's use of a picture of the body of Ms. Henneman 
was designed to inflame the passions of the jury and to distort the jury's consideration of 
the evidence supporting the aggravator. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference Claim Q.l, 
infra. 
L. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase Closing 
Arguments 
Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the State's closing 
arguments both in the guilt and the sentencing phases. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference 
the facts and legal arguments from his previous claims, specifically, Claim K. Trial 
counsels' failure to object, and alternatively request a mistrial, admonishment, and 
curative instruction constitutes deficient performance. Mr. Hall asserts that but for 
counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have 
been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death. 
Based on professional standards of performance in addition to trial counsels' 
years of experience with the prosecutors in this case, counsel was intimately familiar with 
the State's tactics in closing arguments, or at least should have been. Trial counsel 
should have anticipated the prosecutors' arguments and moved to preclude them by way 
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of a motion in limine. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 (footnotes 
and quotations omitted). 70 
"Because '[p ]reserving all [possible] grounds can be very difficult in the heat of 
battle during trial,' counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any 
issues that counsel anticipate will arise at trial." ABA Guidelines, Commentary to 
Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). 
70 See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 ("Counsel should also object to 
and be prepared to rebut arguments that improperly minimize the significance of 
mitigatin~ evidence315 or equate the standards for mitigation with those for a first-phase 
defense.3 6".) Footnote 315, written before Tennard, supra, provides: 
Prosecutors will frequently try to argue, for example, that "not everybody" 
who is abused as a child grows up to commit capital murder or that mental 
illness did not "cause" the defendant to commit the crime. See Haney, 
supra note 93, at 589-602. Both of these arguments are objectionable on 
Eighth Amendment grounds because they nullify the effect of virtually all 
mitigation. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 277-80. In any event, 
counsel can seek to counter such arguments by emphasizing the unique 
combination of factors at play in the client's life and demonstrating that 
there are causal connections between, for example, childhood abuse, 
neurological damage, and violent behavior. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, 
Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 
77 N.C. L. REv. 1143, 1157-66 (1999) (reviewing psychological and 
medical "research on the correlation between childhood abuse and adult 
violence"). 
Footnote 316 provides: 
Arguments confusing the standards for a first phase defense and mitigation 
also violate the Eighth Amendment. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (finding unconstitutional trial judge's failure 
to consider defendant's violent upbringing as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing); see generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of CUlpability and 
Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death 
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21 (1997). 
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M. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Request A Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing For The Presentation Of Facts 
Alleged In Support Of The Noticed Aggravating Circumstances 
Trial counsel should have requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing for the State's 
evidence in support of the noticed aggravating circumstances. The purpose of the hearing 
would have been three-fold: (1) to provide notice to the defense so that they could 
adequately prepare for sentencing; (2) to ensure that the evidence was reliable; and (3) to 
ensure that the facts offered in support of the aggravating circumstances existed by a 
preponderance of the evidence; and (4) that the noticed aggravating circumstances were 
based on independent evidence. Trial counsel should have relied on grounds for the 
motion including the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. As a result of trial counsel's failure, they were inadequately prepared 
to defend Mr. Hall's case at sentencing. In support of this claim, Mr. Hall incorporates 
herein by reference Claims D, E, F, H, I, J, P, and Q. 
N. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Fully Preserve Sentencing-Phase Motions On Federal Grounds 
Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims 
from future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved 
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline 
1O.8.A.3.c. As stated in part in the Commentary, 
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case 
at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage 
of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may 
result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at 
trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be 
especially aware not only of strategies for winning at trial, but also of the 
heightened need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted). 
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1. Trial Counsel Failed To Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare 
Idaho's Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future 
Attacks By The Government That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently 
Preserved 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully protect 
their challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty statute claims from 
procedural default attacks from the government. While trial counsel did cite numerous 
United States Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the government will 
assert some sort of procedural bar on nearly every claim in state appellate and federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, trial counsel should have cited specific constitutional 
provisions violated if for no other reason than to preserve the claim against future legal 
challenges. 
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations 
of weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the 
statute fails to explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp. 
204-205.) It is a fair reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory 
provisions based on the case law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure 
subsequent consideration of the claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested 
their motion on the following constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.71 
71 Mr. Hall does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly 
preserved for future review, but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to 
fully insulate their claims against future procedural attack. In light of the wealth of case 
law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default rules, trial 
counsel took a short-sighted and even flippant approach trial counsel took to their motion 
practice, at times captioning motions, "Yet Another Motion To ... " and often not citing to 
a single constitutional provision in support. (R., pp. 142-44.) 
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2. Trial Counsel Failed To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In 
Support Of Their Objection To Dennis Dean's Testimony 
Regarding Risk Assessment 
Dennis Dean testified for the State regarding Mr. Hall's possible custody status if 
convicted on the murder charge and sentenced. Trial counsel objected to Mr. Dean's 
testimony as to risk assessment, and argued that the defense was precluded from 
questioning Mr. Deen without risk of "opening the door" to evidence of the Hanlon 
murder, and that there would be a denial of confrontation. (Tr., p.4924, L.18 - p.4936, 
L.7.) At no time did counsel state the federal constitutional bases for the objection. 
Counsel should have rested the objection on the Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
O. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge The Introduction Of Victim Impact Evidence 
The jury was instructed to consider and weigh all evidence presented at 
sentencing. The jury was also instructed that "victims" have a right to personally address 
them regarding the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the 
defendant's crimes. (Tr., p.4955, L.16 -p.4956, L.3.) The jury was never told that victim 
impact is not evidence, or if it is evidence, how it should be used in the weighing process. 
The instructions gave the jury absolutely no guidance on how to utilize such statements in 
assessing the gravity of aggravating circumstances, the existence or weight of mitigation, 
and the weighing of aggravators against the mitigation. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 
496 (1987) (holding Eighth Amended prohibits introduction of victim impact evidence); 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (modifying Booth in holding that Eighth 
Amendment does not erect a per se bar against victim impact evidence, but leaving 
prohibition of characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the 
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appropriate sentence intact, and noting that introduction of victim impact evidence could 
violate due process under some circumstances). 
It is reasonably likely that the jury, considered victim impact as non-statutory 
aggravating circumstances. As such, without a proper limiting construction, the victim 
impact is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated 
Mr. Hall's rights to due process and notice as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,244 (1988) ("a capital 
sentencing scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. ''') 
It is also reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact when weighing the 
aggravators against the mitigation, even though victim impact is irrelevant to any of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances. It is also reasonably likely that the jury used the 
victim impact in a way that precluded or otherwise undermined their ability to give 
meaningful consideration to Mr. Hall's mitigating evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. at 604; State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 98, 774 P.2d 252, 268 (1989) ("The broadest of 
views must be entertained in considering all potentially mitigating factors."). Finally, the 
introduction of unsworn victim impact statements not subjected to cross-examination 
violated Mr. Hall's right to confront witnesses against him. Thus, the introduction of 
victim impact violated Mr. Hall's rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
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P. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Challenge The Introduction Of Any Nonstatutory Aggravating 
Circumstances. 
Evidence of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances was introduced against Mr. 
Hall including his convictions for Escape and Grand Theft, as well as evidence that he 
committed a forcible rape against Nonna Jean Oliver, and other alleged bad conduct with 
fonner girlfriends and acquaintances. With the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel 
should have challenged the admissibility of non-statutory aggravating circumstances on 
the following grounds: 
• That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Infonnation in 
violation of Mr. Hall's state statutory and constitutional rights; 
• That Mr. Hall was not given adequate notice as entitled by the state and 
federal due process clauses; 
• That I.C. 19-2515, in its latest post-Ring incarnation, does not provide for 
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; and 
• That due to the lack of guidance available by Idaho law in the context of jury 
sentencing, jury consideration of non-statutory aggravators violates the Eighth 
Amendment. 
If deemed admissible, then trial counsel should have made litigated the following: 
• That state and federal due process requires that the jury should be instructed 
that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the existence of nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
• That the jury should be instructed that they cannot consider nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances when making their determination of whether a 
statutory aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt or when 
weighing the statutory aggravators against the mitigation. 
In conclusion, trial counsel should have objected to nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances based on Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. 
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Q. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Raise Challenges To The Statutory Aggravating Circumstances 
Aggravating circumstances must "genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible 
persons" in a way that reasonably ''justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on 
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Both on their face, and as applied, aggravating circumstances 
must permit the sentencer to make a "principled distinction between those who deserve 
the death penalty and those who do not." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990); 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) ("[t]he construction or application of an 
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally broad or vague if it does not channel or 
limit the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty"). Even if an aggravating 
circumstance is vague on its face, it can nevertheless support a death sentence if the state 
courts have narrowed its scope to a constitutionally sufficient degree and if such a 
narrowing construction actually guided the sentencer in the case under review. Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
Mr. Hall asserts, for at least a few of the claims below, that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise challenges that the Idaho Supreme Court, and even in one 
case, the United States Supreme Court, have previously rejected. See ABA Guidelines, 
Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to Guideline 1.1, 
counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this Guideline, to 
preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well 
depend on how zealously counsel discharges this duty.") Indeed, the importance of 
challenging existing precedent has been demonstrated over the past few years, where the 
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Supreme Court has agreed to revisit issues and overrule precedent in capital cases.72 
Especially in light of the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel should have considered 
raising all claims for reconsideration by the Idaho Supreme Court and federal courts. 73 
The failure to raise a claim on the ground that it has been rejected may cost a capital 
defendant his life.74 
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Especially Heinous, 
Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And 
Overbroad 
The jury entered a special verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity." 
72 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that it is unconstitutional to 
execute juveniles, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989»; Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute the mentally 
retarded, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989»; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002) (holding that a jury must find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt, overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990». 
73 Indeed, prior to Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court had relied on the "important 
distinction" between judge and jury sentencing in upholding constitutional challenges to 
various aspects of Idaho's death penalty scheme. See e.g., State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 
73, 81, 90 P.3d 298, 306 (2004) ("Although we have presumed that sentencing judges 
were able to sort out truly relevant, admissible evidence presented in the form of victim 
impact statements, to allow the introduction of victim testimony espousing the death 
penalty for consideration by a jury is reversible error."); State v. Lanliford, 116 Idaho 
860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing that Idaho's "especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance may be unconstitutional if relied upon in a 
jury sentencing). 
74 For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme Court declined to 
address the merits of a petitioner's claim that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated 
by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him without warning him that the 
interview could be used against him. Appellate counsel failed to assert this claim because 
the Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims. The Supreme Court subsequently 
found such testimony unconstitutional in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The 
Court concluded that the claim was not deemed sufficiently novel to constitute cause for 
the procedural default. Id., at 536-37. Mr. Smith was barred from raising the issue in 
federal habeas proceedings, id., at 539, and later executed. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 163 
0121~ 
(R. p.609.) This statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e), is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 
In Maynard, the Supreme Court held that a similar aggravating circumstance 
under the Oklahoma death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague pursuant to the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 363-365. In State v. 
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
aggravator, distinguishing Maynard based on the Oklahoma statute at issue, stating, 
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma and 
Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that Oklahoma 
has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in capital 
murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that are 
commonly understood among the members of the jUdiciary. As a result, 
the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury 
sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences. 
Id. at 877, 781 P.2d at 214. Of course, this distinction no longer applies. Accordingly, 
the question is whether an adequate limiting construction was given. 
The Court's jury instruction no. 44, limiting the construction of the aggravator, 
read as follows: 
The terms especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel," are 
considered separately; but in combination with "manifesting exceptional 
depravity." The terms heinous, atrocious or cruel are intended to refer to 
those first-degree murders where the actual commission of the first-degree 
murder was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart 
from the norm of first-degree murders. 
A murder is especially heinous if it is extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil. 
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. 
"Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter 
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. 
The statutory aggravating factor does not exist unless the murder 
was especially heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel, and such 
heinousness, atrociousness or cruelty manifested exceptional depravity. It 
might be thought that every murder involves depravity. However, 
exceptional depravity exists only where depravity is apparent to such an 
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extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence. 
The terms "especially heinous manifesting exceptional depravity," 
"especially atrocious manifesting exceptional depravity," or "especially 
cruel manifesting exceptional depravity" focus upon a defendant's state of 
mind at the time ofthe offense, as reflected by his words and acts. 
(R. p.693 Jury Instruction No.5, filed 10/22/04); see also Tr., p.4726, L.12 - p.4727, 
L.20.) 
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate. While the instruction 
adds words, those words do not add meaning of constitutional significance. In short, the 
limiting construction does not genuinely narrow the class of murderers eligible for the 
death penalty and does not adequately guide the jury's discretion. But see Leavitt v. 
Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 835-837 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Idaho's aggravator has been 
adequately defined by limiting instructions, while not condoning the actual choice of 
words). In particular, and a point not addressed in Leavitt, the limiting instruction was 
inadequate because it did not necessarily preclude the jury's consideration of 
circumstances occurring after the victim's death when determining whether the 
aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 P.2d 370, 390 (1993) 
(holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: "[t]he murder is 
complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body would not constitute 
the manner in which the murder was committed"); see also Robedeaux v. State, 866 P.2d 
417,435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). 
The error in the instruction was important, because of uncertainty about the order 
and timing of the victim's wounds. See Claim C, supra. Reasonable jurors might have 
concluded that some of these other injuries were incurred post mortem, or that the 
evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt when they were incurred. On such a 
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record, an instruction which authorized consideration of post mortem injuries or other 
treatment of the body was prejudicially erroneous. 
Indeed, the State encouraged such an interpretation of the aggravator, stating: 
Exceptional depravity. What do you think was going on the riverbank for 
a minimum of six hours while Lynn was tied up and dead and laying on a 
flat surface so that her lividity could take? What was going on at that 
time? The defendant had to be there with her, or he had to come back to 
her because she had to get from that flat surface into the water. She didn1t 
do that by herself The water didn't come up and go down and float her 
away. That's exceptional depravity. 
(Tr., p.5505, Ls.11 -20.) Here, the State is suggesting that Erick Hall committed some 
unspecified depraved acts to Ms. Henneman's body. Not only was this argument 
unsupported by the evidence, it also authorized the jury to consider post-mortem conduct 
in finding this aggravator. Indeed, the State relied on a highly prejudicial photograph 
during their PowerPoint presentation which identified the body in its post-mortem state 
after two weeks in tbe water. 
(Exhibit 45.) This photograph is not an accurate reflection of the condition of the body 
due to the murder, but rather reflects the deteriorating effects of being in the water for 
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approximately two weeks. The prosecutor used this photograph to inflame the passions 
of the jury and to distort the jury's consideration of the evidence supporting the 
aggravator. See Claim K.3.k and Claim L, supra. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's death 
sentence should be vacated. 
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Utter Disregard For 
Human Life" Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And 
Overbroad 
The jury entered a special verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "by the 
murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter 
disregard for human life." (R. p.609.) This statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth 
in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 
The Court's jury instruction no. 45, limiting the construction of the aggravator, 
read as follows: 
"Exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the murder or 
the circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or 
circumstances surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost, 
callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. 
"Cold-blooded" means marked by absence of warm feeling: without 
consideration, compunction, or clemency, matter of fact, or emotionless. 
"Pitiless" means devoid of or unmoved by mercy or compassion. A "cold-
blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a slayer who kills without feeling or 
sympathy. The utter disregard factor refers to the defendant's lack of 
conscience regarding killing another human being. 
(R. p.693 (Jury Instruction no. 5); see also Tr., p.4727, L.21 - p.4728, L.19.) 
The Supreme Court has held that Idaho's limiting instruction is sufficient under 
the Eighth Amendment. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993). The limiting 
instruction was satisfactory because it defined a "state of mind that is ascertainable from 
surrounding facts." Id. at 1541-1542. Because some murderers do exhibit feeling, the 
Court also determined that the aggravator genuinely narrowed the class of persons 
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eligible for the death penalty. Id. Nevertheless, trial counsel should have objected to this 
instruction as inadequate to save the aggravating circumstance, thus at a minimum, 
absolutely ensuring preservation ofthe issue, for a higher court. 
The limiting instruction was also inadequate because it did not necessarily 
preclude the jury's consideration of circumstances occurring after the victim's death 
when determining whether the aggravator existed, by failing to define the language 
"circumstances surrounding [the murder's] commission," to circumstances during the 
commission of the murder. This point was not addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Creech. But see State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 103-04, 967 P.2d 702, 717-18 (1998) 
(permitting consideration of post-mortem conduct in consideration of the "utter 
disregard" aggravator). The error in the instruction was important, because of the lack of 
evidence regarding Mr. Hall's state of mind, the manner of Ms. Henneman's death, and 
the order and timing of the victim's wounds. 
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Propensity To Commit 
Murder Which Will Probably Constitute A Continuing Threat To 
Society'~ Aggravating Circumstances As Impermissibly Lessening 
The State's Burden And As Vague And Overbroad 
The jury entered a special verdict fmding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the 
defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has 
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing 
threat to society." (R. p.610 (emphasis added).) Trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the "propensity" aggravating circumstances 
on the grounds other grounds that asking a jury to find that a defendant "probably" 
constitutes a continuing threat to society unconstitutionally lowers the State's burden of 
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proving all aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584, 586-587 (2002); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
The Court's jury instruction no. 46, limiting the construction of the aggravator, 
read as follows: 
The phrase "exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society" means conduct showing 
that the defendant is more likely than not to be a continuing threat to 
society. Such finding cannot be based solely upon the fact that you found 
the defendant guilty of murder. In order for a person to have a propensity 
to commit murder, the person must be a willing, predisposed killer, a killer 
who tends toward destroying the life of another, one who kills with less 
than the normal amount of provocation. Propensity requires a proclivity, a 
susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act of murder. 
(R. p.693 (Jury Instruction no. 5); see also Tr., p.4728, L.20 - p.4729, L.8.) The jury 
instruction does not save the aggravator because it simply defines "probably" as "more 
likely than not," a preponderance of the evidence standard which unconstitutionally 
diminishes the State's burden of proof. But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 04-905, 674 
P.2d 396, 400-401 (1983) (rejecting the claim that the "probably" language diminished 
the State's burden of proof). 
Trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
challenge the aggravating circumstance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its 
face and as applied, or otherwise inadequately defined by jury instructions. The 
instructions given by the Court were inadequate for three reasons. 
First, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of prior conduct to prior 
murders, or at minimum, to prior conduct showing a propensity to commit murder. This 
is important because the jury was presented with evidence of prior bad acts that did not 
involve murder, or even violent acts. See supra, Claims I and J. 
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Second, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of the defendant's 
"continuing threat to society" to an incarcerated environment. In other v/Ords, the 
relevant "society" is left undefined by the statute or the instruction. 75 This is important 
because the prosecution urged the jury to find this aggravator based solely on a: finding of 
propensity, vvithout regard to any actual likelihood that he would commit another murder 
while incarcerated in prison. (Tr., p.5459, Ls.18-21) ("If you"re tempted to give him 
prison over this, remember prison only affect (sic) his ability to murder? He still has that 
propensity to murder. He's still a threat.") (sic added).) This point was reinforced by the 
prosecutor's PowerPoint presentation. 
(Exhibit 45.) 
Finally, the instruction does not distinguish this agi:,'Tavator from the "'especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator (hereinafter "HAC"). The jury could determine 
that both aggravating circumstances exist on the single determination that the defendant 
75 Accordingly, trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to 
the prison context. See Claim QA. 
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enjoys to kill. Specifically, "cruel" as used in the "HAC" aggravator means murder ''with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others." (emphasis added).) 
This definition is sufficiently similar to "propensity," which is described a person with 
"an affinity toward committing the act of murder," to render the "propensity" aggravator 
unconstitutionally duplicative. 
4. Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Definition Of "Society" 
Limiting It To The Prison Context 
Trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to the 
prison context. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference herein section Q.3, supra. 
R. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise Legal Challenges To Idaho's Death Penalty Scheme 
To render effective assistance of counsel, capital counsel must consider all legal 
claims potentially available to protect the client's constitutional rights and stay abreast of 
the latest developments in the law that might provide additional claims for the client. 
ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 1O.8.A.l; 1O.8.C.1. 
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Constitutionality Of 
The Death Penalty Statute For Its Failure To Assign A 
Burden Of Proof To The Jury's Weighing Findings 
A defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it 
is also found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State 
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial 
court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court fmds that all the 
mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating 
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust.") Unless this additional 
finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without the possibility of parole. 
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Accordingly, based on the rule of law set forth in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), 
this finding represents a finding that must be presented to a jury and found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court enunciated the rule of law: 
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than 
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 600 (citations omitted). Accordingly, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel in failing to challenge the Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from the 
State the burden of proving this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty 
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an 
element, or functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This 
violates the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 
(addressing due process); but see State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 417, 631 P.2d 187, 199 
(1981) (holding pre-Ring, that the scheme does not violate due process because the 
weighing process is not part of an element of the offense). 
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Constitutionality Of 
The Death Penalty Statute For Its Failure To Define 
"Sufficiently Compelling" In A Manner Requiring That 
The Individual Aggravating Circumstances Outweigh The 
Mitigation 
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced 
to death unless it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See 
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e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299,323 (1989) (holding that a 
defendant can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating 
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances 
found and make imposition of death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs 
the gravity of each of the aggravators, by any degree, then the defendant cannot be 
sentenced to death. Under Idaho law, even where the mitigation is only of equal weight to 
the gravity ofthe aggravation, the maximum punishment is fixed life. 
Trial counsel should have challenged the new Idaho death penalty statute because 
it does not provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The 
death penalty statute provides in relevant part that the jury shall return a special verdict 
stating: 
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed 
against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the 
death penalty would be unjust. 
I.e. § 19-2515 (8)(a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as 
requiring the aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The instructions likewise provide 
no definition for "sufficiently compelling" and do not require that the jury find that 
individual aggravators each "outweigh" the mitigation. 
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence 
even if they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the 
aggravation, but not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death 
penalty unjust. It may very well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must 
substantially outweigh the aggravation for the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust 
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under the facts of this case. The State advocated this unconstitutional interpretation of 
the statute. In closing argument, the State argued: 
And I believe that when we go back over these things you will agree that 
these aggravating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation in a manner that 
would make the death penalty unjust ... 
(Tr., p.5447, Ls.6-11.) It is worth repeating: the prosecutor tells the jury that the law 
requires imposition ofthe death sentence so long as ''the mitigation does not outweigh the 
aggravation in a manner that would make the death penalty unjust." What could that 
mean other than that the jury could find that the mitigation outweighs the aggravation, 
but perhaps not "in a manner" that would make the death penalty unjust? The prosecutor 
played off the lack of guidance provided by the statute or the instructions, and, in the 
course of doing so, violated Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel, seemingly ignorant of the prosecutor's slight of 
hand, failed to object, and moreover, failed to challenge the death penalty weighing 
scheme as unconstitutional and in failed to request a jury instruction for the proper 
weighing required as set forth in Charboneau and its progeny. 
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Court's Instruction 
That The Jurors Have A Duty To Consult With One 
Another Regarding Their Findings 
A capital defendant has a due process and Eighth Amendment right to the 
individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own reasoned moral judgment, 
regardless of the competing views or beliefs of the other jurors. See e.g., Simmons v. 
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J. and Steven, J., concurring); Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 382 (1988). 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 174 
0-400C 
These rights were violated by the Court's Instruction No. 51 infonning the jurors 
that they had a duty to consult with one another before making their own individual 
decisions, and to deliberate with the goal of reaching an agreement as a group. (Tr., 
p.5439, L.1O - p.5440, L.5.) Further, the instruction suggested that even the juror's 
individual beliefs about the existence of a mitigating fact, i.e., whether certain evidence 
presented was actually mitigating, and the weight afforded to any mitigation found, 
should be subjected to the views of the other jurors. Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsels' 
failure to challenge this instruction satisfies both prongs of Strickland. 
4. Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Special Jury Instruction 
Requiring The Jury To Provide Written Mitigation 
Findings And Failed To Challenge The New Death Penalty 
Statute On Grounds That It Forces A Defendant To Choose 
Between Constitutional Rights 
Prior to the new death penalty statute, a judge was required to make written 
findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in 
writing any mitigating factors considered. I.e. § 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000). The failure 
to make such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 
405,415-16,631 P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981). 
A written findings requirement serves two purposes: (1) it helps to ensure that the 
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required, 
and (2) it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review. See 
Osborn, at 414-15; 631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot 
detennine whether the fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was 
presented, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the 
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Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993). 
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a 
jury at his sentencing proceeding, the district court is still required to make written 
findings of the aggravation, mitigation considered, and the weighing process. I.C. § 19-
2515(8)(b). In contrast, when a defendant chooses not to waive his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury, he must forgo the written findings requirement; a jury is only required to 
indicate on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and ''whether all mitigating circumstances, when 
weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death 
penalty would be unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a). 
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a 
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing 
proceeding relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully 
reviewed by the district court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a 
part of its mandatory sentencing review under I.C. § 19-2827. Without a complete 
record, the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a 
meaningful review which includes a determination whether imposition of the death 
sentence was reasoned and objective or the result of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g., 
Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the lower court are not set forth with 
reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on an inadequate 
record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate review' demanded by 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v. Lankford, 116 
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Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of 
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition ofthe death penalty by juries). 
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to 
delineate the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation 
against the individual aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision. 
Mr. Hall has been deprived of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
have this Court and an appellate court make a meaningful determination of whether his 
sentence was the product a reasoned and objective, as opposed to an arbitrary and 
unguided, analysis. 
Trial counsel should have requested special written findings from the jury, as 
required of judges, on all the federal constitutional grounds stated above. In addition, 
counsel should have asserted that the new death penalty statute is unconstitutional 
because it forces a defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because of trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, Mr. Hall has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful 
review. Mr. Hall's sentence should thus be vacated and he should be afforded a new 
sentencing proceeding where the sentencer is required to provide adequate written 
findings. 
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5. Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Special Jury Instruction 
Requiring Written Jury Findings Delineating The Evidence 
Considered In Finding The Aggravating Circumstances 
And Failed To Request An Instruction To The Jury That 
The Same Evidence Can Be Used To Find Multiple 
Aggravating Circumstances Only If Additional 
Aggravating Evidence Is Found To Support The Other 
Aggravator Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
In detennining whether a certain aggravating circumstance exists, the jury may 
consider the same evidence they considered in relation to a different aggravator so long 
as the jury finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that particular 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,210, 731 P.2d 192, 
205 (1986). Trial counsel should have requested written findings and an instruction to 
prohibit improper duplication of evidence in support of multiple aggravating 
circumstances. Without written findings, the record is insufficient to detennine whether 
the jury properly considered additional aggravating evidence to support its finding of 
each of the aggravating circumstances. The lack of findings violated Mr. Hall's rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has 
satisfied both prongs of Strickland showing that trial counsels' failures denied him 
effective assistance of counsel. 
6. Trial Counsel Failed To Object To The Court's Instruction 
Regarding The Governor's Power To Commute Or Pardon 
At the request of the State, and without objection by trial counsel, the Court gave 
a jury instruction, not previously approved by Idaho appellate courts or contained in the 
proposed Idaho Supreme Court death penalty instructions. (Tr., p.5420, Ls.I-4.) The 
instruction stated, 
The governor of the State of Idaho has the authority to grant a 
commutation or pardon for any crime except treason, based upon a 
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recommendation from the Idaho Department of Pardons and Parole. Such 
a commutation or pardon could apply to either a life or death sentence. 
(Tr., p.5438, L.25 - p.5439, L.5.) This instruction was constitutionally infirm for several 
reasons including, but not limited to the following. First, the instruction has not been 
approved by the Idaho Legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the instruction is 
not an accurate and complete statement of Idaho law. Third, the instruction failed to 
instruct the jury not to speculate on what parole authorities will do in the future. Fourth, 
the instruction diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility for the gravity of their 
decision in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But see California v. 
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001-1005, 1014 (1983). Fifth, the instruction diverts the jury 
from its individualized sentencing determination mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. But see Ramos, supra. Finally, Mr. Hall asserts that his federal right to due 
process was violated because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury utilized the 
instruction in an unconstitutional manner. 
While the Supreme Court decision in Ramos would seemingly approve this 
instruction, the rationale of Ramos is called into question by Ring. Specifically, when 
rejecting Ramos' Bece6 argument that the instruction diverts the sentencer's attention 
from a "central focus," the Court distinguished Beck on the grounds that Beck involved 
the guilt/innocence phase where the prosecution bore the burden of proving elements of 
capital murder whereas Ramos' case involved an instruction at the penalty phase 
involving no similar "central issue." Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1007-09. Mr. Hall asserts that 
Ramos no longer controls since capital sentencing now involves a jury's determination of 
76 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
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elements, or at least the functional equivalent of elements, during the penalty phase. 
Accordingly, the instruction is unconstitutional. 
In addition to these specific grounds, Mr. Hall's counsel should have asserted that 
the instruction violated Mr. Hall's federal constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the concomitant rights under the Idaho 
Constitution providing greater, but not less, protection than the federal constitution. Each 
of these constitutional violations was due to trial counsels' failure to object to the 
instruction. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Mr. Hall 
requires additional time to research the factual and legal foundation for this claim. 
7. Trial Counsel Failed To Raise International Law Violations 
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise international law violations on 
behalf of Mr. Hall, which prejudiced Mr. Hall under Strickland. The convictions and 
sentences entered against Mr. Hall were obtained in violation of international law. Mr. 
Hall's death sentence was obtained in violation of The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits death sentences where (a) the accused will 
endure a prolonged incarceration on death row which violates Article 7, (b) the accused 
does not have access to a meaningful clemency process, which violates Article 6, (c) the 
accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which violates Article 6, and (d) the accused is 
denied his rights to due process, which violates Article 14. Mr. Hall's death sentence was 
also obtained in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial" hearing to the accused), and the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
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(providing protection for the less culpable co-defendant who refuses to cooperate as 
Damocles' Sword of the death penalty is held over his head). 
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment were signed and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or 
execute Mr. Hall's death sentence without violating the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution, which states: 
All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. Const., Article VI, § 2. 
Moreover, Mr. Hall's death sentence does and will violate (a) the American 
Convention of Human Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United 
States, but which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to 
pay heed to Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670 
(1900) ("[I]nternationallaw is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered 
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determinations.") Mr. Hall's death 
sentence further violates the principle of jus cogens. Ajus cogens norm is an elementary 
right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the international community as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The execution of the 
neurologically damaged, mentally ill and/or mentally retarded violates this principle. 
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8. Trial Counsel Failed To Raise The Ex-Post Facto 
Application Of The Death Penalty Statute 
Trial counsel should have raised the claim that the new death penalty statute that 
required jury sentencing was an ex-post facto application of the statute to Mr. Hall's case. 
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions preclude the State from passing or 
applying ex-post facto laws. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Idaho Const., art. I, § 16. 
Ms. Henneman was killed on or about September 24,2000. At that time, Idaho's 
death penalty statute was unconstitutional. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
The new statute, requiring jury sentencing, did not take effect until February 13, 2003. 
See § 19-2515 (historical and statutory notes). The application of the new statute 
therefore violated the ex-post facto provisions of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); State v. Lovelace, 140 
Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (Idaho 2004). 
S. The State Violated Brady: Norma Jean Oliver77 
1. Introduction 
The State is very familiar with Norma Jean Oliver. As a juvenile, Norma Jean 
was arrested on numerous occasions for being a runaway. Although Payette County 
prosecuted these cases, several of her arrests occurred in Ada County between 1990 and 
1991. Between December 1991 and April 1992, she was the victim and main witness in 
the Ada County prosecution of Erick Hall for two counts of rape. She was interviewed 
by former Garden City Police Detective Daniel Hess and by Deputy Ada County 
77Because the Court has denied Mr. Hall's motion to depose the prosecutors and Jay 
Rosenthal and denied his motion to disclose the prosecutor's files, the Court has limited 
Mr. Hall's ability to state this claim. 
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Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal. Both Detective Hess and Mr. Rosenthallearned a significant 
amount about Nonna Jean's problems at home as well as her mental health problems. 
Both were aware that Nonna Jean had previously been treated, and was currently being 
treated for mental health issues at Intennountain Hospital in Boise. Nonna Jean testified 
before an Ada County Grand Jury in the Hall case. Ultimately, Mr. Rosenthal negotiated 
a favorably plea agreement in the Hall case based on her treatment providers' opinions 
that she was too "fragile" to withstand cross-examination. The State was aware of the 
fact that after the rape allegations, Nonna Jean was referred for in-patient, long-tenn 
treatment at Intennountain Hospital. 
Sometime in 2003 or 2004, the State identified Nonna Jean as a critical 
prosecution witness for Erick Hall's capital sentencing. The State located her in West 
Virginia and flew her to Boise. Nonna Jean consulted with the State's victim advocate 
and was prepared for her testimony by either the prosecutors, their agents, or both. The 
State was aware of Nonna Jean's mental problems, her problems at home, and her 
problems with the law. The State, however, failed to disclose this favorable evidence to 
trial counsel. 
2. Applicable Legal Standards 
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right to the production of exculpatory evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). Pursuant to Brady, prosecutors must turn over exculpatory evidence when the 
prosecutors have knowledge of and access to such evidence. United States v. Santiago, 46 
F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir.1995). Brady held "that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
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material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Id. at 87. 
The prosecutor is responsible for "any favorable evidence known to the others 
acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
u.s. 419, 437 (1995). Idaho has recognized that the duty of disclosure extends not only 
to all the government agents investigating and prosecuting the offense, but also "any 
others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case who either 
regularly report, or with reference to the particular case have reported, to the office of the 
prosecuting attorney." State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433 885 P.2d 1144, 1149 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting I.C.R. 16 (a»; see also State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138, 149, n. 6, 832 
P.2d 311, 322, n. 6 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a prosecutor's duty under the Due 
Process Clause is coextensive with that under I.C.R. 16) (citation omitted).78 
Favorable evidence includes evidence tending to eXCUlpate the accused as well as 
any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses. United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 433. The "material" standard for establishing prejudice is the same as the 
prejudice standard under Strickland. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985). 
3. Analysis 
Mr. Hall alleges that the state violated its obligations under Brady to disclose 
favorable evidence. This claim parallels the Strickland claim above and is divided into 
78 See also I.C. 19-2515 (6) ("Disclosure of evidence to be relied on in the sentencing 
proceeding shall be made in accordance with Idaho criminal rule 16.") 
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five subclaims: subclaim a addresses the State's failure to disclose the nature and extent 
of Nonna Jean's mental health problems; subclaim b addresses the State's failure to 
disclose inconsistencies in Nonna Jean's story, her motive to lie, and her motive to 
retaliate against Mr. Hall; subclaim c addresses State's failure to disclose favorable 
evidence of Nonna Jean's problems at home; subclaim d addresses State's failure to 
disclose favorable evidence ofNonna Jean's prior misconduct; and subclaim e addresses 
State's failure to disclose favorable evidence of inaccuracies in Detective Hess's report. 
Each of these subclaims independently, and in conjunction with each other, establishes 
both prongs of the Brady standard. 
Unless otherwise noted herein, this claim, and its individual subclaims, parallel 
Mr. Hall's Strickland claims. See supra, Claim D.79 To the extent that the Court finds 
that trial counsel did not perfonn deficiently in failing to uncover favorable evidence, this 
claim addresses the State's failure to disclose such favorable evidence. Because the 
favorable nature of the evidence and the prejudice associated with trial counsel's failure 
to obtain such evidence was established in the Strickland claim and the subclaims, those 
factual and legal elements are incorporated herein by reference. Therefore, for purposes 
of this claim, unless otherwise noted, Mr. Hall focuses on the State's possession or 
knowledge of such evidence. 
79 To the extent that the Court finds that trial counsel did not perfonn deficiently in 
failing to uncover the favorable evidence, this claim (and its subclaims) addresses the 
State's failure to disclose such favorable evidence known to the prosecution or within its 
possession. 
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a. The State Failed To Disclose The Nature And Extent Of 
Norma Jean Oliver's Mental Health Problems 
This claim is similar to the Strickland claim above, in which Mr. Hall 
demonstrated that Norma Jean Oliver suffers from various mental disorders, including 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Bipolar Disorder, which could have been used to 
undermine her credibility or call into question her competency to testify.80 See supra, 
Claim D.3.a. The State had possession of documents, or otherwise had knowledge of 
information, indicating the nature and extent of Norma Jean's compromised mental 
health, or which at least would have caused trial counsel to further investigate and 
uncover the nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental health problems. 
i. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy Of 
The Transcript Of The Grand Jury Proceedings In 
The Case Of State v. Erick Hall. Ada County. Case 
No. 18591. Held December 19.1991 
The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in 
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991. 
In fact, a copy was located in the State's file from the underlying capital case. The State 
disclosed a copy of the transcript after requested by Mr. Hall during these post-conviction 
proceedings. 81 The fact that the State possessed or had knowledge a copy of the 
grand jury transcript should be specifically admitted or denied in the State's answer 
to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b) ("A party shall state in short and plain terms the defenses to 
80 Norma Jean disclosed during these post-conviction proceedings that she suffers from 
these disorders. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p.5.» 
81 This Court granted Mr. Hall's motion for a copy of the grand jury transcript in its 
discovery order filed February 16, 2007. 
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each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party 
relies.") 
The favorable evidence contained in this transcript was discussed in Mr. Hall's 
Strickland claim. See supra, Claim D.3.a.{i).(b).. In short, the State possessed or had 
knowledge evidence via the grand jury transcript that Norma Jean suffered from a 
"chemical imbalance," had spoken at length to former Ada County Deputy Prosecutor 
Jay Rosenthal about her history, and that Intermountain Hospital, a psychiatric hospital, 
had expressed concerns about sending her home because of her history. (Exhibit 53.) 
ii. The State Had Knowledge O(Norma Jean's Mental 
Health Problems Through Jay Rosenthal, A Former 
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor And State's Witness 
In Mr. Hall's Capital Case 
The State had knowledge of Norma Jean's mental health problems through former 
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal who prosecuted the 1991 rape case. 
Mr. Rosenthal testified that he was informed by Norma Jean's mental health treatment 
providers at Intermountain Hospital that Norma Jean was suffering from mental health 
problems and that she was too fragile to testify. (Tr., p.4953, L.12 - p.4954, L.9.) At a 
minimum, the State had imputed knowledge of this exculpatory information through 
Rosenthal due to his status as a former deputy prosecutor and as a current Idaho Deputy 
Attorney General. In addition, the State had knowledge of his anticipated testimony due 
to his status as a prosecution witness. Not only should such knowledge be presumed, but 
in this particular case, it is clear through the State's leading questions that they had 
knowledge of exculpatory information. {See e.g., Tr., p.4953, Ls.12-14 ("Q. Did you 
discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals? A. I did.") The fact that 
the State had knowledge of Norma Jean's mental health problems through Jay 
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Rosenthal, should be specifically admitted or denied in the State's answer to this 
petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b) 
iii. The State Had Knowledge O(Norma Jean's Mental 
Health Problems Via Intermountain Hospital Based 
On The Role Intermountain Hospital Took In 
Assisting The Prosecution In The 1991 Norma Jean 
Rape Case 
The State had knowledge of exculpatory infonnation and documentation within 
the possession of Intennountain Hospital. Although Intennountain Hospital is not 
typically considered an agent of the prosecution, in the 1991 rape case, Intennountain 
Hospital personnel and treatment providers were potential witnesses for the prosecution 
had the case proceeded to trial. (See e.g., Tr., p.4771, Ls.11-18 (indicating that Nonna 
Jean reported the rape to Intennountain Hospital personnel); p.4786, LS.14-25 (indicating 
that Detective Hess was briefed by Intennountain Hospital personnel).) Moreover, 
Intennountain Hospital provided counsel for the prosecutor, assisting him in his decision 
to negotiate a settlement. 
Q. Did you discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals? 
A. I did. She was at Intennountain Hospital in the Adolescent Unit. She 
was, as I recall, being treated by Lamar Heyrend who was a 
psychiatrist, she had a case worker discussed it with those individuals. 
And I spent a great deal of time, along with a victim witnesses 
coordinator, with her trying to prepare her to testify. 
Q. And ultimately did you decide that you could not proceed to trial with 
her as a witness? 
A. I did. It was my decision, as well as the recommendation of the those 
people who were treating her. 
Q. SO how did you proceed? 
A. Proceeded with a reduction to a statutory rape and a negotiated 
resolution. 
Q. And that was because of the weakness in your case? 
A. It was because of the inability of Nonna Jean to be able to sit in a 
situation like this and in front of a jury and be SUbjected to cross 
examination. 
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(Tr., p.4953, L.12 - p.4954, L.9.) Thus, any favorable evidence known to Intermountain 
Hospital or within its possession should be imputed to the State. 
iv. The State Had Knowledge O(The 1992 Presentence 
Report From The Norma Jean Oliver Rape Case. 
The 1992 presentence report from the rape case contains information that Norma 
Jean had been admitted into Intermountain Hospital's long-term care unit, again 
suggesting the presence of serious mental disorders. The State, through its agents, 
possessed or had knowledge the 1992 report even if acting in good faith in failing to 
disclose it prior to the trial and sentencing. The fact that the State actually possessed 
or had knowledge a copy of the presentence report should be specifically admitted 
or denied in the State's answer to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b) 
In this case, the presentence investigator, while technically appointed by the 
district court, worked closely with the prosecution. The report indicates that the 
investigator relied heavily on governmental and prosecutorial contacts including the FBI, 
cm, Mr. Hall's probation officer, and significantly, the prosecutor's file material. 
Further, at some point, the prosecutor was privy to the information in the PSI. See I.C.R. 
32(g) (indicating that disclosure of the contents of the PSI "shall be made" available to 
the prosecuting attorney). Further, a copy of the PSI was likely possessed by yet another 
governmental agency which works closely with the prosecution, the Idaho Department of 
Corrections. See I.C.R. 32(h)(1) (indicating that a copy of the PSI "shall be available to 
the Idaho Department of Corrections" while the defendant is in their custody). 
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v. The State Had Knowledge Of Norma Jean Oliver's 
Mental Health Condition Based On Her Status As A 
Prosecution Witness 
Because the Court has denied Mr. Hall's motion to depose the prosecutors and 
denied his motion to disclose the prosecutor's files, the Court has limited Mr. Hall's 
ability to state this claim. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall asserts that the State was aware of the 
nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental health condition based on her status as a 
former victim represented by the State and as a prosecution witness at Mr. Hall's capital 
sentencing. The fact that the State had knowledge that Norma Jean Oliver suffered 
from various mental disorders, including but not limited to Borderline Personality 
Disorder and Bipolar disorder, or that she had taken antidepressants or 
antipsychotic medications in the past should be specifically admitted or denied in 
the State's answer to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b) 
Based on Norma Jean's status alone, it is more likely than not that the State was 
aware of the nature and extent of her mental problems. The State's knowledge is 
reflected in its opening statement, in which the prosecutor stated, "She didn't like living 
with her parents. She was having trouble there, she had some emotional trouble 
besides and decided that the grass was greener in California .... " (Tr., p.4734, Ls.17-
20.) Thus, the State knew that Norma Jean was having "emotional trouble" beyond her 
troubles at home. The State's knowledge is also reflected in the transcript of its State's 
direct examination of Norma Jean: 
Q. Okay. Are you taking any medication right now? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Have you taken some in the past but you don't take it now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
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(Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-8.) It is inconceivable that the prosecutor asked such potentially risky 
questions unless he already knew the answers.82 Further, once the questions were asked, 
it opened the door for the defense to ask follow-up questions. Thus, it is extremely 
unlikely that the State would have opened the door to such questions without first 
interviewing Norma Jean ahead of time about her medication history and her mental 
health problems. 
Regardless of how the prosecution gained knowledge of Norma Jean's mental 
health problems, whether through various witnesses or reports, one thing is clear, this 
case closely mirrors the facts in Freeman v. United States., 284 F.Supp.2d 217 (D. Mass. 
2003). In Freeman, the prosecuting attorney received information (via a letter) from a 
psychiatrist for the main and uncorroborated government witness in a criminal 
prosecution. Specifically, the psychiatrist informed the prosecutor that the witness 
suffered from psychological problems and that she would likely decompensate under 
cross-examination by defense attorneys. Id. at 225. The prosecutor failed to disclose this 
information to the defendant. The court recognized that the letter did not actually 
identify the witness's disorder. Id. However, the. court noted that the information would 
have at least allowed the defense lawyers to inquire directly of the psychiatrist or to 
obtain other information as to the severity of the witness's disorder, i.e., Bipolar 
Disorder. Id. at 224-225. The court concluded that withholding the information 
"foreclosed a promising avenue of investigation for the defense." Id. at 225. Further, the 
withheld information was deemed material because it "it brought into question the 
82 From a review of the transcript in its entirety, it is clear that the State prepped its 
witnesses prior to putting her on the stand. Unlike trial counsel, the State erred on the 
side of preparation as opposed to relying on a "run-and-gun" approach to preparing for 
witness examinations. 
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reliability of the government's main, and uncorroborated, witness" and "could reasonably 
have been taken to put the whole case in [ ] a different light." Id. at 226 (quotations 
omitted). 
In this case, the jury had no reason to question Norma Jean's ability to accurately 
perceive events at the time of the alleged forcible rape or to accurately testify regarding 
such events at the sentencing hearing. Like the defense lawyers in the Freeman case, had 
trial counsel been provided this information, they could have further investigated the 
nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental condition prior to trial, discovering that she 
suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. Had the jury heard evidence of Norma Jean's disorders and the 
symptoms associated with them when untreated, there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. In conclusion, Mr. Hall 
incorporates herein by reference the prejudice analysis set forth for his Strickland claim 
involving the same evidence. See infra, Claim D.3.a.ii and D.4.83 In addition, even if this 
evidence is not material under Brady taken in isolation, this evidence in conjunction with 
other favorable evidence noted in this claim and elsewhere in this petition, satisfies the 
Brady standard. 
b. The State Failed To Disclose Favorable Evidence Of Norma 
Jean's Inconsistent Statements And Motive To Lie And 
Retaliate Against Mr. Hall 
This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that 
Norma Jean had made inconsistent statements about the events surrounding the alleged 
83 The Supreme Court has adopted the prejudice test from Strickland for determining 
whether withheld eXCUlpatory evidence is material. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
667,682 (1985). 
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forcible rape, and further, had a motive to lie and retaliate against Mr. Hall. See supra, 
Claim D.3.b, supra. 
i. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Copies Of 
Boise Police Department Reports Detailing 
Multiple Arrests Of Norma Jean Oliver Between 
November 1990 And December 1991 
The State was in possession of police reports indicating that Norma Jean was a 
chronic runaway and that she was going to be returned to her home in Fruitland, Idaho, 
where she would be prosecuted by Payette County authorities as a juvenile runaway. 
(Exhibits 59-62.) The State disclosed these reports following litigation of Mr. Hall's 
motion for discovery. In addition, the State has filed an admission in a post-
conviction discovery response admitting that they possessed or had knowledge of 
such reports but did not disclose them to trial counsel. (Exhibit 82.) Even without this 
admission, it is clear that the State possessed or had knowledge this information through 
their agents, the police. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that the 
prosecution is responsible for "any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government's behalf in the case, including the police.") One of the withheld police 
reports indicated that Erick Hall reported Norma Jean for being a runaway, thus 
providing her a motive to retaliate against him. (Exhibit 61.) 
ii. The State Had Knowledge Of The 1992 Presentence 
Report From The Norma Jean Oliver Rape Case 
The State was in possession of the 1992 presentence report in the rape case. See 
supra, section 3.a.iv, incorporated herein by reference. The report is relevant to this 
claim because it indicates that once Norma Jean reported that she had been raped, rather 
than being returned home, she was admitted to Intermountain Hospital's long-term care 
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unit and may never have been returned home or even prosecuted for being a runaway. 
(Exhibit 55.) In addition, this report indicates that Norma Jean initially joined Erick in 
his bed that night, in contradiction with her grand jury and trial testimony. (Exhibit 55.) 
Finally, the report indicates that Norma Jean told the investigator that at some point 
during the rape Erick seemed to snap out of it, regain his composure, and apologize for 
his actions. (Exhibit 55.) Norma Jean even told the investigator that she felt sorry for 
Erick because he did not seem to know what he was doing. 
iii. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Detective 
Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews Of Norma 
Jean Oliver And Erick Hall 
The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews 
of Norma Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 56B.)84 The tape recordings 
were disclosed by the State during post-conviction proceedings. It is not yet clear 
whether the recordings were in the prosecutor's file or located at the Garden City Police 
84 Mr. Hall is aware of the States' Response to Discovery, dated July 22,2003, contained 
in trial counsel's files. (Exhibit 102.) (The State filed a response with the Court on July 
23, 2003, (R., p.72), which does not reflect what was presumably disclosed to trial 
counsel.) 
In that Response, the State purports to be disclosing copies of audio tapes of Detective 
Hess' interviews with Erick Hall and Norma Jean Oliver, regarding DR #91-2582. 
(Exhibit 102.) However, the "Discovery Log" attached to the Response does not reflect 
that the State disclosed those audios-the Discovery Log does not list the Hess audios. 
Furthermore, trial counsel files did not contain the Hess audios, even though they did 
contain other media that were referenced in the Discovery Log. For example, trial 
counsel's files contained a videotape of the body recovery, a CD of autopsy photographs, 
and a videotape of the interview of Erick Hall on March 29, 2003, all of which were 
itemized in the Discovery Log. Furthermore, even if the tapes had been disclosed, it is 
likely that they were of the same inaudible and unusable quality as the tapes initially 
"disclosed" to SAPD during the post-conviction investigation and discovery process. See 
note 84, infra. Mr. Hall asserts that the burden is on the State to prove they disclosed the 
audios. However, even if the State is able to do so, i.e., the audios were in fact disclosed, 
then it is further evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. 
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Department, in either event, they were known to the State.8S These recordings were 
withheld in violation of the prosecution's obligations under Brady and I.C.R. 16. 
The tape recordings include infonnation that is not included in Detective Hess's 
report, and which contradicts Detective Hess's testimony in two areas: 1) that he did not 
discuss the nature and extent of Nonna Jean's problems at home during his interview 
with her; and 2) that Erick made inconsistent statements to him during the interview. See 
85 The State initially alleged that the tape recordings had either been destroyed or 
misplaced. (See Exhibit 82 (State's Response to the Discovery Order, dated 3/15107, 
pA.» If Mr. Hall had relied on the State's response, then the recordings would never 
have been disclosed. Instead however, Mr. Hall moved to depose Detective Hess 
regarding the lost recordings. Prior to a hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the tapes turned 
up. (See Exhibit 83 (State's Supplemental Response to the Discovery Order, dated 
6/15107, p.1.» Had Mr. Hall relied on the copies disclosed by the State, then most of the 
contents would have been inaudible. Instead however, Mr. Hall listened to the State's 
copies and discovered that their copies were almost entirely audible. Whether this is an 
example of gamesmanship or not, is irrelevant. The fact is that the State has not taken its 
Brady obligations seriously either during the underlying criminal proceedings or during 
these post-conviction proceedings. For example, elsewhere in this petition, Mr. Hall 
submits the affidavit of Joi Reno. Ms. Reno states that Nonna Jean was not acting like 
she had recently been raped, instead engaging in sexual activity with others at the Sands 
Motel. Ms. Reno also states that she witnessed Nonna Jean using drugs in December 
1991, including drinking alcohol at Mountain Billiards. Ms. Reno was contacted by an 
agent of the State sometime in 2006. The time of the State's post-conviction interview 
corresponds with Mr. Hall's post-conviction attempts to identify the names of individuals 
that were staying with Nonna Jean at the Sands Motel. It seems clear that had Mr. Hall 
not conducted his own investigation, the State would never have disclosed the 
exculpatory evidence learned from their post-conviction interview of Ms. Reno. While it 
is not necessary to show bad faith by the State to demonstrate a Brady violation, there is 
evidence of it in this case. Yet another example of the State's laissez-faire approach to 
discovering Brady infonnation is the State's minimal effort to obtain Nonna Jean's 
juvenile records from Payette County. (Exhibit 82 (State's Response to the Discovery 
Order, 3115107, pp.3-4 ("An inquiry has been made of Payette County and the 
undersigned has been infonned that no records were immediately available to the clerk of 
the court in Payette. The clerk advised the undersigned that if any records could be 
found, the clerk would call. No call was received."» A simple follow-up call by the 
SAPD's investigator yielded much more infonnation including an ROA that has been 
submitted for the Court's review and detennination whether additional records should be 
disclosed. All of this must be considered when assessing the State's anticipated answer 
to this petition that they have complied with Brady. 
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supra, Claim D.3.e. The tape also indicates that Nonna Jean stated that at some point 
during the rape Erick seemed to snap out of it, regain his composure, and then apologize 
for his actions. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.15.) Finally, the taped interview 
indicates that contrary to her statements to Detective Hess and subsequent testimony, she 
may have presented herself as eighteen years old and may have been drinking the night of 
the purported forcible rape. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.20 (infonning Detective 
Hess during her taped interview that she had sexual intercourse on two prior occasions, 
one time she was drunk».) 
iv. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy or 
The Transcript or The Grand Jury Proceedings In 
The Case OrState v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case 
No. 18591, Held December 19, 1991 
The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in 
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991. 
See supra, section 1.i. In her grand jury testimony, Nonna Jean stated that she received a 
ride back to the Sands Motel from a neighbor in the Garden City trailer park. Had the 
State disclosed the grand jury transcript, trial counsel would have known to investigate 
this story, including discussing it with Nonna Jean during their eleventh hour interview. 
In a post-conviction interview, Nonna Jean stated that rather than having the neighbor 
take her directly to the Sands Motel, she first returned to the trailer to get some clothes. 
(Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p.25).) 
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v. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Of Copies 
Of Boise Police Department Reports Listing 
Potential Witnesses To Norma Jean's Post-Rape 
Behaviors 
The State was in possession of a police report indicating that Norma Jean was 
arrested at the Sands Motel on December 2, 1991, and then again on December 3, 1991, 
both following the alleged forcible rape. (Exhibit 61; Exhibit 62.) One of the withheld 
police reports contains the names of other individuals at the Sands Motel, including Joi 
Reno. (Exhibit 62.) Had trial counsel known Ms. Reno's name, they should have 
interviewed her and would have learned that Ms. Reno witnessed Norma Jean engaging 
in sexual activity with others at the Sands Motel. Trial counsel would also have 
discovered that Ms. Reno witnessed Norma Jean using drugs in December 1991, 
including drinking alcohol at Mountain Billiards. 
c. The State Failed To Disclose Favorable Evidence Of 
Norma Jean's Problems At Home 
This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that 
Norma Jean had been abused over a number of years by her father, that such abuse was 
one of the reasons she ran away from home, and that the injuries from such abuse could 
have provided an alternate explanation for the injuries observed by Detective Hess and 
Dr. Vickman. See supra, Claim D.3.c. 
i. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Detective 
Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews Of Norma 
Jean Oliver And Erick Hall 
The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews 
of Norma Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. See infra, section 3.iii. The taped interview of 
Norma Jean indicates that her father abused her at home. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B.) 
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The abuse had lasted from her childhood through her late teenage years, and was one 
reason that Nonna Jean continually ran away from home. The abuse included beatings. 
(Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.35 (describing being thrown across the room by her 
father)).). This history is not reflected in Detective Hess's written report, and thus was 
not uncovered by trial counsel's nominal preparation. Had this infonnation been 
presented to the jury, it would have appeared that the State was attempting to cover up 
the alternate explanation for Nonna Jean's injuries and highlighted the lack of 
investigation of the rape case. 
ii. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Of A Copy 
Of The Transcript Of The Grand Jury Proceedings 
In The Case Of State v. Erick Hall. Ada County. 
Case No. 18591, Held December 19,1991 
The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in 
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991. 
See supra, section 3.iv. Nonna Jean's grand jury testimony reveals that her treatment 
providers at Intennountain Hospital were concerned about her problems at home, and did 
not want her to return. (Exhibit 53 (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9 ("[T]they didn't want me to go 
home, because they know my history.")) 
d. The State Failed to Disclose Favorable Evidence of Nonna 
Jean's Prior Misconduct 
This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that 
Nonna Jean had previously given a false name and date of birth to law enforcement. See 
supra, Claim D.3.d. 
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i. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy O( 
A Boise Police Department Report Detailing Norma 
Jean's Prior Misconduct 
The State was in possession of a police report indicating that Nonna Jean was 
arrested at the Sands Motel on December 2, 1991, and then again on December 3, 1991, 
both following the alleged forcible rape. (Exhibit 61; Exhibit 62.) See supra, section 
3.b.i. One of the withheld police reports detailed Nonna Jean's arrest approximately one 
year prior to her allegations against Erick Hall. Specifically, on November 19, 1990, 
Nonna Jean was arrested as a runaway and gave a false name and date of birth to police 
officers during their criminal investigation. ((Exhibit 60.) 
e. The State Failed to Disclose Favorable Evidence of 
Inaccuracies in Detective Hess's Report 
This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that 
Nonna Jean had previously given a false name and date of birth to law enforcement. See 
supra, Claim D.3.d. 
i. The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge O( 
Detective Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews 
O(Norma Jean Oliver And Erick Hall 
The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews 
of Nonna Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. See infra, section 3.b.iii. The taped interview of 
Nonna Jean provides favorable infonnation including: 1) inconsistencies between 
Detective Hess's testimony and his taped interview ofNonna Jean; and 2) inconsistencies 
between Detective Hess's testimony and his taped interview of Erick Hall. 
4. The Cumulative Prejudice Due To The Prosecutor's Failure To 
Disclose Favorable Evidence Of Nonna Jean Oliver's Allegations 
Satisfies The Prejudice Prong Of Brady 
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Because this claim virtually mirrors the Strickland claim, Mr. Hall incorporates 
by reference the cumulative prejudice analysis from the Strickland claim. See supra, 
ClaimD.4. 
T. The State Violated Brady: April Sebastian, Michelle Deen, And Wendy 
1m 
1. The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding April 
Sebastian86 
April Sebastian testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing on October 23, 2004. 
At the time of her testimony, she was actively represented by Mr. Hall's trial counsel, 
Amil Myshin, in her upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State v. April Sebastian, 
Ada County, case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp.4868-70; pp.4875-96.) (Exhibit 72.) Following 
her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared in court with Mr. Myshin on November 19,2004, 
and on November 30, 2004, for her "rider" hearing. (Exhibit 72.) The district court 
presiding over the case granted her probation based on a recommendation from the 
State. (Exhibit 72.) Mr. Hall has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered 
Ms. Sebastian benefits in her other cases based on her willingness to give testimony 
against Mr. Hall. For instance, based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian 
was not a good candidate for probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice 
previously. (Exhibit 72.) 
2. The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding Michelle Deen 
The State used Michelle Deen for two reasons: 1) to portray Erick Hall as a 
monster; and 2) to argue that Erick Hall was not using drugs in 2001. It is impossible to 
86 Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting the Court's in camera 
review of April Sebastian's presentence report and addendum to presentence report, and 
any attached documentation, in State v. April Sebastian, Ada County, case no. H0400228. 
See Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2/16/07. 
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fully state this claim because the Court denied Mr. Hall's request for discovery. See 
Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2/16/07. Accordingly, the analysis of this claim is 
somewhat abbreviated. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall asserts that on the record before him the 
State committed Brady violations for withholding favorable evidence including: 1) 
evidence of an additional prior felony conviction; 2) evidence of attempts (at least in the 
past) by Ms. Deen to negotiate favorable treatment by turning State's evidence; and 3) 
evidence of Ms. Deen's compromised mental health. 
a. The State Withheld Evidence Of A Prior Felony Conviction 
Michelle Deen testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing. (Tr., pp.4813-39.) It 
was elicited during her testimony that Ms. Deen had a prior felony conviction. Mr. Hall 
has discovered through his post-conviction investigation that Ms. Deen was convicted of 
at least one other felony. The State had an obligation to disclose Ms. Deen's full criminal 
record including both felony convictions stemming from the cases of State v. Michelle 
Deen, Ada County, case no. H0301398, and State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County, case 
no. H0200584. (Exhibit 70; Exhibit 71.) Both of these cases arise from drug use around 
the timeframe in which she testified about incidents with Erick Hall. The jury should 
have heard that Ms. Deen was using methamphetamine during the timeframe in which 
she testified about events. The use of methamphetamine clearly would have called into 
question Ms. Deen's ability to accurately perceive events at the time and then to recall 
such events years later. 
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b. The State Withheld Evidence Of Michelle Deen's Past 
Attempts To Broker Deals With The Police To Avoid 
Prosecution 
Michelle Deen has attempted in the past to seek favorable treatment from the 
State by implicating others in criminal activity. Specifically, Mr. Hall has located a 
handwritten note among other court documents in Ms. Deen's court file which states: 
2-9 - narc. arrest made by patrol. D arrested at 18.4 g meth (+). D wanted 
to talk to police re: "deal." D said meth not hers & didn't want to go down 
on someone elses dope. D then failed to contact cops after they spoke. 2 
syringes found wi dope 
(Exhibit 69.) This appears to be a note, reflecting the circumstances surrounding 
Ms. Deen's arrest on February 9, 2002, for multiple drug-related offenses, including 
felony possession of a controlled substance, State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County, case 
no. H0200584. Trial counsel could have used this note to further undermine Ms. Deen's 
credibility. 
c. The State Withheld Evidence Of Michelle Deen's 
Compromised Mental Health As Reflected In By Court-
Ordered Substance Abuse And Psychological Examinations 
Mr. Hall has discovered in his post-conviction investigation of the case that that 
Ms. Deen underwent court-ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in the 
case of State v. Deen, Ada County, case no. H0301398. Trial counsel could have used 
this information to further undermine Ms. Deen's credibility. 
3. The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding Wendy Levy 
The State interviewed Wendy Levy in the course of investigating its case. 
(Exhibit 2.) Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was eXCUlpatory. Accordingly, 
the State found nothing helpful from Ms. Levy and chose not to call her as a witness. 
However, the State withheld the exculpatory evidence from Mr. Hall. 
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The evidence provided to the State included, but was not limited to, evidence 
regarding Erick Hall's positive, non-violent relationships with previous girlfriends. This 
evidence was exculpatory because it tended to mitigate against imposition of the death 
sentence and it undercut the State's argument that Mr. Hall has a propensity to murder 
based on a history of violent sex crimes against former girlfriends. The State had an 
affirmative obligation to disclose this evidence to the defense. None of that evidence was 
disclosed to trial counsel. 
U. The State Violated Brady By Failing to Disclose Evidence Of An 
Alternate Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape 
Mr. Hall raised two similar claims as ineffective assistance of counsel for failing 
to investigate the possible connection between Lynn Henneman's death and Patrick 
Hoffert's suicide. Mr. Hall incorporates fully be reference herein Claim B.3.c, supra; 
Claim D, infra; and Claim LL, infra). 
One of the police reports that trial counsel failed to utilize in their investigation 
was disclosed by the State; however, according to trial counsel, that report was withheld 
until late in the proceedings, effectively precluding an adequate investigation. Moreover, 
the State failed to disclose lead sheets indicating that Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis had told 
the police that Patrick Hoffert not only was seen with Lynn Henneman on the day she 
disappeared, but on the following day he claimed that he had "raped the girl" prior to 
committing suicide. 
Trial counsel files only included 12 lead sheets. The police had over 500 lead 
sheets, and multiple follow-up reports and documents of many of the lead sheets. There 
were thousands of pages of information included with the lead sheets. It appears that the 
State did not disclose exculpatory lead sheets involving the Patrick Hoffert-Lynn 
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Henneman connection. Even if the trial team had full access to those lead sheets, the 
State was still obligated to disclose exculpatory Brady infonnation. It is not enough to 
have an open file policy and leave small bits of Brady infonnation buried amongst 
thousands of pages of materials for trial counsel to uncover. Thus, the State withheld 
material evidence corroborating both Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill's statements regarding 
the connection between Patrick Hoffert's suicide and Lynn Henneman's rape and murder. 
(Exhibit 34; Exhibit 35.) 
Evidence tending to identify someone else as the perpetrator is obviously 
exculpatory and material. Grube v. Blades, 2006 WL 297203 (D. Idaho 2006) (slip copy, 
memorandum order). In this case, once the DNA evidence presented by the State is 
challenged as it has been through post-conviction proceedings, i.e., by demonstrating that 
the DNA sample contained more than one contributor; the evidence of guilt of murder is 
far from overwhelming. While the jury may have still convicted Mr. Hall of rape, there 
is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Hall of murder. 
The value of this evidence applies not only to the guilt phase, but also to the 
penalty phase. In this case, there were no eyewitnesses. Any doubt that the jury may 
have had whether Erick murdered Lynn Henneman is mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase. The prejudice from this claim should be considered cumulatively with other 
sentencing phase prejUdice. 
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V. The State Committed Misconduct By Dissuading Mitigation Witnesses 
From Testifying Or Predisposing Them To Disregard Mitigating 
Evidence87 
During the course of Mr. Hall's reinvestigation of this case, he has learned that 
the State, either acting through its prosecuting attorneys, or their agents, committed 
misconduct when interviewing potential mitigation witnesses. Specifically, 
• Jean McCracken, Erick's mother, stated that on September 27, 
2004, a man working with the prosecution contacted her. He told 
her that the defense team was going to say at trial that Frank, 
Erick's father, and her had raised Erick to be a killer and that they 
were responsible for what Erick had become. The prosecution also 
asked her if she thought Erick's drug use excused his behavior. 
Jean did not testify at the sentencing. (Exhibit 6.) 
• Tamara McCracken, Erick's older half-sister, was also contacted 
by the prosecution. She was asked whether she was a good 
Christian and believed that if someone did something wrong 
shouldn't they be held accountable for it. They asked if she had 
ever killed anyone. They suggested that since she had the same 
childhood but hadn't killed anyone that the defense team should 
not based a defense upon Erick's childhood. Tamara resented the 
insinuations and attempts to trivialize the trauma she and Erick had 
experienced while growing up. Tamara testified at the sentencing. 
(Exhibit 25.) 
Based on these two incidents alone, Mr. Hall has reason to believe that the State 
committed other acts of misconduct. Mr. Hall asserts that the State's conduct violated his 
right to due process, right to present a defense at sentencing, and right to present 
mitigation under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States' Constitution, and warrants reversal of his sentencing. 
87 Further development of this claim has been precluded by the court's denial of 
Petitioner's discovery requests. (See Order Regarding Discovery, p.15.) 
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w. The State Committed Numerous Napue Violations 
The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of evidence 
known to be false violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the 
government, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In other words, the state cannot 
create a materially false impression regarding the facts of the case or the credibility of the 
witnesses. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), the Supreme Court made 
clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false 
evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed in 
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the 
Court stated that, "[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false 
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id., at 269; see also Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972). 
Prosecutor falsehoods alone do not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief. 
Relief is compelled when the false impressions are "material," which means when "there 
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 394 U.S. 103 (1935). The record must suggest a 
reasonable likelihood that during deliberations the jurors could have considered the false 
evidence or argument. 
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1. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Dennis 
Dean Regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate 
Classification System, Directives For Classification And 
Conditions Of Confinement 
During the sentencing trial, the State created a materially false impression of how 
the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) would determine Mr. Hall's custody status, 
and the conditions of confinement to which Mr. Hall would be subjected. At sentencing, 
the State called Dennis Dean, the Inmate Records Placement Manager with the IDOC. 
(Tr., p.4904, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Dean described the initial classification process for offenders, 
and explained that classification was a "risk assessment" done to determine how best to 
house an inmate. (Tr., p.4906, L.24 - p.4907, L.6.) The State elicited testimony that the 
IDOC system has three prison levels of "secured" facilities-maximum, medium, and 
minimum-and other non-secured facilities such as work centers. (Tr., p.4905, L.17 -
p.4906, L.1.l8 
The prosecutor deliberately and repeatedly elicited materially misleading 
information from Mr. Dean suggesting that Mr. Hall, if sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole, could be housed at a minimum custody facility: 
Q. Okay. So if a person were, say at the medium security facility and 
they were misbehaving, showing disrespect to staff or breaking 
things or doing a variety of other rule violations, they could get 
more points and go to maximum security? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then, over time, if they behaved and did certain things, they could 
lose points and ultimately go to minimum custody? 
A. Yes, those points - detention points would fall off after a year. 
88 This information alone is incorrect. According to IDOC, there are at least 5 levels of 
custody. (Exhibit 84.) (IDOC Offender Classification). Furthermore, Mr. Dean's claims 
or implications that classifications are based on purely "objective" criteria are false. (Tr., 
p. 4907, Ls. 9-10); (Exhibit 85.) 
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(Tr., pA91l, Ls.6-15) The prosecutor asked about conditions at minimum secured 
facilities, and elicited that inmates at those facilities can work on "fire fighting crews [] 
that work out of that facility," can work on "road crews," "have the opportunity to work 
outside," have access to "a therapeutic community," and can "attend classes." (Tr., 
pA915, Ls.9-25) This examination was designed to deliberately mislead the jury into 
believing that Mr. Hall would be eligible for minimum security despite first degree 
murder, rape, and kidnapping convictions, using the assumption that the Mr. Hall would 
receive a life without parole sentence. (Tr., pA949, L.22- pA950, L.8.) 
The State did finally elicit testimony on redirect examination that Mr. Hall would 
not be eligible for minimum custody under the current IDOC classification system. 
However, the State immediately pointed out that the classification system is not state law, 
but merely IDOC policy, and that "from time to time points and classifications have to 
change based on prison populations and crowding and various things like that." (Tr., 
p.4950, LsA-7.) It is improper to rely on speculative future housing policy changes to 
obtain a sentence of death. Overall, the State left the jurors with the overwhelming, and 
incorrect, impression that Mr. Hall could be eligible to live in a minimum secured facility 
at some point, which is not the case. The prejudice was especially acute because the 
State drew attention to the fact that Mr. Hall's escape in 1994 was from a minimum 
secured facility. (Tr., pA920, Ls.18-25.) 
The State also improperly and prejudicially implied that Mr. Hall would 
eventually be housed in "country-club-like" conditions. Mr. Dean testified that the 
medium secured facility was "like a little town," "something like a college campus," with 
a gymnasium, dining room, chapel, where inmates could go to work, play at the ball field, 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 208 
earn wages, attend college classes, and live in a therapeutic environment. (Tr., p.4913, 
L.IS - p.4915, L.6.) According to the IDOC Directive 303.02.01.001, however, 
"medium custody" offenders "shall be held within the confines of a secure perimeter," 
movement "shall be structured and monitored," and inmates "shall normally be under 
continuous armed staff supervision and in restraints" whenever outside the facility. The 
IDOC medium security facility is surrounded by mUltiple layers of razor wire, attack 
dogs, and armed guards. The State's presentation of Mr. Hall's "conditions of 
confinement" if sentenced to life without parole is extremely misleading, irrelevant to the 
jury's sentencing determination, and highly prejudicial in that it encouraged the jury to 
make its sentencing determination based on improper, irrelevant, and incorrect 
information. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony 
could have affected the judgment ofthe jury. 
2. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False 
Impression That Mr. Hall Seriously Choked Evelyn Dunaway 
While Engaging In Sexual Intercourse 
The State argued at sentencing that Mr. Hall's history with girlfriends and other 
women established his propensity to commit murder. The State's questioning of 
Ms. Dunaway was materially misleading and unduly prejudicial. Specifically, the State's 
examination of Ms. Dunaway was designed to and did leave the impression that Mr. Hall 
seriously choked Ms. Dunaway while having sexual intercourse with her: 
Q. Okay. Would that have been in March of2002? 
A. Possibly. 
Q. All right. Was that the end of the relationship then? 
A. It was. 
Q. Okay. Was there another time before that when Erick choked you with 
his hands? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did that take place? 
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A. In our bedroom. 
Q. At that same trailer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why was he mad at you that day? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. How serious was the choking? Was it --
A. It was serious. 
Q. Tell us what happened, that you remember? 
A. There was a couple times -- I don't remember. 
Q. Was it bad enough to scare you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean did he come up from behind you, or sit on you, or how did it 
work? 
A. He would sit on me. 
Q. I just need to ask you one other area, Evelyn, that I don't care to ask 
you but I need to anyway. While you were living there with him in the 
trailer for those months did you have a sexual relationship with him? 
A. We did. 
Q. I just need to know kind of in terms of frequency. Was -- how often 
was there sexual intercourse between you? 
A. Daily. 
Q. Was it sometimes more than daily? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that of your -- of your instigation or his? Did he want sex --
A. Sometimes both but more him. 
(Tr., p.4846, L.l - p.4947, L.16 (emphasis added).) Given that Ms. Henneman was 
purportedly raped and choked to death, the connection the State wished the jury to infer is 
obvious: Mr. Hall has a propensity for choking women while having sex. As the State 
argued in closing, 
You know what he did to Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You 
know what he did to Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only 
killed once so far in that group. Now then does that mean that he has a 
propensity? Does he have an appetite that he likes to hurt women? Is he 
sadistic? Does he like to hunt them? 
(Tr., p.5507, Ls.14-20.) However, Ms. Dunaway never testified that Mr. Hall choked her 
while having sex. Indeed, Ms. Dunaway has subsequently provided an affidavit stating 
that Mr. Hall never choked her while having sex. (Exhibit 40.) Thus, the State 
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deliberately asked questions in such a way that the jurors would naturally make the 
connection between sexual intercourse and choking, without regard for the truth. The 
State used Evelyn Dunaway to prove the propensity aggravator and to otherwise put non-
statutory aggravating evidence before the jury. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's death sentence 
should be vacated. 
3. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False 
Impression That Mr. Hall Choked Michelle Deen While Engaging 
In Forcible Sexual Intercourse 
In further support of its propensity theory and other non-statutory aggravating 
factors, the State called Mr. Hall's former girlfriend, Michelle Deen, to testify. As with 
Ms. Dunaway, the State's questioning of Ms. Deen was materially misleading and highly 
prejudicial. The State's examination of Ms. Deen was designed to and did leave the 
impression that Mr. Hall choked her while raping her: 
Q. Now, I hate to be indelicate and I -- but I told you I was going to have 
to be some and so I need to ask you about your sexual relationship 
with the defendant. Who decided when and where and how and such 
as that in terms of when you were going to have sexual relations? 
A. Erick did. 
Q. And how did he decide that, I mean, and how did he convey that to 
you? 
A. It just pretty much when he wanted it, it was right then and there. 
Q. Did it matter if you said no? 
A. It didn't matter. 
Q. If you did say no, what would happen? 
A. It would still happen. It would be pretty much take my clothes off and 
have sex. 
Q. Did he ever have to use force on you to get you -
A. He's a very strong man. I couldn't fight Erick back if! wanted to. 
Q. Did there come a point when, you know, August when he put you in a 
headlock over something that had come up? 
A. He put me in a headlock, and I can't remember the situation why he 
put me in a headlock. He had me in a headlock on the couch and he 
told me that if I yelled or moved that all he had to do was to twist my 
neck and he could kill me. And he told me not to tell nobody about 
this, about our situation or he'd kill me. 
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Q. Okay. How hard did he squeeze? 
A. It was very forceful. It hurt really bad. I couldn't move. I was too 
scared. 
Q. Did -- (brief delay.) Did it interfere with your breathing? 
A. I couldn't breathe that well after he did it. You know, during the time 
he did it it was hard for me to breathe and I didn't want to move or say 
anything, because I didn't want to die. 
Q. Okay, now. When you -- after this all happened, did you decide to 
leave? 
A. Yes, I did. Erick went to bed -- we went to bed one night, he got 
sound to sleep and I snuck out and left. 
(Tr., p. 4820, L. 22 - p. 4822, L.16). The prosecutor thus "linked" instances of sexual 
intercourse with an incident not involving sex where Mr. Hall placed Ms. Deen in a head 
lock. Ms. Deen never testified that Mr. Hall choked her during sex, yet the State's 
questioning was designed to connect sex with force. Given that the victim, Lynn 
Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked prior to her death, the connection the State 
wished the jury to infer is obvious. There can be no doubt that the erroneous conclusion 
the prosecutor calculated jurors would draw was material, given the allegations about the 
manner of Ms. Henneman's death. 
4. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Norma 
Jean Oliver89 
Mr. Hall incorporates fully by reference herein Claims D and S. During cross-
examination, trial counsel elicited evidence that Norma Jean was receiving social security 
benefits and at some point had been prescribed medication for an unspecified mental 
health condition that she described as a "chemical imbalance." (Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-7; 
p.4780, Ls.3-18; p.4783, Ls.17-18.) During re-direct examination, the State elicited 
testimony suggesting that Norma Jean did not require medication for her condition. (Tr., 
89 Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is awaiting discovery of Norma Jean 
Oliver's medical and psychiatric records. Additionally, Mr. Hall's discovery request for 
prosecutor notes was denied. 
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p.4777, Ls.5-7 ("Okay. Have you taken some [medication] in the past but you don't take 
it now? A. Yes.").) However, the real reason Norma Jean was not taking medication at 
the time of her testimony was not because it was unnecessary, but rather because she had 
trouble finding the help of "good doctors." Norma Jean stated, during the post-
conviction interview, that: 
Q. So you pretty much told me what you were -- what your diagnosis 
was and everything. And so are you on medication now? Did they give 
you medications since you're on SSI? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What--
A. I wasn't -- I wasn't on anything there for the longest time, like during 
the --
Q. Trial? 
A. Last hearing, I wasn't on any meds, because it's difficult to find 
good doctors, I guess. And I've been on medication for the past three 
months, I think. 
(Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52, Tr., p.36, Ls.13-25 (emphasis added).) Because the Norma Jean 
Oliver rape was central to the State's case in aggravation, her credibility and mental 
health were at issue. Furthermore, the jury gave great weight to Ms. Oliver's testimony, 
(see Exhibit 86 (including KTVB, Channel 7, juror interview). Thus, the State's 
questioning of Ms. Oliver was materially misleading and highly prejudicial. 
5. The State Elicited Materially Misleading Evidence Through 
Leading Questions To Detective Daniel Hess And Allowed False 
Or Materially Misleading Cross-Examination Testimony To Go 
Uncorrected 
Mr. Hall incorporates fully by reference herein Claims D.3.e and S. The State 
elicited materially misleading and prejudicial testimony from Detective Hess, allowed 
Hess' materially misleading and prejudicial testimony to go uncorrected, and 
incorporated such testimony into its closing arguments to the jury. 
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During cross-examination, Detective Hess testified that he did not know the 
nature of Nonna Jean Oliver's troubles at home. (Tr., p.4806, Ls. 18-25 (Q. Did you 
know what the nature of that [family] trouble was? A. I have no idea.).) This was false 
testimony. Detective Hess's taped interview of Nonna Jean revealed that Hess spoke at 
length with Nonna Jean about her history of family trouble. Nonna Jean told Hess that 
she had been physically abused by her father for years up to the point of her interview 
with Hess, and the abuse including having been thrown across the room. It was because 
of the abuse that Nonna Jean so often ran away from home. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B 
(Tr., p.34).) 
On direct examination, Detective Hess suggested that Erick made inconsistent 
statements to him. First, Hess testified that Erick initially stated that he believed Nonna 
Jean was eighteen years old, but then later admitted that he knew she was a juvenile 
runaway, as though Erick were "changing his story." (Tr., p.4797, Ls.14-22; p.4799, 
Ls.4-8. (testifying that Erick first said he thought Nonna Jean was 18, but later said he 
knew she was a runaway).) The State exploited this alleged inconsistency in argument. 
(Tr., p.4738, Ls.I-4 ("The defendant said at first ... that he thought she was 18 but later 
said he knew she was a run-away and shooed her away and run her off .... ").) However, 
Erick was not inconsistent in his statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that he initially 
believed Nonna Jean was eighteen years old based on what he was told and based on the 
fact that she was drinking beer at Mountain Billiards. Later, when he heard her name 
come across the police scanner, he realized that she was a juvenile runaway. 
Accordingly, he told her that she had to leave. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 57A (Tr., p.22).) 
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Thus, Erick was consistent in his statements. The jury should have been told the truth 
rather than lies that tended to undermine Erick's version of events. 
Second, Detective Hess testified that Erick changed his statement regarding how 
he received scratches on his face. (Tr., p.4799, L.9 - p.4800, L.1 (testifying that Erick 
first stated that a cat scratched him, but then said that Norma Jean clawed him).) The 
State again exploited this alleged inconsistency in argument. (Tr., p.4738, Ls.6-8 ("When 
asked how come he had a scratch under his eye he said that the cat had scratched him and 
then that this Norma Jean had charged him .... ").) However, Erick did not give 
inconsistent statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that the scratches were a result of a 
combination of being scratched by his cat and Norma Jean. Erick told Hess that Norma 
Jean pulled the cat's tail and the cat scratched him. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 57A (Tr., p.8).) 
Thus, Erick was consistent in his statements. 
6. The State Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Conclusions 
That Could Be Drawn From The DNA Test Results Taken From 
Christian Johnson 
The prosecution misrepresented the test results by stating that DNA testing 
excluded Christian Johnson as the killer. (Tr., p. 3423, Ls. 11-12.) The state made this 
assertion knowing that trial counsel considered presenting Mr. Johnson as a potential 
alternate perpetrator at trial. Further, the state made this assertion knowing it to be false; 
at most, the lack of Christian Johnson's DNA found on the victim only established that he 
did not leave any semen. Thus, he could have been a co-perpetrator of rape. Moreover, 
the lack of DNA does not exclude Mr. Johnson as the actual killer. Trial counsel made 
this very point outside the presence of the jury, but failed to object. (Tr., p.3682, Ls.5-
10.) 
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X. The State Committed Misconduct By Indirectly Commenting On Mr. 
Hall's Invocation Of His Right To Remain Silent During Cross-
Examination Of Dr. Mark Cunningham And In Closing Arguments 
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor 
violates due process when he uses a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence against 
him either in examining witnesses or argument to the jury. 
Q. Okay. I believe that you didn't ask the defendant anything about the 
murder of Lynn Henneman when you spoke to him. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. SO you didn't hear any of the details about the murder from his lips. 
A. That's correct. 
(Tr., p.5387, Ls.I-17.) Here, it appears the State elicited Mr. Hall's post-arrest, post-
Miranda silence in an attempt to insinuate a lack of remorse and to undermine his 
experts' opinions. This violated Doyle and requires, alone, and in conjunction with all 
other claims of error listed herein, a new sentencing. 
Further, the State impermissibly argued during closing argument that Mr. Hall's 
silence at trial demonstrated an apparent lack of remorse that should be considered as a 
non-statutory aggravating factor for the jury's consideration when weighing the 
mitigation against the aggravation: 
The family coming up here to give impact statements is enough to put a 
bronze statue on its knees for sorrow. None of us even know Lynn and I 
know the effect it had on me and what I could see from you. What effect 
did it have on the defendant? Did he weep? Did he bury his face in his 
hands and agonize over the things that he had done? Does he show you 
remorse? Did he give you confidence to think that he won't do this again, 
that he's learned his lesson, that he's repentant, that he's sorry, that he's 
willing to change his life, that he wants to make amends to Lynn's family? 
Does he do that? Is this letter that says "I'm going to offer myself as a 
sacrifice for your loss". Is that a way of showing that he's repentant? 
(Tr., p.5506, Ls.7-22) (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Hall had the right to remam silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. No negative inference from Mr. Hall's failure to testify is permitted. 
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999). This rule applies at sentencing as 
well as the guilt phase. Id. Thus, just as a jury cannot infer guilt from a failure to testify, 
it cannot infer lack of remorse as a non-statutory aggravating factor from a failure to 
testify at sentencing. 
Y. The Admission Of Testimonial And Other Hearsay Statements Which 
Violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment And Due Process Rights 
Admission of testimonial statements without both unavailability and pnor 
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant violates the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). Among 
statements considered testimonial are those statements obtained with the "involvement of 
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial." Id. at 56 
n.7. Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated 
when the State presented hearsay through Dennis Deen and Detective Daniel Hess. 
1. Hearsay Introduced Through Detective Daniel Hess 
Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated 
when the State elicited testimonial hearsay statements attributed to Norma Jean through 
the testimony of Detective Hess, without a showing that Norma Jean was unavailable, 
and without prior opportunity for Mr. Hall to have cross-examined Norma Jean about 
such statements. Without objection, the State elicited the following testimony: 
Q. All right. And when you were speaking with Norma Jean, did she tell 
you whether or not the defendant had tied her up with her clothing 
during this rape? 
A. Yes, she told me that. 
Q. What did she tell you about that? 
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A. She explained that she had been unconscious a couple of times and 
woke up undressed and was bound with her clothing, her pants and her 
shirt. 
Q. Did she say whether or not she had been gaged [sic] with something? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. Did she say at some point that the defendant wanted her to perfonn 
oral sex on him but she couldn't because she was gaged [sic]? 
A. That's what she told me. 
Q. And that she was able to spit the gag out and talk to him about what he 
was doing to her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did she tell you whether or not she was frightened or that she thought 
that he was going to kill her? 
A. She told me that, yes. 
Q. And at one point when she woke up did she tell you that, in so many 
towards [sic] at least, that she thought she might be dead because she 
couldn't feel anything? 
A. Yes, that's what she said. 
(Tr., p.481O, L.I2 - p.4811, L.I5). Nonna Jean's statements were inadmissible through 
Detective Hess, and their admission violated Crawford and the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment. 
Admission of the statements was prejudicial. The State had previously 
unsuccessfully sought to obtain the same testimony from Nonna Jean; their failure to 
obtain the testimony in a constitutionally pennissible fashion did not pennit them to 
violate Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting her testimonial statements 
through Detective Hess. (See e.g., Tr., p.4766, Ls.4-9 ("Q. Okay. Did you have 
something in your mouth? A. I can't remember. Q. Okay. Did you at one time have to 
spit something out of your mouth? A. I don't know. I'm sorry.").) Accordingly, 
Detective Hess's statements were necessary to the State's case, and therefore prejudicial 
to Mr. Hall. The statements linked "facts" regarding the Nonna Jean Oliver rape to fact 
alleged by the state regarding the Lynn Henneman rape-murder; namely, gagging and 
tying the victim with her clothing, and the victim's fear of being killed. 
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Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment rights were also violated when Detective Hess 
testified about results of the rape kit conducted on Nonna Jean. (Tr., p.4804, L.1O -
p.4806, L.8.) Over trial counsel's objection, Detective Hess testified that a criminalist 
with the Department of Law Enforcement Forensic Lab, Pamela Marcum, told him she 
found spenn on the swabs taken from Ms. Oliver. This clearly violated Crawford and 
should have been excluded. Moreover, the admission of this testimony prejudiced Mr. 
Hall, because it implied that Nonna Jean Oliver's story was correct when, in fact, the 
spenn could have come from a consensual sexual encounter with either Mr. Hall or any 
other sexual partner. 
2. Hearsay Introduced Through Detective Dennis Dean 
Without objection, the State introduced a "pen packet," through Dennis Dean, the 
Inmate Records Placement Manager for the Idaho Department of Corrections. (Tr., 
p.4939, L.20 - p.4940, L4; R., p.699 (State's Exhibit 150).) The packet was prepared by 
the Idaho Department of Correction and contains various legal documents including three 
judgments of conviction, one for escape, one for statutory rape, and one for grand theft. 
While judgments of conviction are generally admissible, the documents in this 
case included statements that were not admissible because they were testimonial, 
irrelevant, and their probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejUdice. See Crawford, supra, I.R.E. 401 - 403. The documents included 
statements attributed to the district courts that Erick Hall stated that there was no legal 
cause why the judgments should not be entered against him. In addition, the documents 
suggest that Erick Hall had no mitigating evidence to present for those crimes. Finally, 
the statutory rape judgment of conviction states that Amil Myshin represented Erick on 
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that charge. This suggests to the jury that Amil Myshin would have been in the best 
position to defend Norma Jean's allegations at the capital sentencing hearing if possible, 
and also suggested that Jay Rosenthal's testimony should not be questioned on the matter 
of the reason for the plea bargain. Thus, the statements beyond the judgments of 
convictions themselves were inadmissible, and their introduction prejudiced Erick Hall. 
Z. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Object To The Admission Of Testimonial And Other Hearsay Statements 
Which Violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment And Due Process Rights 
Mr. Hall incorporates by reference Claim Y, supra.90 Trial counsel's failure to 
object to the testimonial and other hearsay statements constituted deficient performance 
and resulted in prejUdice as discussed above. In addition, Mr. Hall notes Crawford v. 
Washington was issued in March 2004. Mr. Hall's trial was not held until October 2004. 
Trial counsel should have been familiar with this landmark opinion in Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
AA. Lethal Injection 
Idaho prescribes execution by lethal injection.91 1.<;. § 19-2716 (" ... punishment of 
death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of 
an ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent. ... ") 
Executing Mr. Hall by lethal injection is unconstitutional, however. See, e.g., Harbison v. 
90 Mr. Hall acknowledges that trial counsel objected to Detective Hess' testimony 
regarding the results of the sex crimes kit swabs on confrontation grounds, and claims 
ineffective assistance of counsel only to the extent trial counsel did not cite to the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Crawford opinion. 
91 Post-conviction counsel is unaware of any IDOC policy regarding the exact protocol 
for execution by lethal injection. However, it is becoming readily apparent that lethal 
injection is not the painless, "humane" manner of execution it was once portrayed, and 
can cause excruciating pain, albeit sometimes masked by a paralytic agent. 
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Little, _ F.Supp.2d _,2007 WL 2821230 (M.D.Tenn. 2007) (holding Tennessee's new 
lethal injection procedures are cruel and unusual, because they present "a substantial risk 
of unnecessary pain" violate death row inmate Edward Jerome Harbison's constitutional 
protections under the Eighth Amendment, and noting that the protocols do not adequately 
ensure that inmates are properly anesthetized during lethal injections, a problem that 
could "result in a terrifying, excruciating death"); Baze v. Rees, _ S.Ct. _, 2007 WL 
2075334 (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to review question of whether 
Kentucky's lethal injection execution method violates the Eighth Amendment). 
BB. Mr. Hall's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were 
Violated When He Was Improperly Shackled During The Course Of His 
Trial 
1. Introduction 
Mr. Hall wore a "leg brace" during all court appearances. (Tr., p.592.) According 
to the State, the brace was worn under clothing, but would lock whenever Mr. Hall stood 
and his leg would remain stiff, unless he pressed a button to the side of the brace that 
released it. (Tr., p.592, Ls.7-15.) Mr. Hall would have to push the button as he walked. 
(Tr., p. 593, Ls. 4-6.) This was a new device that the Court had never previously 
employed. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 23-24.) The Court made no findings whether the device was 
detectable and no findings whether the device was necessary. Mr. Hall asserts that the 
jurors were able to discern that he was wearing this device and thus knew he was 
shackled. (See Affidavit of Erick Virgil Hall.)92 
92 Mr. Hall's affidavit will be submitted under separate cover. 
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2. Applicable Legal Standard 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to 
the jury absent a trial court detennination that restraints are justified by a state interest 
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _, 125 S.Ct. 
2007, 2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). This basic rule 
embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503,505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses 
such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it must be justified by an 
"essential state policy"). Visible shackling undennines the presumption of innocence, the 
related fairness of the factfinding process, the right to counsel and right to secure a 
meaningful defense, and the maintenance of a dignified juridical process that includes 
respectful treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing Coffin v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)) (presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of 
the administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (restraint suggests 
that the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at 
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1963) (holding the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in order to secure a meaningful defense); 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum 
of judicial proceedings"). The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force 
during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the 
severity and fmality of a death sentence, jury accuracy in making the decision between 
life and death is no less critical than the decision between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125 
S.Ct. at 2014. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 222 
01 ?·~A 
Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of 
the case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing 
Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck, 
125 S.Ct. at 2015. Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make 
out a due process violation. Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id., 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967)). 
3. Analysis 
The jurors were able to discern that Mr. Hall was shackled during the guilt phase 
and penalty phase of his trial. First, the leg device made clicking noises which the jurors 
would have been able to hear each time he stood up before the court. Second, in order to 
return to a seated position, Mr. Hall had to press a button on the device, which also would 
have been noticeable by the jurors. The jury was therefore aware that court authorities 
considered him a danger to the community, inevitably affecting their perception of Mr. 
Hall. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014 (reasoning that shackling almost inevitably implies to a 
jury, as a matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to 
the community, and shackling almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of 
the character of the defendant). Mr. Hall relies on his affidavit, to be submitted, to 
establish this matter, as the district court's refusal to allow post-conviction counsel to 
interview jurors precludes Mr. Hall from otherwise fully developing this claim. (See Tr., 
12/8/06, deposition of D.C. Carr, p. 309 (explaining he would have missed any noises 
made by the leg device because he has "high frequency loss" of hearing).) 
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Here, because propensity was an aggravating factor, the use of shackles was 
especially prejudicial at the sentencing phase of the trial. The State specifically argued in 
closing that Mr. Hall was dangerous: 
He kills her because he wants to, because he's sadistic and brutal towards 
women. He doesn't have to kill her. What does the instruction tell you that 
it's a person who likes to kill, who kills without the normal amount of 
provocation who kills because they have an affinity. What's their affinity? 
They like it. That's what it is. That's what we're talking about here. He 
doesn't have to do that to her. He does it because he likes it. 
(Tr., p.5508, L.19 -p.5509, LA.) 
Even aside from the statutory aggravating factor, the dangerousness of the 
defendant is nearly always a relevant factor in jury decision making even where the State 
does not specifically argue the point, and thereby inevitably undermines the jury's ability 
to weigh accurately all relevant considerations--considerations that are often 
unquantifiable and elusive--when it determines whether a defendant deserves death. 
Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014. By forcing Mr. Hall to appear before the jury in shackles that 
were discernable, there was a "thumb [on] death's side of the scale." Id., quoting Sochor 
V. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). 
4. Conclusion 
Absent written findings to the contrary, and because the leg restraint made 
Mr. Hall's custody status and physical restraint apparent to the jurors, the use of the 
restraining device, absent a determination that they were 'justified by a state interest 
specific to [that] particular trial," violated "a basic element of the 'due process of law' 
protected by" the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the presumption of 
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mnocence. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2012.93 Moreover, the shackling device impermissibly 
affected the jury's determination of aggravating factors and the weighing of those factors, 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to 
present a meaningful defense. 
CC. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Suppress Evidence OfMr. Hall's Third Interrogation 
The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in 
Claim A.2, supra. In this case, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to 
suppress the April 1, 2003, interrogation (herein "third interrogation") of Erick Hall 
because Erick had already been formally charged and his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had attached by the time the interrogation commenced. The introduction of the 
third interrogation was highly prejudicial. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches the moment formal judicial 
proceedings are initiated. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The right is 
triggered when judicial proceedings are initiated against the accused, ''whether by way of 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). Once the right attaches, the state, including the 
police and their agents, may not interfere with the accused's right to counsel. Illinois v. 
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990). 
The formal complaint was filed against Erick Hall in the Henneman case at 3:50 
p.m. on April 1, 2003. (Exhibit 87.) The third interrogation of Erick by Detectives Allen 
93 The Court cannot now make the requisite factual findings based on its extra-record 
recollection without making itself a witness in the instant post-conviction proceedings. 
See Dyas, 317 F.3d 934, 936-937 (state court determination that jury could not have seen 
the shackles was unreasonable in absence of any inquiry to establish facts concerning 
what jury could see). 
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and Mace did not take place until 5:00 p.m. on April 1,2003. (Tr., p.4177, L.23 - p.4178, 
L.21). Thus, the interrogation violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard in failing to move to suppress 
statements obtained from Mr. Hall in this interrogation. 
Videotape of most of the third interrogation was played to the jury. (Tr., p.4178, 
p.4180-4182.) The interrogation was captured on a set of three videotapes, which were all 
played, with some short redactions. (Tr., pp.4197-4208; R., p.699, (State's Exhibits 132-
134).) The interrogation included highly damaging statements from Mr. Hall, which 
prejudiced both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. For example, Erick was 
questioned about what might have triggered his anger the night ofthe Henneman murder: 
Mace: What - what made that anger boil over that night? And why - why 
did you take it out on her? I mean, why - why did it all get channeled 
right there? 
Hall: I don't know. I guess what they say, opportunity knocks, you 
answer it. I don't know. Wrong place at the right time. 
(R., p.695, (Suppression Hearing Exhibit 4, p.53 (transcript of April 1, 2003, 
interrogation».) Erick's statement that "opportunity knocks" was highly damaging and 
was incorporated into the State's closing argument at the guilt phase of trial to establish 
that Erick had murdered Lynn Henneman, despite the fact that there was a possible· 
alternate perpetrator, see Claim B.3.c, supra, and Claim LL, infra, and despite the fact 
that Erick did not recall killing her: 
The defendant made a statement that I think we need to focus on. Mace 
says, "What made that anger boil over that night? And why did you take 
it out on her? I mean why, why did it all get channeled right there?" And 
you can see the defendant's words before you. He says, "I don't know. I 
guess what they say, opportunity knocks, you know, answer, I don't know. 
Wrong place at the right time." 
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(Tr., p.4625, L.25 - p.4626, L.8.) The State also used the same statement in their closing 
arguments at the sentencing phase in order to establish the propensity statutory 
aggravating circumstance: 
The fourth and final aggravator, the one we told you we would offer proof 
on. Propensity to commit - that "The defendant, by prior conduct or 
conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a 
propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing 
threat to society. 
*** 
The Defense told you that opportunity knocks. And you know that he said 
well, wrong place, right time. The opportunity that knocked for the 
defendant, in addition to having a woman to rape, this is something --
somebody to steal from. Walter told you about the ring, the beautiful 
sapphire ring he gave her. Dr. Groben told you that it was gone. It wasn't 
on the body when they found her. Do you know that the only thing, other 
than what he hit her with, what he took from - the defendant took from the 
scene was the wallet and the contents and he sure didn't leave the money. 
The wrong place at the right time. 
(Tr., p.5454, L.20 - p.5455, L.l, p.5458, L.22 - p.5459, L.9); (Exhibit 45.) 
During the third interrogation, Detective Mace persuaded Erick to write a letter to 
the family of Lynn Henneman. (R., p.695 (Suppression Hearing Exhibit 4, pp.91-92 
(transcript of April 1, 2003 interrogation)).) The letter was introduced at Erick's trial. 
(Tr., p.4211, Ls.l-ll; (R., p.699 (State's Exhibit 136).) The letter also was used by the 
State to establish that Erick killed Lynn Henneman: 
The defendant made a written statement, you got a chance to watch this, 
and, of course, we tried to move this thing along for you, but it went 
pretty fast because we fast forwarded it during the time that he was writing 
that written statement out. But this is what he wrote during that time. 
You've got the exhibit if you want to look at it again. But the most 
important thing I think he said in there is "You probably hate me for 
taking from you something so dear and closely cherished, the life is 
something that no person has the right to take, no one but the one who 
owns it." Signed Erick Hall. 
Would you write a letter like that to the parents of a murdered woman if 
you didn't kill her? 
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(Tr., p.4625, Ls.6-19.) Thus, because trial counsel failed to move suppress the 
interrogation and its fruits on the basis that Erick's right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment had already attached, the State was again able to argue that Erick was Lynn 
Henneman's killer -- even though, as discussed above, other evidence points to the fact 
that another person could have been an alternate or co-perpetrator of the murder. 
In sum, trial counsel should have moved to suppress the introduction of the third 
interrogation of Erick Hall on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 
attached prior to the interrogation. Had they done so, the jury would not have been 
exposed to Erick's damaging statements and the letter to the Henneman family. Because 
the evidence was highly inculpatory, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
both the guilt and the sentencing phases ofthe trial would have been different. 
DD. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Move For Change Of Venue, Or, In The Alternative, Failing To Move To 
Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled 
Criminal defendants are entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury. This right is 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 19-
1902, -2019, and -2020, and Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b). "The bias or prejUdice of even a 
single juror is enough to violate that guarantee." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 
1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). 
The Supreme Court has long held that where a criminal case receives excessive 
publicity, the defendant's rights to an unbiased jury and, consequently, a fair trial, may be 
violated if the trial court does not take prophylactic measures, such as changing venue to 
a place less saturated by pUblicity, to insulate the jury's decision-making process from the 
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outside influences of the publicity. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 
(1959) (remanding case for a new trial where seven jurors had been exposed to news 
accounts containing information which was not presented at trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717 (1961) (vacating the conviction of a prisoner sentenced to death based on the 
saturation of the jury pool with pretrial pUblicity and the fact that eight out of twelve 
jurors came into the trial with a preconceived opinion that the defendant was guilty); 
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that the trial court had erred in 
denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue where the media, prior to trial, had 
broadcast a taped confession of the defendant). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant's right to a fair trial can be violated without a particularized showing of 
prejudice, see Rideau, 373 U.S. 723, Idaho's appellate courts have sometimes held that 
the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that his own jury was 
biased.94 See, e.g., State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 687-88, 85 P.3d 656, 663-64 (2004); 
State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fetterly, 
109 Idaho 766, 769 & n.l, 710 P.2d 1202, 1205 & n.l (1985). However, they do not 
always do so. In State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court 
of Appeals noted that: 
a defendant's inability to make a detailed and conclusive showing of 
prejudice is not a proper ground for refusing to change venue. Prejudice 
seldom can be established or disproved with certainty. Rather, it is 
sufficient for the accused to show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial 
94 Even if this view were correct, Mr. Hall has been precluded from conducting juror 
interviews, and therefore could not establish the prejudice sometimes erroneously 
required by the Idaho appellate courts. 
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news [coverage] prior to trial will prevent a fair trial." Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 .... 
Hall, 111 Idaho at 829, 727 P.2d at 1257, (emphasis and alteration in original). See also 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003) (adopting the "reasonable 
likelihood" standard set forth in Hall). Regardless of whether a showing of prejudice is a 
strict requirement though, the Idaho appellate courts have said that there are certain basic 
factors that should be considered in evaluating the question of whether pretrial publicity 
had necessitated a change of venue below: (1) the nature and content of the pre-trial 
pUblicity; (2) the amount of time elapsed between the pretrial publicity and the trial (and 
sentencing); (3) whether there is evidence, e.g., affidavits, indicating prejudice, or a lack 
thereof, in the community where the defendant is to be tried; (4) voir dire testimony by 
actual jurors indicating whether or not they had pre-formed opinions as to the defendant's 
guilt or innocence; and (5) whether the defendant moved to strike any of the jurors for 
cause. Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258. 
In the present case, the nature and volume of pretrial publicity that the case 
received should have caused trial counsel to move for a change of venue. Trial counsel 
should have aggressively investigated the above factors, and presented the results of the 
investigation to the Court in support of the motion. 
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Obtain And Analyze Copies Of The 
Articles And Television And Radio Broadcasts That Had Saturated 
Ada County 
Had trial counsel engaged in an adequate investigation and analysis, they would 
have discovered that both quantity and the nature of the pUblicity in this case, and in the 
other crimes for which Mr. Hall has been charged, rendered it impossible to find an 
impartial jury composed of his peers. 
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The first flurry of news coverage resulted from Lynn Henneman's disappearance. 
That news coverage, stretching from September 26, 2000, through November 10, 2000, 
which included near-daily stories in The Idaho Statesman,95 as well as extensive 
television news coverage,96 is detailed, in part, below:97 
• September 26, 2000. One day after she was reported missing, the Statesman 
reported Ms. Henneman's disappearance in the banner headline of its "Local" 
section. Patrick Orr, Woman missing since Sunday, police say, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 2000, at IB. The article detailed the highly visible 
efforts to find Ms. Henneman: a dive team, Life Flight flying over the Boise 
river, and Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue team. Id. It also included a 
picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• September 28, 2000. The Statesman's front-page banner headline was that 
some of Ms. Henneman's personal effects had been found. Patrick Orr, Boy 
95 The Statesman, headquartered in Boise, and claiming Ada and Canyon Counties as its 
primary markets, see The Idaho Statesman (visited Apr. 14, 2006) 
<http://custserv.idahostatesman.comiCustSvc/advertising_services/adv-pdfs/market-
profile/2005BoiseMSASnapshot.pdf>, is, by far, the most widely circulated Idaho 
newspaper. The Idaho Newspaper Association reports the Statesman's circulation as 
68,060 copies. See Idaho Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006) 
<http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. In comparison, the next most widely 
circulated Idaho newspaper is the Post Register, at only 26,551 copies. See Idaho 
Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12,2006) http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html 
It is interesting to note that undersigned counsel has searched for, but has been 
unable to locate any articles regarding Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, or Mr. 
Hall, in either the Coeur D'Alene Press or the Idaho State Journal, two of the major 
newspapers in north Idaho and east Idaho, respectively. See Idaho Newspaper 
Association (visited Apr. 12,2006) <http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. Thus, the 
chances of prejudice attributable to pretrial publicity in this case could have been cut 
drastically by transferring venue to a court in north or east Idaho. 
96 In response to Mr. Hall's requests for information, only one of four local network 
affiliates voluntarily provided materials related to its coverage of Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance and death, Ms. Hanlon's death, and Mr. Hall. Copies of the transcripts of 
the coverage is submitted as Exhibit 86. The other three network affiliates refused to 
cooperate. 
97 All of the articles from the Statesman are marked as Exhibit 88 and are provided 
herewith. 
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finds missing woman's purse, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 28, 2000, at lA, 12A. 
That article indicated that after the effects had been discovered, police 
engaged in a throrough search of the immediate vicinity-in full view of the 
public. Id. at 12A. In discussing Ms. Henneman's disappearance generally, 
the article also indicated that "[t]he news media has really hit the airwaves 
hard with her picture .... " Id. at 12A (quoting the spokeswoman for the 
Garden City Detective Unit). It also indicated that the pUblicity was 
apparently working as detectives had already received fifty different tips. Id. 
It also included a picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• September 29, 2000. Another banner headline about Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance appeared in the "Local" section of the Statesman. Patrick Orr, 
Henneman may have gone to comedy club, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 
2000, at IB. That article revealed that the pUblicity campaign had led to the 
police receiving some 34 more tips in only 24 hours. See id. It also included 
Ms. Henneman's picture. Id. 
• September 30, 2000. The Statesman ran a front-page story revealing that a 
$20,000 reward was being offered for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of anyone involved in Ms. Henneman's disappearance. Emily 
Simnitt & Patrick Orr, $20,000 reward offered, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 30, 
2000, at lA, 7 A. That article also reported that a "tearful" press conference 
had been given by Ms. Henneman's family, indicated that the community 
offered tremendous support to the family, conveyed the family's gratitude to 
the Boise community, and included emotional pictures of the family. Id. It 
included Ms. Henneman's picture. Id. 
• October I, 2000. For the fourth day in a row, the Statesman reported on Ms. 
Henneman's disappearance, but only to say that no new leads had developed. 
• October 4, 2000. In an article prominently displayed on the first page of its 
"Local" section, the Statesman reported that Ada County residents were 
feeling uneasy about using the "Crown Jewel" of their community, the Boise 
River Greenbelt, in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance: "Henneman's 
recent disappearance has many shaken up. 'Seeing those pictures [the missing 
person fliers] everywhere is haunting. It really makes you apprehensive .... I 
didn't really start worrying about it until this last incident. '" Patrick Orr, 
Greenbelt incidents make users nervous, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 4, 200, at 
IB, 5B (quoting a local resident). In discussing the public's unease, the article 
highlighted two previous rape-killings on the Greenbelt in recent years-that 
of Kay Lynn Jackson in 1998, and that of Samantha Maher earlier in 2000. 
Id. at 5B. But, at the same time, it included a large photo of a bicycle police 
patrol, id. at IB, and included numerous reassurances from officers that the 
Greenbelt is relatively safe, id. at IB, 5B. 
• October 8,2000. The banner headline on the cover of the Statesman indicated 
that Lynn Henneman's body had apparently been found. Jeff McKinni & 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 232 
Patrick Orr, Body Found in Boise River, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 8,2000, at 
lA, 9A. This article included a timeline and an annotated map of the 
Greenbelt and downtown Boise, showing, among other things, where Ms. 
Henneman had last been seen and where her body was recovered; two photos 
of officers, apparently at the scene of the body recovery; and yet another 
photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 9A. 
• October 9, 2000. The day after reporting her body apparently found by a 
fisherman, the Statesman reported, in another front-page banner headline, that 
Ms. Henneman's body had been positively identified. Patrick Orr, Coroner 
confirms body's identity, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at lA, 9A. That 
article quoted the Ada County Coroner, Erwin Sonnenberg, as asserting 
unequivocally: "It was definitely a homicide." The article also discussed the 
high-profile "massive search," which had included boats, divers, search-and-
rescue dogs, and helicopters, that had failed to uncover Ms. Henneman's 
body. Id. Finally, the article included yet another picture of Ms. Henneman. 
Id. at lA. 
• October 10, 2000. For the third day in a row, the Statesman carried a front-
page banner headline about Ms. Henneman. Patrick Orr, Searchers find items 
from slain woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 10,2000, at lA, 8A. The article 
reported that additional items belonging to Ms. Henneman had been found: 
"Right now, we are not disclosing what those items are, but there are some 
things we know are hers, Boise Police Spokesman Jim Tibbs said at the scene 
Monday. "We need to look at all the evidence before we can release that 
information." Id. (quoting police spokesman). It also included an annotated 
Greenbelt/downtown map, two large photos of police officers' evidence 
recovery efforts, and another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 8A. 
• October 11, 2000. In another front-page banner headline, the Statesman 
again, for the second time in eight days, addressed the public's safety 
concerns in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and apparent murder. 
Patrick Orr, Boise to step up Greenbelt security, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 
2000, at lA, 7A. The article quoted then-police chief Don Pierce as saying: "I 
think first and foremost it was a traumatic event for this community. The 
Greenbelt is one of our most prized posses~ions, and when something like this 
happens, it is like someone steals one of our possessions." Id. at 1A. 
In a separate article, carrying its own banner headline, and appearing on the 
first page of the Statesman's "Local" section, it was reported that the Ada 
County Coroner was expected to reveal the cause of Ms. Henneman's death 
later that day. Patrick Orr, Cause of woman 's death expected today, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 2000, at IB, 6B. It went on to repeat the earlier-
reported "knowledge" that certain items found in or near the Boise River over 
previous days "definitely" belonged to Ms. Henneman. Id. at lB. The article 
included another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at 1 B. It also reported that 
Ms. Henneman's family had expressed gratitude to the citizens of Boise for all 
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their support, but were also "fearful for the citizens of Boise, because there is 
a killer on the loose." Id. at lB, 6B (quoting a Boise lawyer who had been in 
contact with the family). 
• October 12, 2000. In its fifth Henneman-related front-page banner-headlined 
article in a row, and again including a picture of Ms. Henneman, the 
Statesman reported that, although the Ada County Coroner would not publicly 
reveal his opinion as to the cause of Ms. Hennman's death, he had "ruled out 
stabbing, shooting, and blunt head trauma," and another newspaper had 
reported that she was "probably strangled" to death. Patrick Orr, N. Y. 
newspaper: Henneman was 'probably strangled, 'IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12, 
200, at lA, 6A. In addition, the article noted that the reward for information 
about Ms. Henneman's death had been increased to $30,000 with the 
anonymous $10,000 contribution ofa local businessman. !d. at 6A. 
In the "Local" section of the Statesman, Ms. Henneman's obituary appeared. 
Obituaries, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12, 2000, at 7B. That obituary indicated 
that Ms. Henneman had "become a part of the community" during the 
previous two weeks, it asked that the "residents of the Treasure Valley" pray 
for the Henneman family, and it urged "the residents of the Treasure Valley" 
to attend a public memorial service to be held on October 19, 2000. Id. The 
obituary also included another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id. 
• October 13, 2000. For the sixth day in a row, the Statesman reported on the 
Henneman's, but only to say that no new no information had been released by 
the police. No new info released in Henneman case, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 
13, 2000, at Bl. That article indicated that police had, by then received in 
excess of300 tips from members of the community. Id. 
• October 20,2000. [Officer tells women to trust instincts, stay safe]98 
• October 23, 2000. In a front-page banner headline, the Statesman again 
discussed the community'S safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt in light of 
Ms. Henneman's death. Emily Simnitt, Police to rethink Greenbelt safety 
after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. That article 
reported on an apparent attempted attack on a 20-year old woman which 
garnered a "heightened [police] response [which] was due in part to a partially 
implemented plan to beef up security around the Greenbelt after Henneman 
was slain near the pathway on about Sept. 24." Id. at lA. Despite the 
overwhelming police response, the article indicated that members of the 
public were still greatly disturbed: 
98 In some instances, Mr. Hall has provided the Court with only a date and an article title. 
In such instances, Mr. Hall knows that an article was published, but he has not been able 
to obtain a copy of that article. 
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"It's outrageous (that) as women, we can't go out 
walking any place after dark," said Sue Fellen, whose office is 
near the Greenbelt. "The city is paying attention, but 
obviously, it's not doing enough. They need to take this 
seriously." 
"We need to send the message to bad people: 'Don't 
corne to our town because there are consequences to pay. '" 
For Bryana Deits, the stronger officer presence and better 
lighting discussed by police and the parks department can't 
corne soon enough. Deits, who moved to Boise three weeks 
ago from Seattle, says she's more scared here. On Sunday 
afternoon, Deits carefully chose a spot in the open and close to 
busy Broadway Avenue in which to picnic. 
Id. at 7 A. The article went on to detail measures that were being taken to 
enhance Greenbelt security, including stepping up bike, horse, and motorcycle 
patrols, increasing lighting, adding telephones, and moving transients out of 
the area (even though police acknowledged that transients have as much of a 
right to use the park system as do other residents, and that they had no reason 
to believe that transients had been involved in the most recent attack). Id. 
• October 27, 2000. In a banner headline on the front page of its "Local" 
section, the Statesman reported a new lead in the Henneman case. Emily 
Sirnnitt, Taskforce investigates Henneman lead, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 27, 
2000, at 1B. That article indicated that Ms. Henneman was seen talking to 
someone on the Greenbelt shortly before she disappeared, but it also reported 
that the police still refused to disclose the cause of her death, and whether she 
had been sexually assaulted, for tactical reasons: "'Hypothetically, let's say 
she was sexually assaulted,' Boise Det. Dave Smith said. 'If we put that out, 
the killer knows we know and might leave the area. '" Id. It also included 
Ms. Henneman's picture again, as well as another plea from help from the 
community, promising a $42,500 reward for information leading to an arrest 
and conviction. Id. 
• November 10,2000. [Henneman task force loses members.] 
This summary of the early news coverage of the Henneman case makes a number 
of things clear: (1) not only was the media spreading information about the Henneman 
case through traditional channels, but police, Ms. Henneman's family, and concerned 
members of the community were actively reaching out to everyone in the community 
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through pleas for information and missing person posters; (2) the net result of these 
combined efforts was that Ms. Henneman's death was thrust to the forefront of Boise's 
consciousness virtually every day for over a month; (3) Ms. Henneman's disappearance 
and death were deeply emotional, not only for her family, whose personal suffering was 
shared with the entire community, but also for the community as whole, many of whom 
were able to empathize with the family's personal loss; (4) Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance and death, which had come relatively soon after two prior rape/murders on 
the Greenbelt, was a terrifying event not only for those Ada county residents who 
regularly used the Greenbelt, but for all members of the local community who perceived 
the Greenbelt to be a symbol of everything that is great about the Treasure Valley; and 
(5) the police were completely in control of the information that was disseminated to the 
public through the various media outlets, such that where police suspicions were 
presented, they were given as fact, and where the police suspicions were in doubt, they 
were presented as being withheld for tactical reasons. In the aggregate, this coverage 
virtually guaranteed that all of Ada County's residents would have strong feelings about 
whoever might eventually be charged with harming Ms. Henneman. They felt deep and 
pain and fear, and they had been led to believe that everything the police said was fact. 
After November 2000, although the specifics of the Henneman case were no 
longer reported on a near-daily basis, the case never strayed far from people's minds. 
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the major media outlets occasionally reported on the fact that 
no progress had been made in the Henneman case, but were actually more likely to report 
on the related issue of the public's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt 
• April 4, 2001. [City to light Greenbelt tunnels] 
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• April 26, 2001. [Ada residents still worry about Greenbelt safety] 
• June 10,2001. [Guardians of the Greenbelt] 
• August 20,2001. [Group seeks to light Greenbelt] 
• September 25,2001. [Clues still sought in Henneman case] 
• October 20,2001. [Boise adds to Greenbelt trail security] 
• November 19, 2002. [Police chief tries to allay CIU fears] 
• April 11, 2002. [Boiseans to gather on birthday of flight attendant slain in 
2000] 
• April 13, 2002. [Boiseans show their support for slain woman's family] 
• June 19,2002. [Boise council awards bid to light up the Greenbelt] 
• September 24,2002. [Murders, other crimes prompt Boise Police to increase 
Greenbelt safety] [2 years later, detectives still search for killer] 
These articles demonstrate that, although months had passed since the discovery 
of Ms. Henneman's body, the residents of Ada County had not forgotten: they had a deep 
sense of hurt over Ms. Henneman and her family's suffering; and they had a new-found 
fear that their beloved Greenbelt was no longer a safe place to recreate. 
On March 1, 2002, another tragic event greatly impacted the Henneman 
investigation and, ultimately, Mr. Hall's prospects of getting a fair trial in the Henneman 
case: Cheryl Ann Hanlon was found dead in the Boise foothills. That event led to more 
saturation-style media coverage, and eventually led to Mr. Hall being labeled a "killer" in 
the public's eye. 
• March 2, 2003. In a front-page banner-headlined article, the Statesman 
reported that Cheryl Ann Hanlon had been found dead on a North End 
hillside, the victim of an apparent ligature strangulation. Chereen Langrill, 
Woman found strangled on North End hillside, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 2, 
2003, at 1,8. The article contained a small map of the North End, two photos 
of the body recovery scene, a photo of Ms. Hanlon, and pleas for citizens to 
help the police by calling in all potential tips. Id. at 8. 
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• March 3, 2003. In a banner-headlined article on the first page of the 
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper provided a sketch and a physical 
description of a man supposedly seen with Ms. Hanlon shortly before she 
turned up dead. Jonathon Brunt, Sketch of man released by police, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Mar. 3,2003, at 1, 7. The article also included another picture of 
Ms. Hanlon, another map of the North End, another plea for help from the 
community, and a photo of Ms. Hanlon's truck. Id. at 1, 7. Finally, the 
article, intimated that Ms. Hanlon's apparent murder might be related to one 
or more of the numerous other unsolved Boise murders, including those of 
Kay Lynn Jackson and Lynn Henneman. Id. at 1, 7. 
• March 4, 2003. In another banner-headlined article on the first page of the 
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper reported again on Ms. Hanlon's 
apparent murder, providing another picture of her, another composite sketch 
and physical description of the man she was supposedly seen with, and 
another plea for information from the community. Jonathon Brunt, Police 
following up tips in killing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1, 3. The 
article also included a number of safety tips for area residents. Id. at 3. 
• March 5, 2003. On the first page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that Ms. Hanlon had leisurely strolled into the foothills alone, had 
stopped at some point, had struggled with her assailant, and then had been 
dragged downhill to the place where her body was ultimately found. Chereen 
LangrilI, Police: Murder victim walked into foothills, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Mar. 5,2003, at 1,3. That version of events, apparently derived from police 
measurements of footprints at the scene, was presented by the police (through 
the Statesman) as fact. See id. at 1. The article also provided another picture 
of Ms. Hanlon, another composite sketch and physical description of the man 
she was supposedly seen with, and another plea for information from the 
community. Id. at 1,3. 
• March 15,2003. On its front page, the Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had 
been charged with the murder of Ms. Hanlon. Patrick Orr, Transient charged 
in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1, 11. That article 
prominently referred to Mr. Hall as a "transient," which was the same 
negative label that had been used to describe the homeless people who were 
assumed to present safety challenges on the Greenbelt after Ms. Henneman's 
death. See Police to rethink Greenbelt safety after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. It also offered a side-by-side comparison of the 
composite sketch of the individual supposedly last seen with Ms. Hanlon, to 
Mr. Hall's unflattering mug shot. Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon 
death, IDAHO STA TESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1. 
It also made it appear that the police had, without doubt, found their man: 
"The city of Boise can breathe a sigh of relief that Eric 
Hall is off the streets," Boise Police Chief Don Pierce said 
Friday morning. 
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Pierce said Hall admitted to detectives late Thursday that 
he killed Hanlon, 42, in the foothills near 5th and Alturas 
streets in the early morning hours of March 1. 
Pierce also said detectives had amassed a significant 
amount of physical evidence tying Hall to the sexual assault 
and murder but declined to specify the evidence. 
Investigators believe Hall sexually assaulted Hanlon and 
strangled her to death, then tried to conceal her body in a 
shallow hole by covering her with grass and tree branches, 
Pierce said. 
Detectives say Hall then took Hanlon's car, eventually 
abandoning it near 13th and Franklin streets. 
Id. at 1, 11. The article then went on to detail what it called Mr. Hall's 
"extensive" criminal history, highlighting his conviction for statutory rape 
after having been accused of sexually assaulting and choking a 17-year old 
girl, and his subsequent charge of failure to register as a sex offender. Id. at 
11. It also indicated that Mr. Hall had been implicated based on tips from the 
public: "'This is a very good example of how we rely on our community to 
help us,' Pierce said, praising the more than 100 people who came forward 
with tips on the case." Id. at 11. Finally, the article included yet another 
picture of Ms. Hanlon, as well as a photograph of Boise Police Chief Don 
Pierce. Id. at 1, 11. 
In a separate article, the Statesman reported that a DNA sample taken from 
Mr. Hall would be sent out-of-state for analysis. Chereen Langrill, DNA tests 
in slaying may be delayed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,2003, at Local 11. 
• March 18, 2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman ran 
an article reiterating many of the inflammatory content of its March 15 article. 
Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces hearing on March 28, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Mar. 18, 2003, at Local 1. It included Mr. Hall's unflattering 
mugshot; it reported that prosecutors claimed he "used a belt to strangle 
Hanlon," as if that allegation had already been established as fact; it asserted 
that Mr. Hall had admitted to killing Ms. Hanlon; it stated that police had 
categorized Mr. Hall as a ''transient''; it implied that Mr. Hall may have raped 
and killed either Kay Lynn Jackson or Lynn Henneman; and it detailed his 
criminal history, highlighting the unproven allegation that he had raped, 
bound, and choked a 17year old girl. Id. 
• March 29, 2003. [Murder suspect also charged with rape] 
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The intense media coverage surrounding Ms. Hanlon's death, while at first 
playing to the community's fear for the safety of its young women and, perhaps, outrage 
for having to be concerned with such matters, later offered the community an expedient 
path to peace of mind: get rid of Erick Hall. The media coverage, driven by police 
statements, portrayed Mr. Hall as a "transient" sexual deviant, with a penchant for 
strangulation during rape, who has lived a life of crime. Thus, it dehumanized him. 
Furthermore, it portrayed his guilt in the Hanlon case as having been already established, 
and it implied that Mr. Hall may be guilty of other unsolved murders in Boise. And, 
even if he is not guilty of other crimes, it implied that Mr. Hall was certainly guilty of 
something and, therefore, should be removed from society: "The city of Boise can 
breathe a sigh of relief that Eric Hall is off the streets .... " Patrick Orr, Transient 
charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.IS, 2003, at 1 (quoting the Boise 
Police Chief). Thus, it also made him a lightening rod for all of the community's 
frustration about its crime problems. 
On April 2, 2003, based on the DNA sample obtained from Mr. Hall in relation to 
the Hanlon case, the State accused Mr. Hall of raping and murdering Lynn Henneman. 
As detailed below, that charge only served to heighten the prejudicial reporting on 
Mr. Hall. 
• April 3, 2003. In a prominent article on its front page, the Statesman reported 
that Mr. Hall had been charged with Ms. Henneman's murder. Patrick Orr, 
Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1, 
6. That article included a sub-headline reading "DNA test shows Eric [sic] 
Hall killed flight attendant in 2000, Boise police say," which appeared next to 
the unflattering mugshot of Mr. Hall. Id. The article then went to great length 
to report that in police officers' minds, trial would be nothing more than 
technicality because Mr. Hall had already been "proven" guilty beyond all 
doubt: 
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Boise police say DNA evidence links the same man to 
two brutal rape/murders, providing a major break in a 2~-year 
old murder case that changed the way Boise residents view 
safety on the Greenbelt. 
Lead Detective Dave Smith and others in the department 
took the case personally, Pierce said .... 
Two and a half years later, Pierce said, Boise is a safer 
place with the Henneman murder finally solved. 
"Today, we know the man who killed her, Eric [sic] 
Virgil Hall, is behind bars," Pierce said Wednesday during a 
news conference. "We are 100 percent certain we have our 
man." 
Id. at 1, 6. After all of that, however, "Pierce declined further comment, 
saying he wants to ensure Hall gets a fair trial." Id. at 6. Detective Smith, 
however, picked up right where Chief Pierce had left off. According to the 
Statesman, Detective Smith claimed that the "details at the Hanlon crime 
scene ... immediately brought to mind the Henneman case.... 'Right at the 
(scene), we had strong feelings there might be a match here,' Smith said.,,99 
Id. at 6 (alteration in original). 
The Statesman's lead article on April 3, 2003 also tugged at the public' 
heartstrings. It was topped by a large picture of Ms. Henneman's relatives, at 
taken at the previous day's City Hall news conference announcing that Mr. 
Hall had been charged, showing them overcome with emotion. Id. at 1. 
99 It should be noted that Detective Smith's claim on or about April 3, 2003, which was 
reiterated by the Statesman on AprilS, 2003, and April 24, 2003, Jonathon Brunt, 
Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003, 
at 8; Patrick Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman , IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24, 
2003, at Local 6, is directly at-odds with statements made by Chief Pierce a few weeks 
earlier. See Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15, 
2003, at 1 ("Pierce said a DNA sample has been taken from Hall and will be compared 
against DNA evidence from other major unsolved crimes in Boise, likely including the 
Lynn Henneman and the Kay Lynn Jackson rape/murder cases in 2000 and 1998 and last 
year's serial rape attacks in the Winstead Park area. However, he said, there is no 
suspected link to those cases at this point."); Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces 
hearing on March 28, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1 (same). Thus, one 
has to wonder whether Detective Smith's statement is true or whether, perhaps, his 
recollection was altered by the DNA testing results. 
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Later, it had a large photo of Ms. Henneman's husband and sister hugging at 
the conclusion of the press conference. Id. at 6. The article said that during 
the news conference, Ms. Henneman's parents and sister stood behind Chief 
Pierce, "at times holding each other for support," while Ms. Henneman's 
husband stood quietly to the side. Id. It then quoted Ms. Henneman's 
husband, Walter Us, as being just as convinced of Mr. Hall's guilt as Chief 
Pierce and Detective Smith were, and printed his request that 'justice" be 
done: "'I am sad another person had to die to catch this killer, but I am glad he 
is behind bars and will have to face justice," Us said. Lynn deserves justice. 
All we can do is pray and hope for the best and pray justice is carried out. '" 
Id. at 1,6 (quoting Ms. Henneman's husband). 
Finally, it is worth noting that the article touched on the psychological effects 
of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death on the Boise community. It 
noted that "Henneman's disappearance as she walked along the river to her 
hotel frightened city residents and led to several safety improvements on 
Boise's Greenbelt." Id. at 1, 6. It made it clear that Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance and death had changed the way many Boiseans viewed their 
community: See id. at 6. 
In its April 3, 2003 edition, the Statesman devoted a full page (besides the 
front-page coverage) to Mr. Hall's alleged crimes. At the top of the page was 
an article detailing Ms. Henneman's family's two and a half year ordeal. 
Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. In that article, it was noted that Mr. Hall's 
arrest had "eased the minds" of the family, and had given them "some relief." 
Id. Interestingly, the article appeared with a large photo of a tough- and 
serious-looking Detective Smith posing next to an American flag. Id. In the 
article, Ms. Henneman's family and Chief Pierce heaped praIse upon 
Detective Smith, portraying him as a tireless advocate of justice: 
"This guy is just fantastic," Micki Husienga said, 
pointing at Smith. 
"For the last two and a half years, Micki has been calling 
and saying 'Dave, I love you, and I have been praying for you' 
... " Smith said .... 
Smith said he took the case personally, working on the 
case at least once a week--chasing every lead, re-examining 
old clues, scouring the Internet for similar cases and getting 
DNA samples from people of interest while working on his 
regular caseload. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 242 
01294 
"These are the kinds of cases where good detectives 
become intimately, personally involved in the case," Chief Don 
Pierce said. 
Id. at 6. 
Also in the April 3, 2003, edition of the Statesman was an article largely 
vilifying Mr. Hall. See Jonathon Brunt, Suspect in two slayings has lengthy 
criminal record, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. In that article, which 
contained a second copy of Mr. Hall's unflattering mugshot, Mr. Hall's prior 
criminal history was detailed, with particular attention paid to the fact that he 
had been on probation for "assaulting a different woman when one of the 
victims [Ms. Hanlon] was killed .... " Id. However, the article did finally 
reveal some information that did not come directly from the police: it quoted a 
friend as saying that Mr. Hall had cried and asserted his innocence, and that he 
is actually a kind and gentle young man. Id. 
• April 4, 2003. The Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had been arraigned in the 
Henneman case. Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, 
IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 4,2003, at Locall. The article then went on to offer 
the police department's version of the facts without question: "he [Mr. Hall] 
eventually confessed to [the Hanlon murder],,; and "[a] DNA sample taken 
from Hall linked him with the two murders .... " Id. The article then went on 
to quote a friend of Mr. Hall's who, despite her faith in him, had already been 
persuaded by the State's evidence which had been reported in the media, and 
her misperception of the strength of that evidence: 
Id. 
[Jillian] Stone said she first met Hall during the summer 
of2000 at Julia Davis Park. "He was like a father figure to me, 
so the first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there 
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie." 
She added: "Now I think, 'What ifthat was me?'" 
• April 5, 2003. The Statesman, in a front-page article that provided yet another 
copy of Mr. Hall's unflattering mugshot, as well as much more flattering 
photos of his two alleged victims, reported that despite Mr. Hall's criminal 
record, the State did not have a sample of Mr. Hall's DNA on-hand when it 
started investigating the Henneman and Hanlon murders because he had been 
released from prison before Idaho's DNA sampling law went into effect. 
Jonathon Brunt, Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003, at 1, 8. The clear implication of this article is that 
if the DNA sampling law had gone into effect sooner, then Mr. Hall would 
have been apprehended sooner and Ms. Hanlon might never have been killed. 
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See id. However, this implication pre-supposes the accuracy of the DNA 
testing and interpretation, and Mr. Hall's guilt. 
• April 14, 2003. Lest there have been any confusion about whether the 
Statesman had prematurely adjudged Mr. Hall guilty in its April 5, 2003, 
article, the newspaper made its position clear in an April 14, 2003 editorial: 
It's outrageous to think that Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, now 
accused of killing two women in Boise, could sit in prison for 
seven years without submitting to a DNA test. But it's 
downright scary to think that other violent criminals may have 
slipped by the DNA database because of lack of administrative 
follow-up. 
Editorial, DNA testing is a must, preferably at booking, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
Apr. 14, 2003, at Local 8. Thus, the newspaper labeled Mr. Hall a violent 
criminal and, by arguing that his alleged crimes had "slipped by the DNA 
database," it presupposed that he is actually guilty of those crimes. It then 
went on to argue that DNA matches are indisputable by quoting then-Ada 
County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen: '''DNA determines guilt or innocence,' 
Killeen said. 'It's more reliable than eyewitness accounts. If I were falsely 
accused of a crime, I'd want to have the DNA testing.'" Id. It should be 
noted that the Statesman's editorial also featured Mr. Hall's unflattering 
mugshot. 
• April 24, 2003. On the front-page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that Mr. Hall had been arraigned in the Henneman case. Patrick Orr, 
Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman , IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24,2003, 
at Local 1, 6. In that article, the Statesman, which referred to Mr. Hall not as 
"the man" or "the person," but rather ''the transient" accused of killing 
Ms. Henneman, reiterated: the details of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and 
death; the fact that Mr. Hall stood accused of killing not only Ms. Henneman, 
but also Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that Mr. Hall had confessed to killing 
Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that "[a] DNA sample taken from Hall after his 
arrest in the Hanlon killing linked him with the Henneman killing"; and 
Detective Smith's questionable claim that the Hanlon crime scene 
immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because it appeared to 
involve a similar modus operandi. Id. at 1,6. In addition, the article indicated 
that, in discussing supposedly secret grand jury proceedings, the Ada County 
Prosecutor had selectively leaked information which he obviously felt would 
help his chances of convicting Mr. Hall: the fact that multiple out-of-state 
experts had testified ''that DNA taken from murder suspect Eric [sic] Hall 
matched DNA taken from victim Lynn Henneman." Id. at 6. 
• May 6,2003. [Greenbelt patrols spring into action] 
• May 8, 2003. [Execution sought in Henneman slaying] 
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• May 20, 2003. [Plea in Henneman case delayed] 
• May 22, 2003. In an article on the front-page of the "Local" section, the 
Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had been indicted in the Hanlon case. 
Patrick Orr, Hall indicted in Hanlon murder, rape case, IDAHO STATESMAN, 
May 22, 2003, at Local 1. The article contained cursory summaries of both 
cases and highlighted what the police/Statesman saw as the damning 
evidence: Mr. Hall's "extensive" criminal record; a DNA sample which 
"linked him to the Henneman killing"; and the questionable claim that the 
Hanlon crime scene bore such similarities to the Henneman case that that 
crime scene immediately brought the Henneman case to mind for 
investigators. Id. It should be noted that this article also once again 
showcased the unflattering mugshot of Mr. Hall, and a smiling picture of 
Ms. Hanlon. Id. 
• May 29,2003. [Recent rash of murders strains police, prosecutors] 
• June 7, 2003. [Not guilty pleas entered in two Ada County murder cases] 
As the above news reports make clear, after Mr. Hall had been charged with 
Ms. Henneman's death, the police began to use the press to begin conditioning the 
community to internalizing the themes that it would later develop during voir dire and, 
ultimately, at trial. The press portrayed Detective Smith, the lead investigator on the 
Henneman case, as being a indefatigable proponent of justice: a tough, hardworking cop 
on the outside, but a caring man on the inside whose only flaw is sometimes he took the 
pursuit of "justice" too personally. See generally, e.g., Patrick Orr, Henneman's family 
has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. At the same 
time, the press reported that the officers involved in the Henneman case, whose integrity 
and professionalism had already been bolstered, could personally vouch for the "fact" of 
Mr. Hall's guilt. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO 
STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6 ("We are 100 percent certain we have our man.") (quoting 
Police Chief Pierce). At the same time, the press characterized the police department's 
evidence as being virtually incontrovertible. First, it treated the police department's 
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characterization of the DNA evidence as being the unquestionable truth. Second, it 
adopted Detective Smith's after-the-fact and highly suspect contention that once he saw 
the Hanlon crime scene, it immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because of 
an allegedly similar modus operandi. Third, it portrayed Mr. Hall as evil: it included a 
sinister-looking mugshot with every article; it adopted the police department's 
dehumanizing label of "transient"; and it highlighted what it repeatedly called Mr. Hall's 
"extensive" criminal record at every turn while, at the same time, trying to draw 
analogies between the pending rape/murder charges and his prior statutory rape 
conviction and assault charge. Indeed, if there is any doubt about the degree to which the 
police had shaped the public's preconceptions about the case through their use of the 
media, one need turn no further than the statements given to the Statesman by lillian 
Stone. Ms. Stone was a friend of Mr. Hall's who, at one time, had trusted him so much 
that she though of him as a father-figure. But even Ms. Stone was quickly convinced of 
Mr. Hall's guilt and the infallibility of the State's DNA evidence-not by evidence 
adduced at trial or by a jury's verdict, but by the pretrial media publicity (as driven by the 
statements of the police): "[T]he first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there 
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie. Now I think, 'What if that was 
me?'" Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 
4,2003, at Local! (quoting Ms.Stone). 
Any time the press shows the police and, in particular, the lead investigator on a 
case, such adoration, treating the individual officers as saviors of the community, and 
also presents the State's evidence as categorically true, while at the same time denigrating 
the defendant and treating him as sub-human, there is always going to be a risk that the 
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public will develop a tremendous prejudice against the defendant. However, that risk 
was heightened in this case because the messages offered to the public by the press were 
the very types of messages that the public so wanted to embrace. In this case, the public 
was so deeply saddened, angered, and terrified by the circumstances of Ms. Henneman 
and Ms. Hanlon's deaths, that it must have been comforting to hear-and to believe-
that the cause of all the suffering had been removed from society and, therefore, that the 
streets of Boise were once again safe. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in 
Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1 ("Today, we know the man 
who killed her, Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, is behind bars.") (quoting Chief Pierce). 
While the intensity of the news coverage surrounding the Hanlon and Henneman 
cases certainly diminished after Mr. Hall was indicted in those cases, it did not go away. 
Consequently, neither case strayed far from the public consciousness. As detailed below, 
from the winter of 2003 to the start of the Henneman trial in the fall of 2004, both cases 
continued to be the subject of pUblicity. 
• November 30,2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that the $42,500 reward that had been offered for infonnation leading 
to an arrest and conviction in the Henneman case would not be given to 
anyone because the case was "solved" by police work, not a tip. Patrick Orr, 
Reward won't be given for solving homicide, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 30, 
2004, at Local 1, 5. fu that article, besides proclaiming Mr. Hall's guilt in the 
Henneman case by referring to it as having been "solved," the newspaper 
reiterated a number of its previous prejudicial statements. It continued to refer 
to Mr. Hall as "Boise transient"; it made it clear that Mr. Hall stood accused 
of two crimes which the police now claimed involved a similar modus 
operandi; and it repeated the police department's assertion that "[t]he DNA 
samples matched Hall with both Hanlon and Henneman." Id. 
• January 17, 2004. [Trial put off in Henneman slaying] 
• January 24,2004. [October trial set in slaying ofLynn Henneman] 
• February 10, 2004. [Bill would require more criminals to have DNA test] 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 247 
0"'000 
• February 23,2004. [Greenbelt seems safer-and stats say it is] 
• February 24,2004. [City is investing wisely in keeping Greenbelt safe] 
• February 26,2004. [Volunteers free up Garden City police for more time on 
street] 
• March 24, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that during the previous afternoon another young woman had turned 
up dead near the Boise Greenbelt. Kathleen Kreller & Patrick Orr, Passer-by 
discovers body of woman in Boise pond, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 24,2004, at 
Local 1. Later, this woman was identified as Amanda Stroud, an individual 
who was listed as a potential State's witness in the Henneman case. 
• March 25, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman 
reported that the dead body found two days earlier near the Greenbelt was that 
of Amanda Stroud. Patrick Orr, Police seek clues to where woman was living, 
Idaho Statesman, Mar.25, 2004, at Local 1, 3. It further reported that the 
cause of her death was unknown. Id. 
• March 27,2004. [Dead woman linked to murder suspect] 
• April 3, 2004. [Toxicology results pending in woman's death] 
• April 22, 2004. [Tests fail to show how woman, 21, died] 
• September 22, 2004. [Courthouse to host 2 big trials] 
The above media coverage, while certainly not as intense as it had been at 
previous times, undoubtedly kept the Hanlon and Henneman cases on the public's 
collective mind. Moreover, since the coverage had been so persistent for so long (it was 
just about four years between Ms. Henneman's disappearance and Mr. Hall's trial), the 
State's message, as reported through the media, had no doubt become ingrained in 
people's thinking about the cases. Indeed, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has already 
recognized: "When prospective jurors are incessantly exposed to news stories selectively 
packaged for mass consumption, they may become subtly conditioned to accept a certain 
version of facts at trial. Such repetitive exposure may diminish the jurors' ability to 
separate information absorbed before trial from information during trial." State v. Hall, 
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111 Idaho 827, 830, 727 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussed favorably in State.v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003». This danger seems especially 
insidious in cases such as this one--where some, but not a great deal, of time has passed 
between the most frenzied media coverage and the actual trial. In this case, enough time 
has passed (approximately a year and half between the time that the police, amid great 
pomp and circumstance, announced that they had collared "their man," and the time that 
Mr. Hall was actually tried) for potential jurors to forget the details of what they had 
heard and seen in the news, such that their biases would not have been readily articulable 
during jury selection, but an insufficient amount of time had passed for those potential 
jurors to have forgotten their much more subtle biases about the police, the evidence, and 
the defendant. 
In light of both the quantity and the quality of the pretrial pUblicity in this case, 
trial counsel should have, at the very least, thoroughly investigated and considered the 
issue of whether it was possible for Mr. Hall to receive a fair trial before an unbiased jury 
in Ada County. ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("Counsel should 
maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes, including to support 
a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in the voir dire of the jury 
regarding the effects of pretrial pUblicity, to monitor the public statements of potential 
witnesses, and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of 
the case.") Because even a cursory review of the pretrial pUblicity that occurred in this 
case reveals that there was "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news coverage 
prevented a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution," State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003), it is likely that a 
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change of venue would likely have been granted. Thus, trial counsel should have fully 
developed and litigated a motion for a change of venue. 
2. Trial Counsel Failed To Poll The Community And/Or Obtain 
Affidavits Demonstrating A Community Bias Against Erick 
HalllOO 
Although the sheer volume and prejudicial nature of the pretrial publicity in this 
case was sufficient to warrant a change of venue, see, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 
723 (1963), counsel should have done more than rely on the publicity itself; counsel was 
required to develop a thorough motion to change venue, highlighting all possible grounds 
for that motion to be granted. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 
("Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual, 
sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion 
shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of 
publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal and factual bases for 
the request. This will increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also 
fully preserve the issue for post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied."). 
That means that counsel had an obligation to obtain evidence that the community was, in 
fact, biased against Mr. Hall. See Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258 ("Among the 
factors considered [when reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to change venue] are the 
existence of affidavits indicating prejudice, or lack of prejudice, in the community where 
100 Post-conviction counsel has not polled the community, because any polling after the 
fact, i.e., after the Henneman trial, would necessarily be tainted by the coverage of the 
trial itself and by the fact that Mr. Hall was convicted and sentenced to death. Moreover, 
following the Henneman trial, the State went forward on the Hanlon charges. The 
community sentiment at the time of the Henneman trial, then, cannot be "reconstructed." 
The Court must therefore rely heavily on the quantity and nature of the publicity prior to 
the Henneman trial. 
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the defendant was tried .... ") Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have made some 
effort to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community, i.e., the 
jury pool. 
In the present case, every indication is that trial counsel made no effort 
whatsoever to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community. 
(Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.287, Ls.2-10 (trial counsel did not conduct 
any sort of community polling).) Because such an effort would likely have revealed an 
overwhelming bias against Mr. Hall, and because such bias would likely have led to a 
motion for change of venue being granted, Mr. Hall's trial counsel was ineffective. 
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Move For A Change Of Venue Or, In The 
Alternative, To Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled 
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue or, 
in the alternative, a motion to impanel a jury from another county. As discussed above, 
such a motion would have been extremely compelling, and would have been likely to 
succeed based solely upon the prejudicial media coverage. 
It appears that trial counsel never seriously considered moving for a change of 
venue, despite the overwhelming quantity and prejudicial nature of the pre-trial pUblicity. 
Although trial counsel briefly indicated they thought about filing such a motion, neither 
could recall any discussions about moving for a change of venue. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition 
of Ami I Myshin, p.125 Ls.6-19 (stating that he "considered" filing a motion for change of 
venue, but did not recall why they did not file one); Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, 
p.262 ("Q. Was there any discussion amongst the trial members of moving for a change 
of venue? A. "Yeah, I think Amil - I don't remember. I can't say. I'm just making 
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things out of my head. I'm sure I thought about it, and I'm sure Amil thought about 
it.").) 
Trial counsel's complete lack of recollection about a change of venue motion suggests 
that trial counsel did not seriously consider moving for one: 
Q. . .. do you remember if you filed for a change of venue in this case? 
A. I don't. I don't remember. Did we? 
Q. No. 
A. I don't recall." 
Q. Do you recall any - I suppose that you don't recall any decision 
whether you should file one or not file one, then? If you don't 
recall whether one was filed, I would be surprised if you recalled. 
A. No. I don't recall. 
(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.125, Ls.4-15.) Trial counsel should have 
seriously investigated filing a motion for change of venue. Trial counsel was aware of 
the media coverage of Erick Hall and that the media had linked his name to both the 
Henneman and Hanlon murders. (Tr., 911406 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.158, L.15 -
p.159, L.4; Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr ("Q. But you had concerns about the 
publicity? A. Um-hmm. I think that was somewhat the nexus of the case of keeping 
Hanlon out of Henneman and that whole thing, yeah. Absolutely."); Tr., 9/13/06 
deposition of D.C. Carr (recalling that he saw pUblicity about Erick sexually abusing a 
seventeen year old).) 
Trial counsel also did not consider impaneling a jury from another county. Trial 
counsel stated his belief that the ''best'' juries or at least the "liberal" juries come from 
Ada County. (Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.287, L.20 - p.288, L.2.) 
However, this cannot be a legitimate strategic choice, as there is nothing to indicate that 
trial counsel even considered impaneling a jury from another county, or that Ada county 
seats "liberal" juries. Moreover, Mr. Myshin has spent his thirty years of practice in the 
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Ada County, and his only criminal trial experience has been in Ada County-he's been 
with the Ada County Defender's office for the past 22 years. (Tr., 11116106 deposition of 
Amil Myshin, p.392, Ls.2-24.) 
Due to the overwhelming quantity of media coverage of Erick Hall and the 
Henneman and Hanlon murders, trial counsel should have moved for a change of venue 
or, in the alternative, moved to impanel a jury from another county. But for their 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that Erick Hall would have 
received a life sentence from an unbiased jury. See section 1, supra; see Claim FF, infra. 
4. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Question Potential Jurors 
During Voir Dire As To The Amount, And Nature, Of The Pretrial 
Publicity To Which They Had Been Exposed 
As discussed above, the Idaho courts have been incorrect when they have said that 
in order to obtain a change of venue based upon unfair pretrial publicity the defendant 
must show that he was actually prejudiced by inclusion of a juror, specifically proven to 
be biased, on his jury. See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).101 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that inclusion of a juror, specifically shown to be 
biased, warrants vacation of the defendant's conviction. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 
F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have thoroughly 
examined all of the prospective jurors regarding the extent to which they had been 
exposed to, and influenced by, pretrial publicity-whether to make a record to appeal a 
denial of a motion for change of venue (had one been filed) or to ferret out instances of 
actual bias. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an 
issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual, sequestered voir dire on 
101 Not only is this approach incorrect, it is impossible to establish in this case, due to the 
Court's prohibition on juror contact. 
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death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the capital aspect of 
the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel should be 
sure to litigate all of the possible legal and factual bases for the request. This will increase 
the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for 
post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied."). However, as set forth in detail 
below, trial counsel utterly failed to do so. 
a. Juror No.6 
Juror No.6, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.850, Ls.22-24.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.850, L.25.) 
Later, in response to a question from the prosecutor, Juror No.6 indicated that she had 
seen "the media" before. (Tr., p.1060, Ls.17-I8.) But it is not clear whether the State 
was talking about a news program or fictional television programming when it asked that 
question. (See Tr., p.1060, Ls.5-23.) Either way, it is obvious that these questions, 
which were the only questions that could have gone anywhere toward delving into the 
question of whether Juror No. 6 had come into contact with any of the extensive pretrial 
publicity in this case, or had formed some type of opinions about the case based on that 
publicity, were not well-crafted for that purpose. Thus, trial counsel should have 
followed up with questions of their own. However, they did not. They did not ask a 
single question about pretrial publicity, or Juror No. 6's pre-conceptions about the case, 
before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr., p.1067, L.I8 - p.1083, L.5.) 
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b. Juror No. 51 
Juror No. 51, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1766, Ls.10-12.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1766, L.l3.) 
The State asked Juror No. 51 if she was a Greenbelt user, and she answered 
affirmatively. (Tr., p.1829, L.15 - p.1830, L.3.) Later, the State asked her if she 
remembered the details of the Henneman case and whether she was a television news 
watcher, and Juror No. 51 answered affirmatively again-to both questions. (Tr., p.1831, 
Ls.9-18.) Thereafter, the State tried to elicit testimony along the lines of "but that's all I 
can remember about the case," but she kept coming up with additional details that she 
could recall-she volunteered that she remembered that Ms. Henneman's body was not 
found for some time, that Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death ''was a huge story," 
that she was exposed to the details of the Henneman case through newspapers and 
television news, and that Mr. Hall was [mally "caught" and arrested. (See Tr., p.1831, 
L.9 - p.1832, L.10.) 
Despite the fact that Juror No. 51 had said that she was a Greenbelt user, that she 
had been exposed to the extensive (prejudicial) news coverage about the Henneman case, 
and that she remembered that Mr. Hall had been "caught," trial counsel never asked any 
worthwhile follow-up questions about the pUblicity issue. (See generally Tr., p.1832, 
L.21 - p.1849, L.16.) Instead, counsel asked cursorily whether she could recall 
Mr. Hall's background or the circumstances of his being charged and, when she said no 
to both questions, counsel tried to essentially rehabilitate her by asking, in a leading 
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fashion, whether, when she said Mr. Hall had been "caught," she meant to imply that she 
believed he was guilty. (Tr., p.1833, Ls.2-16.) Juror No. 51 answered this last question 
with a "no." (Tr., p.1833, Ls.11-16.) Ultimately, trial counsel passed her for cause. (Tr., 
p.1849, L.16.) 
An effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions about 
what Juror No. 51 knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional fact 
of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her family's 
suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi between the 
two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt. 
c. Juror No. 62 
Juror No. 62, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.) 
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 62 what she remembered about the Henneman 
case, and she testified that she could recall little. (Tr., p.2074, L.20 - p.2076, L.5.) The 
only follow-up to this line of questioning on the part of trial counsel was to ask whether 
she had followed recent articles in the newspaper regarding capital juries in general. (Tr., 
p.2103, L.22 - p.2104, L.4.) Juror No. 62 responded negatively, indicating that she does 
not like the Statesman, and that was it. (Tr., p.2104, Ls.5-16.) 
Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions 
about what Juror No. 62 knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional 
fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her 
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family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi 
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt. 
d. Juror No. 63 
Juror No. 63, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.) 
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 63 if she could remember anything specific about 
the Henneman case. (Tr., p.1211, L.24 - p.2112, L.2.) As she answered that question, 
first saying that she could not remember any specifics, but then beginning to recite those 
details that she did remember, the State cut her off "[t]hat suits us just fine." (Tr., p.2112, 
Ls.3-6.) At that point, Juror No. 63, probably feeling that her knowledge of the case 
actually wasn't important, stated simply: "Just from the paper, you know." (Tr., p.2112, 
L.7.) 
Trial counsel did not ask a single follow-up question about Juror No. 63's 
exposure to pretrial pUblicity, or any pre-conceived opinions that she may have 
developed based on that publicity, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr., 
p.2121, L.22 - p.2136, L.22.) Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deep, 
probing, questions about what she knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly 
emotional fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of 
her family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi 
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 257 
n-t'lOO 
I 
I 
~ ... " 
e. Juror No. 65 
Juror No. 65, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.) 
The State asked Juror No. 65 if he and his family used the Greenbelt, and he 
explained that they had done so on a regular basis. (Tr., p.2146, Ls.12-16.) However, he 
did not follow up with any questions about whether this case had alarmed him, or even 
whether he knew anything about this case going into it. (See generally Tr., p.2140, L.3 -
p.2149, L.2.) 
Even though Juror No. 65 had indicated that he and his family had used the Boise 
Greenbelt and, therefore, he was a prime candidate for having been influenced by the 
media's coverage of the Henneman case, trial counsel never questioned him further about 
his feelings about the Greenbelt or about this case. (See generally Tr., p.2149, L.5 -
p.2169, L.22.) Nor did counsel question him about pretrial pUblicity at all. (See 
generally Tr., p.2149, L.5 -p.2169, L.22.) 
£ Juror No. 68 
Juror No. 68, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2177, L.24 -
p.2178, L.l.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., 
p.2178, L.2.) 
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Neither the State nor trial counsel ever asked Juror No. 68 a single question about 
the quantity and nature of the pretrial pUblicity to which he had been exposed, or whether 
such publicity could have caused him to form preconceptions about this case. (See 
generally Tr., p.2227, L.9 - p.2238, L.22 (prosecution's voir dire); p.2239, L.l - p.2268, 
L.2 (defense's voir dire).) 
g. Juror No. 83 
Juror No. 83, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2441, Ls.1O-12.) 
The record indicates that none ofthejurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2441, L.B.) 
In response to the State's questions, Juror No. 83 admitted that she remembered, 
based on television and newspapers, that this case is "the case about the woman that was 
the flight attendant .... It's just that the case on the Greenbelt, she was found murdered." 
(Tr., p.2491, Ls.2-12.) Juror No. 83 indicated, however, that she did not know how Mr. 
Hall came to be charged in the case. (Tr., p.2491 , Ls.15-17.) Later, Juror No. 83 told the 
State that her strong pro-death penalty views were formed, at least in part, based on her 
knowledge of criminal cases as reported in the newspaper and on television. (Tr., p.2497, 
L.16 - p.2498, L.15.) 
After all of that, trial counsel failed to follow up in any meaningful way. Counsel 
did ask if she had ever talked about the Henneman case with her husband (who happens 
to be a Deputy Attorney General) and, eventually, after twice denying that she had done 
so, she grudgingly admitted that they may have discussed the case "in passing" because 
"[i]t's odd to have murder cases in Boise." (Tr., p.2511, L.5 - p.2512, L.1.) However, 
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trial counsel never sought to find out the details of what Juror No. 83 may have known 
about the Henneman case, what she may have discussed with her husbands, and what 
opinions, preconceptions, or biases she may have fonned. (See generally Tr., p.2507, 
L.l2 - p.2534, L.4.) 
Later, trial counsel asked Juror No. 83 about other high-profile criminal cases, 
such as those of Scott Peterson and O.J. Simpson. (Tr., p.25l5, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) In 
response to counsel's questions, she indicated that she had formed opinions as to both 
defendants' guilt based on what she had heard through the media and, with regard to the 
Scott Peterson case, which was ongoing at that time, she had adjudged the defendant 
guilty at "day one." (Tr., p.2515, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) Yet, trial counsel never tried to 
relate these questions back to the Henneman case by asking why, if she was interested in 
the Peterson and Simpson cases out of southern California, she was not interested in a 
high-profile case right here at home. (See generally Tr., p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, L.4.) Nor 
did counsel ever question her ability to remain neutral and unpersuaded by the pretrial 
pUblicity where she readily admitted that she had formed steadfast opinions as to 
defendants' guilt based on pretrial pUblicity in the past. (See generally Tr., p.2507, L.l2 -
p.2534, L.4.) 
h. Juror No. 85 
Juror No. 85, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.244l, Ls.1O-l2.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr., p.2441 , L.l3.) 
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The State asked Juror No. 85 what she could recall about the Hennemen case 
from what she had read in the newspaper. (Tr., p.2562, Ls.17 -19.) She indicated that she 
remembered that a flight attendant had gone missing and that Ms. Henneman's name had 
"hooked" her, but that Mr. Hall's name did not, and that she could not recall the 
circumstances of his being charged in this case. (Tr., p.2562', L.20 - p.2563, L.ll.) 
However, trial counsel never followed up with these responses in any way. (See 
generally Tr., p.2567, L.20 - p.2594, L.17.) Counsel never sought to ferret out the 
specific details of what she had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory about 
individual news stories, and never sought to determine whether she had formed any 
preconceptions about the case. 
1. Juror No. 89 
I 
Juror No. 89, and the rest of a mini-panel of five prospective jurors, was asked by 
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the 
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2607, Ls.9-11.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2607, Ls.12-
13.) 
The State asked Juror No. 89 what she knew about the Henneman case going into 
it. (Tr., p.2693, Ls.5-6.) She responded by saying that she did not "know a whole lot." 
(Tr., p.2693, Ls.7; 10-11.) She indicated that she read about Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance and death, but was not aware that a suspect had been found. (Tr., p.2693, 
Ls.7-11; p.2693, L.21 - p.2694, L.4.) She further indicated that she did not know 
anything about the defendant or how he came to be implicated in the Henneman case. 
(Tr., p.2693, Ls.15-20.) 
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Trial counsel, once again, failed to adequately follow up on the publicity issue. 
The only question counsel presented to Juror No. 89 was in leading form: "I understand 
from what you said before, you haven't been following this case particularly closely?" 
(Tr., p.2713, Ls.19-2l.) Not surprisingly, she responded in the negative. (Tr., p.2713, 
L.22.) Thus, counsel once again utterly failed to ferret out the specific details of what 
this juror had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory about individual news 
stories, and never sought to determine whether she had formed any preconceptions about 
the case. 
J. Juror No. 102 
Juror No. 102, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked 
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that 
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2836, Ls.21-
23.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2836, 
L.24.) 
In response to the State's questions, Juror No. 102 indicated that he gets his local 
news on the Statesman's website. (Tr., p.2858, L.25 - p.2859, L.ll.) However, the State 
never asked whether he had read anything about this case on that website or had, in any 
other way, obtained any information about this case. (See generally Tr., p.2847, L.17 -
p.2869, L.4.) 
Although trial counsel followed up on the pUblicity, counsel did so in a cursory 
and wholly inadequate way. Counsel asked Juror No. 102 whether he remembered 
anything reading about this case, and the juror responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2869, 
L.24 - p.2870, L.3.) Counsel then asked if him remembered reading anything about the 
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case other than that infonnation which was contained in the juror questionnaire, and he 
responded negatively. (Tr., p.2870, LsA-9.) Finally, counsel asked if Juror No. 102 
knew anything about Mr. Hall, and he again responded negatively. (Tr., p.2870, Ls.IO-
11.) Without ferreting out the specific details of what this juror had read and seen, 
without jogging his memory as to what he had been exposed to, and without seeking to 
detennine whether he had fonned any preconceptions about the case, counsel moved on 
to other topics and, ultimately, passed Juror No. 102 for cause. (See generally Tr., 
p.2870, L.12 - p.2892, L.15.) 
k. Juror No. 110 
Juror No. 110, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked 
I by the Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that 
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2951, Ls.6-8.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr., p.2951, Ls.8-
9.) 
The State asked Juror No. 110 simply: "And it looks like you have heard that the 
Lynn Henneman's body was-well, she disappeared and then her body was found. Have 
I you heard much beyond that? (Tr., p.3021, Ls.I8-21.) In response, Juror No. 110 said 
I no, he works a lot and does not have time to watch much television. (Tr., p.3021, Ls.22-
24.) At that point, the State positively reinforced the juror's downplaying of his 
knowledge of the case, explaining: "That suits us fine.... The less you know before you 
walk in here the easier it is for you to make decisions." (Tr., p.3021, L.25 - p.3022, LA.) 
Trial counsel did follow up on the pretrial pUblicity issue, but not in a meaningful 
way. Counsel started by mischaracterizing and downplaying Juror No. 11O's knowledge 
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of the case: "you say that you haven't heard anything about this case?" (Tr., p.3069, L.24 
- p.3070, L.1.) Juror No. 110 clarified the facts, while at the same time apparently taking 
the cue of both attorneys: "Not very much. Heard a little bit, yeah." (Tr., p.3070, L.2.) 
At that point, the follow-up question from counsel was a leading query confirming that 
Juror No. 110 had not heard how Mr. Hall came to be implicated in the case, again 
conveying a subtle message that counsel really did not want to hear what he knew about 
the case. (Tr., p.3070, L.3-4.) Moreover, when Juror No. IIO's answer indicated that he 
did not understand the question ("Mr. Hall's what-the defendant. Yeah, we read the 
charges and stuff."), counsel almost immediately abandoned the inquiry and passed him 
for cause. (Tr., p.3070, Ls.3-8.) Thus, not only did counsel generally fail to ask relevant 
questions, but the few questions that counsel did ask were terrible because they were not 
calculated to determine what Juror No. 110 had actually heard or what preconceptions he 
might actually have and, in fact, conveyed to him that the "correct" response was to say 
"no, I don't know anything about the case." 
1. Juror No. 111 
Juror No. 111, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked 
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that 
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.295I, Ls.6-8.) 
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2951, Ls.8-
9.) 
The State asked Juror No. 111 about the fact that she knew Dave Smith, the lead 
detective in the Henneman case. (Tr., p.3075, Ls.2-12.) However, he never asked her if 
she had seen the extremely favorable media coverage of Mr. Smith during the pendency 
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of the Henneman case. (See generally Tr., p.3073, L.23 - p.3086, L.S.) In fact, he never 
asked ifshe had seen any pretrial coverage of the case. (See generally Tr., p.3073, L.23 -
p.3086, L.S.) 
Again, trial counsel utterly failed to follow up in a productive manner. Counsel 
again raised the issue of pretrial publicity with a leading question conveying the message 
that the "correct" was to say "no, I know nothing about this case:" "You have indicated 
you know something about this case, and I don't know that you know anything other than 
what we've already told you. But do you know anything about?" (Tr. Vol. IT, p.3086, 
Ls.17-21.) Not surprisingly, Juror No. 111 parroted back many of the same words used 
by counsel in his leading question: "I know nothing about it, other than what's been 
reported in the Statesman early on." (Tr., p.3086, Ls.22-23.) At that point, counsel 
confirmed that she believed that her memory of the case was constrained to 
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death in the 2000 time frame, not Mr. Hall's 
becoming a suspect in the 2003 timeframe, and was content to move on to other matters. 
(Tr., p.3086, L.24 - p.3087, L.S.) Counsel never sought to investigate the issue of 
whether Juror No. 111 had been traumatized by the event or preconditioned to look 
favorably upon the State's evidence; counsel was concerned only with the issue of 
whether she knew that Mr. Hall stood accused of murder in the Hanlon case as well, but 
did not even examine that issue carefully. 
In sum, trial counsel's failure to adequately question jurors about exposure to 
pretrial pUblicity violated Mr. Hall's right to an unbiased jury.l02 (See Exhibits 13-16 
102 Again, Mr. Hall cannot fully develop this claim because of the Court's order 
prohibiting juror contact. However, it is reasonable to believe that the jury pool had been 
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(juror questionnaires admitted during depositions of Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr, 
indicating juror exposure to media).) 
EE. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Stipulating 
To A Deviation Of Proper Jury Selection Procedures 
Both Idaho statutory authority and rule require that alternate jurors be selected by 
lot. Idaho Code § 19-1904 states that jurors in excess of the number required must be 
removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial: 
A court may direct that one (1) or more jurors in addition to the regular 
panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. All jurors shall be 
drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be 
subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, 
and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges prior 
to deliberations. At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors 
exceeding the number required of a regular panel shall be removed by 
lot. Those removed by lot may be discharged after the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. If more than one (1) additional juror is called, each 
party is entitled to two (2) peremptory challenges in addition to those 
otherwise allowed by law; provided however, that if only one (1) 
additional juror is called, each party shall be entitled to one (1) peremptory 
challenge in addition to those otherwise provided by law. 
I.e. § 19-1904 (emphasis added). Likewise, Idaho Criminal Rule 24 requires that all 
excess jurors be removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial: 
... At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors exceeding the number 
required of a regular panel shall be removed by lot. Those removed by lot 
may be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the 
court otherwise directs as provided below. 
I.C.R. 24(d). There is no discretionary component to the selection of alternate jurors -
jurors exceeding the number of required jurors "shall be removed by lot." When a state 
implements procedures designed to ensure a fair trial, including a fair jury selection 
saturated with media exposure, and that trial counsel's failure to ask appropriate 
questions could not possibly have weeded out bias. 
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process, it must follow that process or violate a defendant's due process rights. Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, supra. Trial counsel was therefore ineffective in stipulating to an alternate 
procedure wherein the above prescribed procedure was abandoned: 
MR. MYSHIN: And the other thing that has always given me heartburn is 
this notion that alternate jurors are selected by lot and -
THE COURT: I agree with you, sir. I think I am coming at this -- you 
and I and Mr. Bower and Mr. Bourne and the Court have always agreed in 
the past that this was a solution in search of a problem. I respect former 
Justice Walters' committee and the work he did. He was motivated by an 
effort, sincere effort to improve the system, but there wasn't a problem 
here to fix. And I was hoping that by stipulation we would just agree to 
do it the way we've always done it, which is the persons that end up sitting 
in -- I will have a chart for you, seating chart that I'll show you. This is 
the way we've done it before, the way we did it in State versus Payne in 
fact. The persons that end up sitting in Boxes 13, 14 and 15 are alternates 
No.1, No.2 and No.3 respectfully, but we don't tell them. We don't tell 
them that they're alternates unless and until their services are no longer 
needed when the jury is sent out to deliberate, so that human nature being 
what it is, these folks will pay careful attention to every single thing that 
happens in the trial and will only get the disappointing news when it is 
necessary to tell them. I think you and I are on the same page. 
MR. MYSHIN: We are, Judge, entirely on the same page. I just would 
like to add fuel to the fire and tell you that it is my information that the 
civil lawyers are the ones that cooked up this dismissal by lot idea. So it's 
not us fine criminal lawyers. I think it's more the subject -
THE COURT: Sometimes they don't understand the differences in nature 
between civil and criminal cases. I think the whole pwpose of the struck 
jury system is to know who you have coming and to know who's there and 
to know, for example, that the person in Box 13 is Alternate No. 1 and the 
person in Box 14 is Alternate No.2 and Box 15 is Alternate No.3, and 
that that means something and we all know who they are in advance, but 
we don't tell them that. Mr. Bourne, are you -- this is the way we've 
always -- are you okay with it? 
MR. BOURNE: We'll stipulate. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Myshin subject ofa stipulation? 
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir. 
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(Tr., p. 607, L.21 - p.609, L. 18.) Trial counsel's performance was clearly deficient, as 
they had an obligation to challenge any irregular jury selection procedures. See ABA 
Criminal Justice Section Standards: Defense Function, Standard 4-7.2(a) ("Defense 
counsel should prepare himself or herself prior to trial to discharge effectively his or her 
function in the selection of the jury, including the raising of any appropriate issues 
concerning the method by which the jury panel was selected .... ") 
Trial counsel's stipulation prejudiced Mr. Hall under Strickland because, by 
failing to guarantee that Mr. Hall receive all of the procedural protections he was 
afforded by the statutory requirement that jurors be selected by lot, they effectively 
changed the jury that would have sat, and instead seated the jury which convicted and 
sentenced Mr. Hall to death. In the penalty trial, this was particularly prejudicial because 
if even one alternate juror would have voted for life and had sat on the jury, Mr. Hall 
would have been guaranteed a life sentence. Moreover, biased jurors did site on the jury. 
See Claim FF, infra. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. 
FF. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Conduct An Adeguate Voir Dire, Failing To Move To Strike For Cause, 
And Failing To Utilize A Preemptory Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors 
1. Introduction 
Trial counsel attempted to utilize a nationally recognized technique for effective 
assistance of counsel in jury selection known as the "Colorado Method," based on 
techniques designed to ensure that a capitally-charged defendant is tried by an impartial 
jury, as set forth in United States Supreme Court capital jury selection jurisprudence. 
However, as discussed below, trial counsel's efforts were premised upon a complete lack 
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of understanding of the Colorado Method, or of general principles of capital jury-
selection generally. As a result of trial counsel's woefully inadequate voir dire, 
Mr. Hall's jury consisted of many jurors who should have been excused for cause, either 
because the juror would automatically vote for the death penalty or because the juror was 
substantially impaired in his or her ability to give meaningful consideration to mitigating 
evidence, thus depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
Because trial counsel purported to use the Colorado Method, Mr. Hall retained a 
well-known expert in the Colorado Method of capital jury selection, Mr. David Lane. 
Mr. Lane has provided several highly instructive declarations, which set forth the 
principles of the method, and critique trial counsel's use of the method. (Exhibit 89 
(Declaration of David Lane, dated April 16, 2006); Exhibit 90 (Second Declaration of 
David Lane, dated June 14,2007).) 
2. Applicable Legal Standards 
The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in 
Claim A.2, supra. The Sixth Amendment further guarantees the right to an impartial 
jury. Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) anything which bears upon the record, 
background and history of the defendant, or circumstances of the crime and lessens the 
perpetrator's moral culpability is per se mitigation and must be considered by the jury. If 
a juror is substantially impaired in his or her ability to consider and give effect to 
anything which Lockett permits them to consider and give effect to in defense counsel's 
actual case, the juror must be challenged for cause as being substantially impaired in his 
or her ability to follow the law. 
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The "Colorado Method" is a nationally recognized technique for effective 
assistance of counsel in jury selection, which trial counsel attempted to utilize. The 
method is based on capital jury selection jurisprudence as set forth in Morgan v. Illinois, 
504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding 'juror[s] who will automatically vote for the death 
penalty in every case" or are unwilling or unable to give meaningful consideration to 
mitigating evidence must be disqualified from service); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 
412, 424-26 (1985) (holding that trial judges may exclude jurors whose ''views on 
[capital punishment] would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] 
duties .... "'); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 42, 49 (1980) (invalidating statute 
disqualifying any juror who would not swear "that the mandatory penalty of death or 
imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact"); 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-23 (1968) (holding that the exclusion in 
capital cases of jurors conscientiously scrupled about capital punishment, without 
inquiring whether they could consider the imposition of the death penalty in the 
appropriate case, violated a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury).) 
3. Analysis 
a. Deficient Performance 
Because the defendant must demonstrate that a juror lacks impartiality, voir dire 
must be adequate to uncover such bias. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733-34. It is not 
enough simply to ask the jurors if they could be fair and follow the law. Id., at 734-36. 
The defendant must be able to ascertain whether the prospective jurors find mitigating 
evidence irrelevant or even not worth their consideration. Id., at 735. 
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The ABA Guidelines, pertaining to the effective assistance of counsel in a capital 
jury selection, state that: 
Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and 
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding 
"death qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the 
death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for 
exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the 
death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that the defendant 
is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances of the case; (2) 
for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give meaningful 
consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential 
jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make 
them possibly excludable. 
Guideline 10.1 0.2.B. Counsel should devote substantial time to detennining the 
makeup of the venire, preparing a case-specific set of voir dire questions, planning a 
strategy for voir dire, and choosing a jury most favorable to the theories of mitigation that 
will be presented. Guideline 10.10.2, Commentary. Given the intricacy of the process 
and the sheer amount of data to be managed, counsel should consider obtaining the 
assistance of an expert jury consultant. Guideline 1O.1O.2.C. 
In this case, trial counsel was shockingly inadequate in preparing for and in 
conducting voir dire. Trial counsel admitted they were learning the Colorado Method as 
they were conducting jury selection. (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.77, 
Ls.13-14 ("We were trying to learn the Colorado method, and trying to use it."); Tr., 
p.79, Ls.20-25 ("So this is all new. There has to be a way to relate to lay people what this 
all means. And it's incredibly complicated. I really felt, I guess at that point, that this 
was all new ground for us, to try and do all of this for the first time."); Tr., 80, Ls.9-14 
("So, although - I mean, it was - I don't know how to say it, except that I was doing 
something outside my realm of experience. And I was taking all the experience that I had 
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and virtually disregarding it. And I found that very, very difficult.,,).)103 This is 
confinned by the fact that they retained another attorney, Rolf Kehne, to consult with 
them about the method, when Mr. Kehne happened to show up to watch the voir dire. 
The use of Mr. Kehne was completely happenstance: 
A. He - Rolf showed up at voir dire, unsolicited. He was in the back 
of the courtroom, and on breaks I would approach him and say - and at 
that time I didn't even know that he taught it [the Colorado Method]. 
Well, I did, because he taught us right before that. He taught us that 
before that, but I didn't know the extent that he taught it. I guess he taught 
it a lot, I've learned, later. 
Q. The Colorado method? 
A. Yeah. But I knew that he did that seminar with us at the office and 
stuff. 
And so I was like, "Tell me, you know, what?" And he would give 
me suggestions, and I would relate those to Ami!. 
And from that - it was interesting, because he sat in the very back 
of the courtroom, and he'd edge his way up toward the front. 
And it was like, finally it was like we were - at our breaks we were 
all talking together. It was like, you know, I don't know whether I made 
the suggestion to Amil, or whether we talked. I don't know how it came 
about. But Amil was like, "Well, let's get him on." We decided to bring 
him on. 
So Amil went ex parte back to the judge and talked to him and 
said, "Hey, I need to get him paid. We'd like to bring him on." 
And during that time - and I think that was early on; and then we 
would consult, and then I landed up - and this was all my doing. I landed 
up consulting with him on a couple right during the voir dire, because 
that's how frustrated I was getting. Like, "Feed me, tell me where I'm 
going with this." 
(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.171, L.12 - p.172, L.2l.) The fact that trial 
counsel relied upon someone who happened to wander into the courtroom evidences the 
defense team's lack of preparation to conduct voir dire. (See Exhibit 90, p.2 ("It was 
103 Although trial counsel indicates they had some limited training regarding the Colorado 
Method, it is unclear what quality and quantity of training they received. See Exhibit 90, 
p.2 n.2 (explaining that "various manifestations of the 'Colorado Method' [are] taught in 
places throughout the country, often times having nothing whatsoever to do with the 
actual 'Colorado Method"'). 
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apparent from reading the trial transcript that there was very little preparation, if any, put 
into this by the trial team. Relying upon Mr. Kehne shows that trial counsel was doing 
jury selection 'by the seat of their pants' which is wholly inadequate.").) "Rolfs 
involvement is irrefutable evidence that the defense team was floundering badly with the 
Colorado Method. Grabbing people who wander into and out of the courtroom to assist 
in one of the most critical aspects of trial is hardly the level of planning and skill 
envisioned by the Sixth Amendment's right to the effective assistance of counsel." 
(Exhibit 90, p.6.) 
Mr. Kehne's tenure as a jury selection consultant was as short-lived as it was 
random. Just one day after the court authorized trial counsel to use Mr. Kehne to assist 
with jury selection, the court objected to using Mr. Kehne to provide briefing on critical 
jury selection issues, namely the meaning of "mitigation impaired." (Tr., p. 2032, Ls.12-
24; p.2060, L.9 - p. 2062, L.17.) Trial counsel agreed to provide the briefing following 
the weekend break, but never did so, despite the fact that the court stated "I don't know 
anything about Whitt [sic]." (Tr., p.2063, Ls.1l-17; p.2032, Ls.21-22.) Wainwright v. 
Witt is a seminal case is death penalty jury selection jurisprudence and holds that jurors 
whose "views on [capital punishment] would 'prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of [their] duties ... .' are excludable for cause. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26 
(1985). For trial counsel not to educate the court on this seminal case is 
incomprehensible. In any case, by Monday morning, Mr. Kehne was no longer on the 
case, and trial counsel informed the court it did not intend to file briefing. (Tr., p.2067, 
Ls.1O-21.) Trial counsel were once again left to their own inadequate understanding of 
capital jury selection, and never again mentioned Witt. 
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The failure to brief the Witt issue illustrates trial counsel's utter unfamiliarity with 
the constitutional underpinnings of capital jury selection. Mr. Carr testified that, after 
speaking to Mr. Kehne, he could not find "anything meaningful regarding meaningful 
consideration to present to the judge." (Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.176, 
Ls.1O-l4.) This is black-letter law. Mr. Myshin testified that proponents ofthe Colorado 
Method people use the phrase "mitigation impaired," but Morgan does not use that 
terminology. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Ami! Myshin, 9114/06, p.107, Ls.16-2l.) While 
technically correct that the case law does not use the precise term "mitigation impaired," 
the phrase is well known shorthand for the concept that a juror who cannot give 
meaningful consideration to mitigation should be challenged for cause under Morgan. 
(Exhibit 90, p.12.) Mr. Myshin also testified that he had not read any cases dealing with 
the "mitigation impairment" upon which the Colorado Method is based, even though, of 
course, any method of capital jury selection is dependent upon United States Supreme 
Court precedent dealing with that concept, and Morgan and its progeny deal with the 
concept without necessarily using that precise phrase. (Tr., 9114/06 of deposition of Amil 
Myshin, pp.107-108; Exhibit 90, pp.12-13.) 
Trial counsel failed to understand or implement the most basic principles of the 
Colorado Method. The structure of the Colorado Method is extremely simple. It includes 
the identification of potential jurors in death penalty cases through a ranking system, 
based solely upon their responses regarding the death penalty, with ranking of one 
through seven, seven being automatic death penalty jurors who should always be 
challenged for cause. (Exhibit 90, p.3, pp.7-9.) At the end of the process, picking the 
jury is purely a matter of ranking where the only criteria for selection is based upon the 
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lowest number in the ranking system. (Exhibit 90, p.16.) A higher ranked juror will 
never be selected over a lower ranked juror regardless of other characteristics. (Exhibit 
90, p.16.) 
Trial counsel acknowledged that he did not prepare a strategy gomg into 
individual voir dire. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.155.) The lack of 
preparation, in addition to lack of understanding of the legal principles of capital jury 
selection and their application, led to that trial counsel's voir dire in every instance was 
ineffective in identifying and ranking jurors, in stripping jurors to help in the 
identification process, and in insulating or isolating jurors, or in challenging mitigation-
impaired jurors for cause. (Exhibit 90, p.17.) Mr. Hall relies on and incorporates herein 
by reference the entirety ofMr~ Lane's analysis of trial counsel's questioning of jurors, as 
set forth in Exhibits 89 and 90. Mr. Lane's concluded that: 
The voir dire conducted in this matter was among the worst examples 
of capital voir dire undersigned counsel has ever read. Defense counsel 
failed repeatedly to challenge jurors for cause even in the face of the juror 
telling the court and counsel that they would automatically vote for the 
death penalty or that they were substantially impaired in their ability to 
give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence. Defense counsel 
was unable to intelligently rank almost all of the jurors, except those who 
indicated that they were a virtual certain vote for death and even then, 
many of those jurors ultimately sat on the case. Defense counsel did 
virtually nothing to insulate potential life-giving jurors from feeling 
pressure in the deliberative process to have to justify their personal moral 
judgments. Defense counsel did virtually nothing to isolate strong death 
penalty proponents on the jury who would demand explanations from 
lifegivers. Defense counsel never discussed the differences between fact-
based decision making at the guilt phase and the normative personal 
decision making process based upon personal morality at the penalty 
phase with any juror. 
(Exhibit 90, pp.39-40 (emphasis added).) 
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Trial counsel also failed to realize that the Colorado Method did not preclude 
them from inquiring into traditional areas of voir dire, including jurors' exposure to pre-
trial pUblicity. For example, a juror who has been tainted by extensive pretrial publicity 
who has been rated a number 4 juror for death penalty beliefs should be challenged 
before a number 4 rated juror who has not been so tainted. (Exhibit 90, p.S.); see Claim 
DD,supra. 
In addition to those grounds set forth in the affidavit, Mr. Hall asserts that trial 
counsel should have moved to strike the following jurors for cause for the reasons set 
forth below.104 
Juror No.6 indicated she would have great difficulty with sequestration beyond a 
"few days." (Tr., p.lOS6, Ls. 8-11.) Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror No. 51 indicated that she is a regular Greenbelt user. (Tr., p.l829, Ls.1S-
24.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's familiarity with the Greenbelt biased her views of 
the crime and the Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror No. 62 knew Angie Abdullah, attended the same church, and knew "a lot 
of information about her." (Tr., p.2074, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's 
relationship with Angie Abdullah, the alleged victim in a near-simultaneous capital 
murder trial, biased her views of the crime and Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have 
moved to strike for cause. 
Juror No. 63 had hearing impediments, had to wear hearing aids, and suffered 
from hearing loss most of her life. (Tr., p.2117, L.22 - p.2118, L.3, p.2123, Ls.7-21.) 
Given the poor quality of the police interrogation tapes played to the jury, Mr. Hall 
104 Petitioner cannot further develop this claim due to the Court's refusal to allow 
Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel to interview jurors. 
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asserts that this juror was unable to hear critical evidence offered at trial. Trial counsel 
should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror No. 68 previously worked for moc, including at the maximum security 
prison. (Tr., p.22S1 - p.22S2.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's dealings with the 
correctional system, inmates, and death row inmates biased his views of the crime and 
Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
Juror No. 83 is married to a Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho. Her 
husband is specifically assigned to the moc. His job includes defending against 
conditions of confinement lawsuits, including those brought by death-sentenced inmates. 
(See Exhibit 92, Gomez v. Spalding, D. Idaho, Civ. 91-0299-S-LMB.) Conditions of 
confinement were referenced during the sentencing phase of Mr. Hall's trial. (See, e.g., 
Tr., p.4904 et seq. (testimony of Dennis Dean).) Her husband was sanctioned by the 
federal district court for opening prisoner mail during a conditions lawsuit, and possibly 
faced or faces bar sanctions. (Exhibits 91-93.) Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsel should 
have moved to strike this juror for cause. She ultimately served as the foreperson. It is 
hardly reasonable to assume that the wife of an advocate for the State in defending 
against death-sentences would not be affected by her husband's employment when 
determining whether to impose the death sentence. Further, Mr. Hall served a IO-year 
term in the moc during the period that this juror's husband served as the Deputy 
Attorney General. It is likely that her husband was familiar with Erick Hall and there is a 
reasonable probability that he shared discussions about inmates, possibly including 
Mr. Hall, as well as information about conditions of confinement and other matters that a 
juror might consider, appropriately or not, during the sentencing process with his wife. 
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In addition to the above, because a key State witness-Jay Rosenthal-also worked for 
the Attorney General's office, this juror was not able to objectively weigh his testimony. 
Furthermore, this juror worked for IDOC, which biased her views of the crime and 
Mr. Hall. Moreover, the juror's cousin was raped and murdered. It is unreasonable to 
assume that event did not color her views of crime and punishment. Mr. Hall asserts that 
event biased her views of the crime and Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to 
strike for cause. 
Juror No. 85 husband was an investigator for the U.S. Investigative Services. 
(Tr., pp.2547-2548.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror was unable to objectively weigh law 
enforcement testimony and had biased views toward the crime and Mr. Hall. 
Juror No. 102 admitted that his mind wanders in the afternoon. (Tr., p.2863, 
L.25-p.2864, L.3.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror was unable to hear evidence at trial 
and sentencing. 
Juror No. 110 works for the Department of Transportation and works with a 
Deputy Attorney General. (Tr., p.3020, Ls.19-20.) The juror works, with his son, with 
the Ada County Court. (Tr., p.3022, Ls.1 0-16.) The juror worked at the penitentiary for 
several years, and managed Correction Industries, and had inmates working for him. 
(Tr., p.3044, Ls.13-16, p.3045, Ls.5-6.) The juror worked for the Department of Law 
Enforcement. (Tr., p.3051, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's background biased 
his views against the crime and Mr. Hall. 
Juror No. 111 works for the Sheriff's Office and was a former neighbor of 
Detective Dave Smith, a key prosecution witness. (Tr., p.3074, Ls.6-7, p.3075, Ls.3-9.) 
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Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's background biased her views against the crime and 
Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause. 
In sum, trial counsel's attempt to use the Colorado Method was an abysmal 
failure, based on a lack of understanding of the principles underlying the method. Trial 
counsel further compounded the problem by not inquiring into specific areas of potential 
bias of individual jurors, all to Mr. Hall's prejudice. 
b. Prejudice 
As a result of trial counsel's utter failure to effectively employ the Colorado 
Method or its constitutional underpinnings, the jury consisted of many 7-rated jurors who 
should have been excused for cause or jurors who should have been rated 7, had they 
been properly examined during voir dire. The jurors who would have been inclined to 
give a life sentence were never adequately identified and given the tools to insulate their 
personal moral decision making from others on the jury who would demand explanations, 
justifications, or defenses to those moral judgments. 
There is a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that "defy analysis by 
'harmless error' standards." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). "Errors of this 
type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal i.e., affect substantial 
rights, without regard to their effect on the outcome. Id. As explained by the Supreme 
Court: 
Those cases, we have explained, contain a "defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself" ... Such errors" infect the entire trial process," .... and 
" necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair." ... Put another way, 
these errors deprive defendants of "basic protections" without which "a 
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for 
determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded as fundamentally fair." 
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!d. at 8-9. See also, James v. State,222 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. App. 2007) (presuming 
prejudice where one juror biased). Trial counsel is ineffective when he fails to 
question a prospective juror about information disclosed by the juror on a 
questionnaire, where the answers "raise[ ] legitimate questions about [the juror's] 
impartiality." State v. Lamere, 112 P.3d 1005 (Mont. 2005). 
Trial by a biased jury is structural error, and prejudice is presumed. Because 
impartiality goes to "the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional 
concept of trial by jury," Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965), whenever it is 
threatened, "the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close 
judicial scrutiny." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). See Ristaino v. Ross, 
424 U.S. 589, 596 (1973) (holding prejudice must be presumed with respect to potential 
bias under circumstances such that "impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by 
due process is posed"); see also, James v. State, supra (holding error is structural). 
If ever a case called for a presumption of prejudice, this is the one. Trial 
counsel's failure to ask even elementary questions, challenge for cause, or exercise 
peremptory challenges in anything more than a random manner, left Erick Hall with a 
jury that must be presumed biased. Even if bias is not presumed, there is enough record 
evidence to support Mr. Hall's claim that, but for the deficient performance of trial 
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a life sentence.105 . 
105 Even if Mr. Hall had the burden of showing actual juror bias, he has been precluded 
from developing it because of the Court's order prohibiting juror contact. 
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Juror No. 83 
As summarized by David Lane: 
The juror tells defense counsel that if the crime was premeditated, "then I 
think it should be the death penalty." (2518). There is no effort to strip the 
juror, however, by this answer she has pegged herself as an automatic 
death penalty juror. There is no effort by defense counsel to elicit 
responses from this juror regarding any other mitigation and shockingly, 
defense counsel never challenges her (or any other jurors who actually 
served) for cause, even though she is substantially impaired in her ability 
to give meaningful consideration to mitigation. 
(Exhibit 89, p.32.)106 
Of particular note, counsel inexplicably excused lower numbered jurors than Juror 
No. 83, which is a cardinal violation of the Colorado Method. (Exhibit 90, pAO.) This 
juror, Juror No. 83, was ranked a 7 on her questionnaire and a 6 in her voir dire, for a 
total numerical score of 13. She was never challenged by the defense even though based 
upon her numerical score, she was a virtual certain vote for death. Based upon the 
defense ratings, there were only four jurors peremptorily challenged by them who were 
rated either equally unfavorably or worse than juror number 83. Jurors numbered 60 and 
94 were challenged with questionnaire scores of 6 and a voir dire score of 7 for a 13 
composite score. This made sense as the voir dire score of 7 is usually given more weight 
than questionnaire scores. Jurors numbered 77 and 104 were 7 rated jurors in both 
categories and should have been a granted challenge for cause if made. The defense used 
peremptory challenges appropriately for those two jurors even though a complete record 
should have been made that those jurors were substantially impaired in their ability to 
give meaningful consideration to mitigation. In every other instance, however, the 
defense permitted juror number 83 to sit with a composite score of 13 yet used nine 
106 Mr. Lane's references transcript page citations in parentheses in his declaration. 
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peremptory challenges for lower rated jurors. The defense challenged juror number 1 
(composite score of 11); number 5 (composite 12); number 13 (composite 12) number 22 
(composite 11); number 30 (composite 11); number 41 (composite 10); number 54 
(composite 11); number 73 (composite 9) and; number 90 (composite 12). 
Juror No. 102 
Again, there was no effort by trial counsel to determine under what circumstances 
this juror would find the death penalty appropriate. (Exhibit 89, p.34.) "This is the most 
elementary task for any defense attorney in a capital case." (Exhibit 89, p.34.) Therefore, 
trial counsel would have no idea of when this juror would vote to impose death. 
Similar to Juror No. 83, trial counsel inexplicably failed to move to strike Juror 
No. 102 for cause, and failed to exercise a peremptory challenge on him. This juror, like 
Juror No. 83, was ranked a 7 on his questionnaire and a 6 in voir dire. Again, there is no 
reasonable explanation for leaving a higher rated juror than those struck with 
peremptories. 
Choosing jurors who were more likely to vote for death than the jurors who the 
defense was excusing represents an abandonment of any semblance of the Colorado 
method. (Exhibit 90, p.19.) There can be no justification for such a choice, and choosing 
a juror who is a virtual certain vote for death and excusing other jurors less likely to vote 
for death resulted in an unconstitutionally biased, mitigation-impaired jury in this case. 
Trial counsel utterly failed to "strip" jurors, i.e., ascertain their true feelings about 
the death penalty, and utterly failed to ascertain if jurors could give meaningful 
consideration to mitigation, as illustrated by the following examples. 
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Juror No.6 
Juror No. 6 is an example of a juror who needs stripping because she is hiding 
behind the cloak of manslaughter as an example of what is in her mind a "murder" which 
would not warrant the death penalty. (Exhibit 89, pp.18-19.) 
Trial counsel did not adequately strip this juror. He failed to determine how she 
felt about the death penalty when there is no crime of passion involved, and should have 
used the facts of the case at issue to do so. If trial counsel had used the facts alleged by 
the State, and the juror responded by saying that under those facts everyone would get 
death in her mind, she would be "substantially impaired in her ability to give meaningful 
consideration to mitigation" and would have been challenged successfully for cause. It is 
essential to keep in mind that the law mandates that no juror fail to give meaningful 
consideration to mitigation. (Exhibit 89, p.2I.) This juror indicated she would not be able 
to give meaningful consideration, when she said that childhood history and upbringing, 
would not be "a major in her decision." Inexplicably, trial counsel ranked this juror as a 
5 on the questionnaire and a 4 on voir dire. According to David Lane, "It is unknown 
why these rankings were given as the identification questions were completely lacking." 
(Exhibit 89, p.22.) 
Juror No. 51 
This juror provided "the classic juror answer, which requires stripping," when she 
said the death penalty is appropriate in some circumstances, but not all. (Exhibit 89, 
p.24.) Yet trial counsel made no effort to determine what those circumstances might be. 
"Defense counsel does not have the foggiest idea what the juror means by this response, 
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yet he does nothing to ascertain what the juror means. It is impossible to identify and 
rank this juror given the abject failure by defense counsel to strip the juror and ascertain 
what the juror's feelings are about the death penalty." (Exhibit 89, pp.24-25.) There is 
also no effort to determine what sort of mitigation would be meaningful to this juror. "[I]t 
was impossible to rank this juror and counsel had no idea what her views were on the 
death penalty." (Exhibit 89, p.25.) 
Juror No. 62 
The State grossly misled this juror in defining the degree of attention that must be 
given to mitigation as something she has to "listen to" but does not necessarily have to 
"pay attention" to. (Exhibit 89, p.25.) Trial counsel failed to object. Trial counsel made 
no effort to strip this juror: 
Defense counsel never identifies or ranks this juror in terms of what she 
believes regarding the death penalty. Clearly she is in favor of it, but no 
effort is made to determine whether given the horrific facts of the Hall 
case, this juror could really ever consider any verdict but death. There was 
no effort to strip the juror or to assess whether in this case she was an 
automatic death penalty juror. It appears likely that an automatic vote for 
death upon conviction was approved by defense counsel. 
(Exhibit 89, p.26.) In her questionnaire, this juror gave every indication that she would 
not be able to give meaningful consideration to mitigating factors such as alcohol and 
drug abuse, childhood trauma, and poor socio-economic status. She also said she would 
use the death penalty as a deterrent, an "eye for an eye." 
Juror No. 63 
Trial counsel engaged in no stripping of this juror and failed to ascertain her 
views on the death penalty. 
In her questionnaire she indicates that she thinks the death penalty needs 
to be enforced more often to be a good deterrent. (2125). If everything had 
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been proven she could give the death penalty. (2128). Again, this is an 
example of a juror giving an indication that if guilt is proven, death is a 
virtual certainty. Counsel should have pushed the juror with stripping 
questions such as "assume guilt is proven beyond all doubt, and it is a 
cold-blooded, brutal kidnapping, rape murder of an absolutely blameless, 
innocent victim. What do you think about the death penalty under those 
circumstances?" If the juror indicates that under those circumstances, no 
mitigation on earth would result in anything but a death penalty, the juror 
should be challenged for cause as substantially impaired in her ability to 
give meaningful consideration to mitigation. This never occurs and 
defense counsel is never able to intelligently rank this juror. 
(Exhibit p.89, p.28.) Trial counsel inexplicably ranked this juror a 4. 
Juror No. 68 
This juror indicated strong pro-death penalty feelings when he stated "the crime and 
penalty match each other." He also stated that "if you kill someone then your life is on 
the line at that point in time." (2237). This juror indicated that he would not be able to 
consider mitigation. When asked "If a person rapes and murders and then claims he was 
taking drugs at the time, do you think that deserves a lesser penalty," the juror answered 
''No.'' (2237) According to David Lane, "This juror is clearly an automatic death penalty 
juror and should be rated a 7." However, trial counsel shockingly rated him as 4 based 
on his questionnaire and a 5/6 after voir dire. There is no reasonable explanation for this 
rating. 
Juror No. 93 
Trial counsel should have move to strike Juror No. 93 for cause: 
The juror on her questionnaire indicated that she was a ten out of ten in 
her strength for the death penalty. She has "no problem with the death 
penalty as long as I'm absolutely positive, no question in my mind the 
guilt." (2715). In her questionnaire she apparently said that she believes in 
an "eye for an eye." (2718). There is no effort made by defense counsel to 
challenge an obvious 7 who will automatically vote for the death penalty 
upon a conviction. There is no effort to strip the juror and tell her to 
assume that Mr. Hall is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and she is quite 
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certain of his guilt. She would almost certainly have said that in that case 
she would impose the death penalty. 
(Exhibit 89, pp.33-34.) As illustrated by the above examples, trial counsel failed 
miserably to strip jurors or to determine their abilities to give meaningful consideration to 
mitigation. 
Trial counsel also failed to insulate jurors who may have voted for life or isolate 
those jurors who seemed likely to vote for death: 
The concept of the "Jurors Bill of Rights" was developed by David 
Wymore and the Colorado Public Defenders. This idea is designed to 
empower weaker life giving jurors and cause pro-death penalty jurors to 
not only back off, but to even have them protect life givers. It is designed 
to "insulate and isolate" each juror from the pressures exerted by other 
jurors. In essence, it instructs jurors that they are to scrupulously follow 
the law and make a personal moral judgment based upon their own 
reasoning and moral judgment as to whether death is the appropriate 
punishment in a given case. In other words, the decision to execute is not 
deemed a collective decision. It is the individualized determinations of 
twelve separate jurors which is expressed through the verdict. This is 
precisely what the law requires. 
(Exhibit 89, pp.11-12.) Trial counsel did not understand the concept. Instead of properly 
educating the jurors about insulating and isolating, trial counsel repeatedly engaged in 
meaningless questioning about "bullying." (See e.g., Exhibit 89, pp.26, 34.) 
Additionally, effective insulating/isolating can only occur after ajuror has been 
identified, i.e., properly ranked. 
4. Conclusion 
Trial counsel's performance during voir dire was shockingly inadequate, and their 
attempts to use the Colorado Method were wholly ineffective due to their lack of 
understanding of the method, their lack of understanding of the constitutional 
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underpinnings of that method or any capital jury selection method, and their lack of 
preparedness. Their failures led to the impaneling of a biased, mitigation-impaired jury. 
GG. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Adequately Challenge Juror No. 60 For Cause 
Trial counsel failed to adequately move to strike prospective Juror No. 60 for 
cause. During the voir dire, the juror indicated she thought "they should get the death 
penalty" if defendant "thought about it." (Tr., pp.2017-2018.) The juror flat out stated 
that, once guilt was established, there was no issue left. (Tr., p.2020, L.l - p.8 ("What 
else do you need to know [once guilt is established]?"); see Tr., p.2020-2021(stating 
circumstances of birth, character, sympathy and mercy do not matter in deciding 
punishment).) Trial counsel seemingly started to explore whether the juror would be an 
automatic death penalty juror. (See Tr., pp.2020-2021.) The prosecutor eventually 
objected, and trial counsel attempted to explain that the juror was "substantially 
mitigation impaired." Trial counsel moved to strike her for cause, which was denied. 
When the Court asked for a definition of "mitigation impaired," trial counsel had no 
ready answer. (Tr., p. 2032, Ls.12-24; p.2060, L.9 - p. 2062, L.17.) The Court then 
denied their motion to strike the juror for cause. Furthennore, trial counsel stated they 
would provide briefmg, which never happened. See Claim GG, supra, incorporated 
herein by reference. Thus, trial counsel had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the 
juror, when, if properly prepared, the motion to strike for cause would have been granted. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 287 
01~~Q 
HR. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Ensure That All Proceedings Were Recorded And That Mr. Hall Was 
Present For All Proceedings 
Numerous unrecorded proceedings were held in chambers without Mr. Hall's 
presence. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to protect 
Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to be present and his due process right to meaningful 
appellate and post-conviction review. The ABA Guidelines provide in part: 
[C]ounsel at every stage must ensure that there is a complete record 
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions, 
statements of grounds, questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral 
and written arguments of both sides, discussions among counsel and the 
court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given 
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the 
parties. If a court refuses to allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel 
should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the substance of the 
court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of 
what transpired in the unrecorded proceeding. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8. See also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 
358 (1993). Proceedings that Mr. Hall is aware took place off the record and outside his 
presence include: 
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed a note received from the jury 
foreman during jury deliberations. (Tr., p. 5463, L. 25 - p. 5464, L. 11. 
(noting that the jury foreperson was concerned that her privacy, I.e., 
identity, had been violated in open court).) 
• An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court and trial counsel in 
which the parties discussed retaining attorney Rolf Kehne as a jury 
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 3-8.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's 
presence. (See also, Deposition of Amil Myshin, 9114/06, p.81, Ls.16-18 
("So I went into Judge Neville's chambers and I said, 'I want to do this,' 
and he said 'Okay."') 
• An unrecorded discussion between trial counsel and the Court in which 
the parties discussed trial counsel's intention not to file a brief, and the 
decision to not employ Mr. Kehne "from this point forward" as a jury 
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consultant. (Tr., p. 2067, Ls. 10-20.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's 
presence. 
• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed expert access to Mr. Hall, use of 
experts, and the defense's Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p. 530, L.9 - p. 535, 
L. 20.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's presence. 
• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
the State in which the parties discussed the videotapes and transcripts of 
the interrogations of Mr. Hall. (Tr., p. 359, L. 9 - p. 362, L.3.) Mr. Hall 
was not present, apparently at the request of trial counsel. (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 
3-12.) 
• An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and 
possibly the State in which the parties discussed the logistics and 
substance of what portions of the videotapes would be shown and "the 
issues that Defense was concerned about." (Tr., p. 431, Ls. 3-17.) There 
was no mention of Mr. Hall's presence. 
Erick Hall had the right, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment, to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings where his 
presence would contribute to the proceeding's fairness. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 
730 (1987). 
II. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Object To The Lack Of A Willfulness Instruction Regarding The Elements 
Of First Degree Murder 
The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in 
Claim A.2, supra. Jury instruction 13A listed the elements of first degree murder, but did 
not include the elements that the killing be ''willful'' and "deliberate," only that it be 
"premeditated" and committed with "malice aforethought." (R., p.693 (Jury Instruction 
No. 13A).) The alternative for premeditation was that the killing occurred during the 
perpetration of a felony. Idaho Code § 18-4003 specifies that "All murder which is ... 
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the 
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first degree." Thus, omitting the willful and deliberate components in the instructions 
was error. 
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the omission, in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment, because the omissions clearly render Instruction 13A an erroneous 
statement of the law, and failing to object to the instruction led to a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 
521 (1979); Polk v. Sandoval, _ F.3d _, 2007 WL 2597437 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing 
and remanding murder conviction on due process grounds where jury instruction on 
premeditation relieved the state of proving elements three necessary elements of 
premeditation, willfulness, and deliberation). While the subsequent instruction number 
15 includes the terms willful and deliberate, the elements instruction does not. 
Furthermore, while instruction 15 defines "deliberate," there is no definition of "willful" 
in the instructions. The omissions clearly would have misled the jury into believing the 
state need not demonstrate either deliberateness or willfulness to prove first degree 
murder, thereby reducing the State's burden of proof. 
As the Court observed in State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363, 690 P.2d 293,298 
(1984), there are distinct definitions associated with the terms willfulness, deliberation, 
and premeditation. Each of these terms must be sufficiently defined to the jury in order 
to make the distinction between first degree murder and second degree murder clear. Id. 
(finding instructions did not blur the distinction between first and second degree murder). 
On the one hand, the jury was informed of the definition of murder, and 
that it involves killing with malice. Malice was defined as a "state of 
mind" manifested by an intentional or deliberate act. The jury was 
instructed that malice may be express or implied. These were proper 
definitions of malice and its interrelationship with the definition of 
murder. 
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Further, the jury was instructed that if nothing more than malice, or the 
intent to do any unlawful act, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
the crime could not be first degree murder. The jury was instructed that if 
it could find beyond a reasonable doubt three other elements-willfulness, 
deliberation and premeditation-then the defendant was guilty of first 
degree murder. Malice, the intent to act feloniously, was properly 
distinguished from willfulness, the intent to take life, premeditation, 
conceived beforehand, and deliberation, done with reflection. The jury 
was properly instructed on the additional elements to prove first degree 
murder, and thus there was no error. 
In contrast to Aragon, the jury in Mr. Hall's case was not properly or sufficiently 
instructed regarding the elements that must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable 
doubt to justify a first degree murder conviction. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hall 
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction, and there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial 
counsel objected to the omissions. 
JJ. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Challenge the State's Presentation of DNA Evidence 
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony challenging the 
testimony of Kathryn Colombo who testified for the State that there was only one 
contributor to the DNA evidence taken from Ms. Henneman's body. 
As noted elsewhere in this petition, to prepare for the State's evidence, expert 
assistance is often necessary. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1 
("Analyzing and interpreting such evidence is impossible without consulting experts-
107 Notably, the jury in Aragon was instructed that malice is express ''when there is 
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature", 
while it is implied ''when no considerable provocation appears, or when the 
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." Aragon, 
107 Idaho at 361,690 P.2d at 297. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 291 
01~4~ 
whether pathologists, serologists, micro analysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists, 
translators, or others.") In this case, trial counsel failed to challenge the DNA testimony 
presented by the State through Kathryn Colombo. 
The jury was left with the impression that there was only one male contributor to 
the DNA sample, when it is likely that there were two contributors. While Ms. Colombo 
testified that there was a "possibility" of a second male contributor to the DNA sample, 
she downplayed that possibility to the extent it effectively did not exist. (Tr., p.4466, 
1.25 - p.4467, L.4 ("It was over the stutter cut-off, but just barely."); p.4472, Ls.19-21 
(" .. .it means that Erick Virgil Hall is the primary source of the DNA obtained from the 
sperm fraction"); p.4478, 1.8 ("There's only one male primary source."); pp.4489, Ls.6-
21; 4525, 1.23 - p.4526, 1.25); see also Exhibit 94 (Cellmark, Amended Report, dated 
4/28/03).) Trial counsel's examination focused on the presence of a 13th allele, an aspect 
of DNA that could neither be attributed to Ms. Henneman nor Erick Hall. While 
Ms. Colombo acknowledged that the 13th allele "could be the true nature of the sample," 
she effectively minimized its importance by repeatedly testifying that it could be a 
"stutter artifact," a ''technical artifact," or "contamination." (Tr., p.4466, 1.20 - p.4467, 
L.16.) Trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the State's expert to minimize the 
probability of a second semen contributor by labeling it a mere "possibility" among 
other unlikely possibilities. Trial counsel was aware of the problems with the DNA 
evidence, and even acknowledged his belief that the presence of the 13 th allele indicated 
"that there was somebody else involved." (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.68, 
Ls.8-20.) In fact, trial counsel retained a DNA expert but for out-of-court consultation 
only. (See Exhibit 95.) Trial counsel could have presented expert DNA testimony but 
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inexplicably resorted to cross-examination without the assistance of, or the presentation 
of evidence by, an independent defense DNA expert. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil 
Myshin, p.205, L.3 - p.206, L.8; see also Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.216, 
Ls.3-16 (explaining that the defense theory ''was that somebody else did it, or there was 
somebody with Erick"); Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.357, Ls.17-20 (agreeing 
that there was not much evidence beyond the DNA evidence which connected Mr. Hall to 
the crime); p.358, Ls.13-23 (admitting he hoped that the jury would not find the DNA 
evidence compelling); p.377, Ls.2-12 (admitting feeling the DNA evidence against 
Mr. Hall was strong); p.388, Ls.11-25 (acknowledging that there ''was some abnonnality 
with the DNA").) 
The State's interpretation of the DNA evidence effectively excluded any other 
contributor to the DNA sample from Ms. Henneman's body other than Erick Hall. As a 
consequence, the jury had no reason to believe that anybody other than Mr. Hall was 
responsible for the rape and murder of Ms. Henneman. Had trial counsel presented the 
testimony of a DNA analyst to support their defense theory with more than an ineffective 
cross-examination and argument, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall would 
not have been convicted of murder or sentenced to death. 
In support of this claim, Mr. Hall submits the affidavit of Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. 
Dr. Hampikian teaches at Boise State University and his expertise is in forensic biology 
and DNA analysis. (Exhibit 96.) After reviewing the data and the testimony, 
Dr. Hampikian is of the opinion, "to a reasonable degree of medical probability," that 
"the semen sample recovered from the victim includes DNA from more than one 
male." (Exhibit 96.) Dr. Hampikian's analysis demonstrates that the 13th allele is a 
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"real" DNA peak, and it indicates a second male contributor. Had trial counsel called an 
expert to testify, the jury would have heard testimony similar to Dr. Hampikian's 
conclusion: "The most direct interpretation of the DNA evidence presented at trial is that 
a second male contributor is included in the semen sample recovered from the victim. 
The best evidence of this is the 13th allele at D5." (Exhibit 96.) 
Trial counsel's failure to adequately consult with an expert at trial and failure to 
call an expert to testify, left the jury with a muddled, confusing picture of the DNA 
evidence at best and the belief that the 13th allele was a meaningless bit of stutter or 
contamination at worst, leaving Mr. Hall as the sole moral agent involved in the 
homicide. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland, and his 
convictions and sentences should be vacated. 
KK. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Eliciting 
Evidence Of Other Bad Acts 
Through careless cross-examination, I.e., by asking open-ended, non-leading 
questions on cross, trial counsel elicitied evidence suggesting that Mr. Hall was suspected 
of committing rapes or other crimes evidenced by DNA other than that of the victim in 
the underlying case. (Tr., p. 4428, Ls. 9-13.) 
Rachel Cutler, the lab manager for the Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
Laboratory, testified that she received one envelope containing two boxes, each of which 
contained saliva swabs from Mr. Hall. (Tr., p.4424, L.16 - p.4426, L.19.) She sent out 
the swabs from one box to Cellmark for DNA testing. On cross-examination, trial 
counsel carelessly elicited the fact that the samples contained in the second box were 
tested in another case: 
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Q. Good morning. 
A. Good morning. 
Q. What did you do with the other box? 
A. I left it in the evidence envelope it arrived in. 
Q. And what happened to it after that? 
A. It was analyzed in a separate case. 
Q. And stored then in the lab? 
A. For a time. 
Q. Thank you. 
(Tr., p.4428, Ls.5-16.) Trial counsel knew that Mr. Hall was charged in another rape-
murder, and should have known that the second box would have been used for evidence 
against Mr. Hall in that case. While perhaps appropriate in a case involving a defendant 
not suspected in any other crime, asking that question in this case was careless and 
constituted deficient perfonnance. 
The answer elicited was damning. Clearly, exposing the jurors to evidence of 
Mr. Hall's involvement in another crime-one requiring DNA, and thus likely another 
rape or murder-is highly prejudicial at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. There 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels' elicitation of the highly prejudicial 
evidence, the outcome of the trial and sentencing would have been different. 
LL. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For The Guilt-
Innocence Phase Of Trial By Failing To Conduct An Adequate 
Investigation Of The Possible Connection Between Lynn Henneman's 
Murder And Patrick Hoffert's Suicide 
Mr. Hall incorporates herein by reference Claims B.3.c and ii. 
MM. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Object To Shackling Or Failing To Adequately Object To Evidence Of 
Defendant's Custodial Status 
Mr. Hall incorporates herein by reference Claims BB. 
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V. PRAYERS FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this 
Honorable Court: 
1. To allow further civil discovery as warranted by receipt and review of 
pending discovery disclosures pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b); 
2. For leave to amend the Final Amended Petition as more information 
becomes available upon receipt of discovery; 
3. For an evidentiary hearing on the merits upon completion of discovery; 
4. For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against 
Mr. Hall; 
5. For such other, or further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable. 
DATED this 5th of October, 2007. 
P~M.~ 
I.w MARKJ.ACKLEY 
D - Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
j)~!r( .. J~ 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 5S. 
County of Ada ) 
Erick Hall, being first duly swom. deposes and says: 
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action: that I have read the foregoing 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the 
contents thereof. and that the facts contained therein are tme and correct as I verily 
believe based upon his review of the record, conversations with Petitioner. 
DATED this __ day of October, 2007. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED A.ND SWOR..N to before me this __ day of October, 1007. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing ___________ _ 
My commission expires ____ _ 
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Affidavit of Mark Cunningham, Ph.D., dated October 1, 2007 
Curriculum Vitae of Mark Cunningham, Ph.D. 
Transcript of Deposition of Amil Myshin, taken on September 14, 2006, with 
deposition exhibits 
Transcript of Deposition of Amil Myshin, taken on November 16, 2006, with 
deposition exhibits 
Transcript of Deposition ofD.C. Carr, taken on September 13, 2006 
Exhibits to Transcript of Deposition of D.C. Carr, taken on September 13,2006 
Transcript of Deposition ofD.C. Carr, taken on December 8, 2006 
Third Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas, dated September 26,2007 
Search results for Shannon Pambrun using "People Finder" 
Search results for Shannon Pambrun using "People Finders" 
Affidavit of Shannon Pambrun, dated September 4, 2007 
Affidavit of Frank Owen McCracken, Sr., dated April 7, 2006 
Affidavit of Tiffaney Leandra Conner, dated April 8, 2006 
Affidavit ofKimberlyA. Bacon, dated April 9, 2006 
Affidavit ofShawnra McCracken Hemming, dated April 7, 2006 
Mfidavit of Tamara McCracken, dated April 7, 2006 
Affidavit of Jeff Langston, dated March 24,2007 
Affidavit of Sophronia Selby, dated March 23, 2007 
Affidavit of Harry Selby, dated March 23, 2007 
Affidavit of Cookie Quirk, dated April 8, 2006 
Boise Police Department! Ada County Sheriff, Supplemental Report, dated 
9/24/00, regarding interviews of Lisa Lewis and Peggy Jean Hill 
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31 Garden City Police Department, report by Detective Stephen Bartlett, dated 
October 24, 2000, re~ardin~ Patrick Hoffert suicide 
32 Affidavit of Lisa Lewis, dated February 10, 2006 
33 Affidavit of Peggy Jean Hill, dated February 10,2006 
34 Second Affidavit of Lisa Lewis, dated September 14,2007 (with lead sheets) 
35 Affidavit of Peggy Jean Hill, dated September 17,2007 (with lead sheets) 
36 Affidavit of Michael J. Shaw, dated August 31, 2007 
37 CD of Audio of interview of Lisa Lewis by Glen Elam, conducted on August 12, 
2004 
38 Transcript of audio of interview of Lisa Lewis by Glen Elam, conducted on 
Augu_st 12,2004 
39 Notes from Glen Elam to John Anzuoni regarding task to interview Ms. Muncie 
40 Affidavit of Evelyn Denise Dunaway, dated April 14, 2006 
41 Affidavit of Jennifer Demunbrun, dated September 7, 2006 
42 Affidavit of Timothy Turley, dated November 30,2006 
43 Affidavit of Laura Turley, dated July 3,2006 
44 Affidavit of Amber Lynn (peterson) Fox, dated June 7, 2006 
45 CD of Power Point used in State's closing argument in case no. H0300518 
46 Affidavit of Dr. Sally S. Aiken, dated April 14,2006 
47 Garden City Police Department, General Report by Detective Hess, dated 
December 4, 1991, r~garding alleged rape of Norma Jean Oliver 
48 State v. Erick Hall, Indictment, Ada County Case No. 91-99, filed December 19, 
1991 
49 State v. Erick Hall, Amended Information/Indictment, Ada County Case 
No.HCR18591, filed April 23, 1991 
50 State v. Erick Hall, Court Minutes, Ada County Case No. HCR185911 
18094117804, showing sentence of 5 years, with one year fixed on Case No. 
HCR18591 
51 CDs containing interview of Norma Jean Oliver, conducted in West Virginia on 
April 8, 2006, by Sharon Callis 
52 Transcript of interview of Norma Jean Oliver, conducted in West Virginia on 
April 8, 2006, by Sharon Callis 
53 State v. Erick Hall, transcript of grand jury proceedings, Ada County Grand Jury 
Case No. 18591 (FILED UNDER SEAL) 
54 Affidavit of Joi Reno, dated September 12,2007 
55 PSI, State v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No. HCR18591 (FILED UNDER 
SEAL) 
56A CD of interview of Erick Hall by Detective Hess on December 4, 1991 
56B CD of interview of Norma Jean Oliver by Detective Hess on December 4, 1991 
57A Transcript of interview of Erick Hall by Detective Hess on December 4, 1991 
57B Transcript of interview Norma Jean Oliver by Detective Hess on December 4, 
1991 
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58 Registers of Action from Payette County Juvenile Magistrate Court, State v. 
Norma Jean Oliver 
59 Boise Police Department Juvenile Processing Form, regarding Payette County 
case no. 90059215, regarding Norma Jean Oliver apprehension as a runaway, 
dated 10/5/90 
60 Boise Police Department, Case Status Report and General Report, regarding 
apprehension of runaway of Norma Jean Oliver on 11118/90 
61 Boise Police Department, Miscellaneous Report and Case Status Report, DR no. 
127-536, occurring on 12/2/91, regarding apprehension of Norma Jean Oliver as a 
runaway at the Sands Motel 
62 Boise Police Department, Miscellaneous Report, Dr no. 127-686, occurring on 
12/3/91, regarding arrest of Joi Reno at the Sands Motel, and referencing finding 
runaway_Norma Jean Oliver 
63 DSM IV -TR, description of Bipolar Disorder 
64 DSM IV -TR, description of Borderline Personality Disorder 
65 St. Alphonsus Hospital, report of Dr. Vickman, dated December 4,1991, 
regarding alleged rape of Norma Jean Oliver 
66 PSI, State v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No. CR 17804 (FILED UNDER 
SEAL) 
67 PSI, State v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No. CR M9400534 (FILED UNDER 
SEAL) 
68 Boise Police Department/Ada County Sheriffs Department, Standard Statement 
Form of Evelyn Dunaway, DR no. 208-655 
69 State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County case no. M02039021H0200584: Commitment 
and Cover Sheet with handwritten note regarding deal 
70 State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County case no. M02039021H0200584: Registers of 
Action and Court Minutes, showing representation by both Amil Myshin and D.C. 
Carr 
71 State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County case no. H0301398, Register of Actions 
(showing order dated 12/5/03 for Substance Abuse Evaluation and order dated 
6/30/04 order for probation including Psychiatric Evaluation); Order for 
Substance Abuse Evaluation, Providing Funds, & Access to Defendant; Judgment 
of Conviction and Commitment; Order Suspending Sentence and Order of 
Probation; showing representation by Amil Myshin 
72 State v. April Sebastian, Register of Actions, Order Suspending Sentence and 
Order of Probation, and Court Minutes from 11130/04, Ada County Case No. 
H0400228 
73 State v. April Sebastian, Register of Actions, Ada County case no. M9513860 
74 State v. April Sebastian, Register of Actions, Ada County Case No. M9703840 
75 Michael Jauhola v. State, Ada County case no. SPOT0100492D, (Tr., p. 4083, L. 
22 - p. 4085, L. 14) 
76 State v. Abdullah, Ada County case no. H0201384: R., pp.114-115; R.pp.142-
146; and Tr., Vol. I, p.27, Ls.II-16 
77 State v. Darrell Pavne Idaho Supreme Court, case no. 28589: Tr., pp.4684-4862 
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78 State v. Jauhola, Idaho Supreme Court, case nos. 27490/31435: Tr.,pp.2858-321 0 
79 State v. Thomas Creech, Idaho Supreme Court, case nos. 10252,3/27/95: Tr., 
pp.365-419 
80 State v. Robin Row, Idaho Supreme Court, case nos. 18945, 11112/93: Tr., 
pp.4013-4040 
81 "Inadequate anesthesia in lethal injection for execution," The Lancet, 2005 :365: 
pp.1412-14 
82 State's Response To The Discovery Order, dated 3/15107 
83 State's Supplemental Response to the Discovery Order, dated 6/15107 
84 Idaho Department of Corrections, Offender Classification information 
85 Idaho Department of Corrections, Directive regarding policy 
86 Transcripts ofKTVB news coverage ofLynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon 
homicides (including interview with juror James Kennedy) 
87 State v. Erick Hall, Complaint, Ada County Case No. M0303573 
88 Idaho Statesman articles(bound separately - 2 volumes) 
89 Declaration of David Lane, dated April 16, 2006 
90 Second Declaration of David Lane, dated June 14,2007 
91 ACLU News Article regarding Timothy McNeese, dated September 15, 1999 
92 Gomez v. Spaulding, Case No. CN 91-0299-S-LMB (D. Idaho), Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Memorandum Decision and Order Relating to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions, filed September 13, 1999, (imposing sanctions against 
Deputy Attorney Generals Stephanie Altig and Timothy McNeese) 
93 Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1188 (9tn Cir. 2001) (upholding imposition of 
sanctions against Deputy Attorney Generals Stephanie Altig and Timothy 
McNeese) 
94 Cellmark, amended report, dated April 28, 2003 
95 Forensic Analytical, letter to Ada County Public Defender, dated May_ 4, 2004 
96 Affidavit of Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., dated April 14,2006 
97 Affidavit of Erick Hall (to be submitted) 
98 State v. Erick Hall, Ada County case no. HCR18591, Register of Actions (NJO 
rape case, shows that PSI ordered released in 10103) 
99 State v. Erick Hall, Ada County case no. HCR18591, Order Releasing PSI, (NJO 
rape case, shows that PSI ordered released in 10103 to Amil) 
100 Idaho State Police evidence receipts, affidavit and report dated December 6, 1991, 
regarding results of sex crimes kit on Norma Jean Oliver 
101 Trial counsel's copies of pictures introduced at trial as State's Exhibits 141-142, 
145-
102 State v. Erick Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518, Response to Discovery, 
including discovery log dated July 22, 2003 
103 Affidavit of Wade Spain, dated October 2,2007 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofIdaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
MARKJ. ACKLEY, I.S.R # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL 
VERIFICATION PAGE WITH 
NOTARY SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of 
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following docwnent: Original Verification 
Page with Notary Seal to Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Dated this ~ day of October, 2007. 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY 
SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1 
.' 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the 
contents thereof, and that the facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily 
believe based upon his review of the record, conversations with Petitioner. 
IIfL DATED this ~ day of October, 2007. 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
Petitioner 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of October, 2007. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
• 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /AYOfOctober, 2007 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL 
VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S 
OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
--
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile X Hand Delivery 
__ U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile X Hand Delivery 
~la<~ 
BARBARA THOMAS 
Administrative Assistant 
NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY 
SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 2 
I~ , 
OR\ G\NA L 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
NQ~----~~~~~-
- FILED ? L ()>>] A.M. ______ RM· ...... 2"-----'_~_ 
OCT 1 9 2007 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------------) 
CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 
97 TO THE FINAL AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of 
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following document: Exhibit 97 to Final 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Affidavit of Erick Virgil Hall, dated 
October 18, 2007). 
Dated this [1-fL-..day of October, 2007. 
£,,~MLM-0~ 
P.N. AM. SWENSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
NOTICE OF FILING 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lq~ day of October, 2007 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 97 TO THE 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
lMSI 
POBOX51 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S 
OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
NOTICE OF FILING 
~ U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
--
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
-Z-O,,- Hand Delivery 
flt~h( . J~ 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
""'M 
MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARKJ. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
----------------------------) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss 
County of Ada. ) 
Erick Virgil Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge; 
2. During the course of my trial in this case I wore a "leg brace" for all in court 
appearances; 
3. The "leg brace" was worn under my clothing and would lock, causing my leg to remain 
in a stiff position when I stood up; 
<' ..R. e \K{ £:' J4/ ~ .1,:{1( To sit back down again, I had to push on a 9J.itt6n to unlock the brace - this would have 
been noticeable to the jury; 
t~ £. U// 
5. The brace made clicking '!!lffl l'(UViilg noises; the jurors would have been able to hear 
these noises every time I stood up. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
10; ljl/20.Q7 15: 39 FAX 208 
_ .. STATE APPELLATE PD I4l 002 
'ik DATED this Ii day of October, 2007. 
AFFIDA VIT OF ERICK VlRGIl HALL 2 
I 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
Il10. __ --:;:: ___ _ 
• '4 FILIj) 
--_J....J.iM __ _ 
OCT 292007 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CIeI1< 
By M. STROMER 
0CPUrY [ffi (E © r? P \\!1 ~ [Q) 
OCT 292007 
ADA CC'J!I!:V 
PROSECUTING ATIORNEYS OFFICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
Case No. SPOT0500155 
STATE'S MOTION FOR 
ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO FINAL 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves the Court for its order granting additional time to the State to 
make the State's response to the final Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The 
undersigned is in the process of making response, but due to the length of the petition and the 
nature of the issues involved, is unable to complete the response by the previously set date of 
November 2, 2007. The State requests additional time, until Friday, December 7, 2007. The 
STATE'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
fINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF (HALL), Page 1 
gned has spoken to Mark Ackley of the office of the State Appellate Public Defender 
about this motion. Mr. Ackley offers no objection. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ;?{; day of October 2007. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
delivered to Mark J. Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703, through the United States Mail, postage prepaid this 
14L day of October 2007. 
'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF (HALL), Page 2 
Session: Neville110907 
Session: Neville110907 
Session Date: 2007/11/09 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Whiting, Laura 
Clerk (s) : 
Ellis, Janet 
State Attorneys: 
Haws, Joshua 
Public Defender(s) : 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s): 
Case ID: 0004 
Division: DC 
Session Time: 08:35 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Defendant: STATE OF ID AHO 
Co-D~fendant(s) : 
2007/11/09 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
11:21:15 - Operator 
Recording: 
11:21:15 - New case 
, STATE OF ID AHO 
11:21:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Tme as set for status conference. 
11:22:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Courtroom: CR501 
The Court would like to set November 15, 2007 @ 2:00 p.m. fo 
r hearing on 
11:23:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
petitioner's motion for permissive appeal and to allow Court 
time to review 
11:24:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
in camera the medical reports and then set December 19, 2007 
Page 1 
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Session: Neville110907 
@ 9:00 a.m. for 
11:25:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
any other hearings that counsel were ready for. 
11:26:11 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated State would probably file Motion to Dismi 
ss, do not think 
11:27:11 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
could argue that by Dec. 19th. 
11:27:21 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated counsel stipulated to allow by Dec. 7th fo 
r the State's 
11:27:42 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
response. 
11:28:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would keep the 19th open for what other matters counse 
1 might have 
11:29:52 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
11:33:14 - Operator 
Recording: 
11:33:14 - Record 
, STATE OF ID AHO 
11:33:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court will identify Thrusday, January 17, 2008 @ 1:30 p. 
m. and continue 
11:33:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
through to Friday, January 18, 2008 @ 9:00 for half the day. 
11:34:46 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated would like to make a record of an objecti 
on of 
11:35:14 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
incorporating the State's Order for Juror Contact that incor 
porates findings 
11:38:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court has viewed the order incorporates the August 8th 
11:39:46 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated objects to the State's argument that the 
Court 
11:40:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
incorporated. 
11:40:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will protect the petitioner's record 
11:40:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated received the Dodd documents as well as No 
rma Jean Oliver 
11:41:17 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
PSI transcript 
11:41:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Page 2 
O~382 
beSSlon: Neville110907 
Court noted that in Mr. Ackley's agenda 
11:41:35 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
Page 3 
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Session: Neville111507 , 
Session: Nevillell1507 
Session Date: 2007/11/15 
Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Reporter: Wolf, Sue 
Clerk(s) 
Ellis, Janet 
St.a te At torneys: 
Public Defender(s) 
Prob. Officer(s): 
Court interpreter(s) 
Case ID: 0002 
Division: DC 
Session Time: 11:05 
Case Number: SPOT0500155D 
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL 
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
Co-Defendant(s) 
2007/11/15 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
15:00:42 - Operator 
Recording: 
15:00:42 - New case 
STATE OF IDAHO 
15:01:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole 
present on behalf of petitioner 
15:01:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Courtroom: CR504 
Court here on Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
15:02:29 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson argued motion, will primarily rest on briefs sub 
mitted. Request 
15:02:47 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Court consider the Court's order denying juror contact. No 
rule that 
15:03:30 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
prohibits juror contact but believe have made showing to all 
ow to go up on 
15:04:07 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
appeal. Also regarding Glen Elam, denial of that deposition 
believe showing 
15:04:31 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
made there are matters controlling, that would allow to go 0 
n appeal. 
15:05:03 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne believes State has said all that it needs to say, 
Page J 
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Sess~on: Neville111507 
believe that 
15:05:35 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
allowing to go on appeal now would set back another year to 
year and half. 
15:05:51 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Regarding Mr. Elam, no showing made that Mr. Elam would have 
anything new to 
15:06:16 State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
add. 
15:06:20 Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Regarding juror contact, if this did not go on appeal now, a 
nd gets reversed 
15:06:59 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
by an appeals Court later would farther remove jurors and me 
mories would 
15:07:20 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
fade. Need to speak with Mr. Elam. 
15:07:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
In dealing with juror contact first, Court has not changed i 
ts views. Court 
15:08:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
is comfortable with its views and rulings placed on the reco 
rd on August 6th. 
15:08:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
This is a matter of discretion. Jurors were informed by th 
is Court that 
15:08:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
they could speak to who they wanted to after the trial was 
over that they 
15:09:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
choose to talk to. Jurors can be affected in their roles as 
jurors by being 
15:11:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
exposed to things not routinely seen in their normal everyda 
y lives. The 
15:12:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
argument that Court has singled out counsel, the Court disag 
rees with that 
15:13:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
statement. Court feels inappropriate to contact jurors with 
out Court's 
15:14:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
permjssion or knowledge. Court done not think it is appropr 
iate to allow 
15:15:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
jury contact in this case. Court can't control the press. 
In abscense of 
15:16:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
any evidence that there was any juror misconduct or failure 
to follow Court's 
15:17:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
instruction, Court is comfortable with its prior rulings. I 
n respect to 2nd 
15:17:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
part, of motion to have Glen Elam deposed. Understanding he 
was interviewed. 
15:18:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Mr. Elam wouldn't sign affidavit requested. Court has conc 
Page 2 
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ern if all of 
15:21:02 - Judge: Neville, 
defense staff becomes 
they may not 
Thomas F. 
subject to 
15:21:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
interviews after every case 
want to stay in their jobs. Both Defense counsel were depos 
ed, and 
15:23:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
ultimately they are responsible for their investigators. Co 
urt will continue 
15:23:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
earlier ruling and not allow deposition of Glen Elam. In af 
fidavit of Mr. 
15:24:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Shaw, he states that Mr. Elam stated he could only sign an a 
ffidavit of his 
15:25:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
lead investigator advised he could do so. Court understands 
that Idaho 
15:26:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
appellate rule 12, Court denied Motion for permissive appe 
al. Stateds 
15:28:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
petitoner's counsel free to file their own direct appeal wit 
h supreme court. 
15:28:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would also like to bring counsel back on December 17, 
2007 @ 9:00 for 
15:28:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
review of medical records. 
15:29:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Request State prepare an order denying. 
15:29:53 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Inquired if Court would like an order denying deposition on 
Glen Elam as well 
15:30:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court indicated it would. 
15:30:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court trying to change schedule a bit in January. 
15:31:20 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
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State of Idaho 
LS.B. # 4843 
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ORI 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 
17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of 
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following document: Exhibit 17 to Final 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Third Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas, 
dated September 26, 2007). The exhibit includes page 5, which was missing from the 
exhibit submitted. 
//\k Dated this _)_ day of November, 2007. 
£alMA/in l~G 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED PETITION 1 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
01384 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
\~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \~ ~ay of November, 2007 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S 
OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
~U.S.Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail 
Facsimile +-Hand Delivery 
1xvthahLL lbmwu\ ~ 
BARBARA THOMAS 
Administrative Assistant 
2 NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED PETITION 
FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State ofldaho 
I.8.B. # 4843 
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender' 
3647 Lake Harbor Lant 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-21l2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VJRGn.. HALL, 
CASE NO. SPOTOS00155 
Petitioner. 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF' 
~002 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DR. JAMES MERIKANGAS& M.D. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. (CAPITAL CASE) 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada) 
L James Merilcangas, M.D., beiDg competent tQ testify, state under penalty of peljury that 
the following is true and correct to the best of my experience and knowledge: 
BACKGROUND 
1. 1 have .been retained by the Idaho State Appellate Public Defenders Office (SAPD) as an 
expert in neurology antS psychiatry to review certain marten in the case of irick~. Hin 
v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOTOSOOlS5, to re\'iew appropriate rec;ords and 
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tra.llSCI'ipts, to perfonn neurological and psyvbiaIric examinations, to recommend 
appropriate neurological testing~ and to review and interPret the results of such testing. 
2. My education, employment and experience are set forth in my Cmriculum Vitae, which I 
undtllri!tand has already been filed with the Court. 
3. I conducted a neurological and psychiatric evaluation of Erick: Hall on April 4, 2006~ at 
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. Erick was cooperative but somewhat subdued 
during that examination. I then recommended an 1v.1RI scan of the brain and a. PBT scan 
of the brain because of iudieations during the neurological examination of possible 
congenital :malfo:ttIUltion of'the brain. The brain SCat;1.$, a cer\lical x-ray. ewd standard 
blood work were a1ao indicated by Brick's histotY of difficulty with hand.eye motor 
coordination, problcIlli with visual perception, multiple head injuries, blackouts. memory 
diificu.lties, and l1lOOO swings, The blood work included tc:st5 for thyroid functi.~ 
sypbilis and blood sugar levels. The reasoDS for th~ specific testing recommended are 
fully set forth in my Second Affidavit, dated October 14, 2006. The recommended 
testing was completed on Februuy IS and 21. 2007. 
I conducted a second examination. of Erick on September 13,2007, at the Twin 
Falb Adult Detention Facility. at whiGh time I noted that Erick was abnoxmally 
grandiose, euphoric, and hypomanic. 
TESTING CONDUCTED AN]) MATERIALS REVIEWED 
4. In addition to various materials previQua1y reviewed by me a$ set forth in my Second 
Affidavit. I reviewed the results of the following testing: 
a" Magnetic resonance im.aging (MRI) ~ of the brain, with and. without contrast. 
The MRl scan is a blain in1age prod:u.ced with radio waves and magnetism. It is a 
standard procedure fbr exllWining the anatomy of the brain aru;l is used to evaluate 
TIllRD AFPIDA VIT OF DR. JAMES MERIKANGAS 2 
01387 
:~ T 
STATE APPELLATE PD Igj 004 
brain damase, brain injury or brttin disease. The MIU scan givw cross s¢ctional 
views of the brain based upon the chemical structural relationship of brain tissue. 
b. Positron emission tomography (PET) scan. Tbe PET scan, like an MRI, produces 
cross seclional views of !be brain, but the picture is generated with the use of, a 
radioactive isotope, and the scan provides an image of th~ btldn basEd Oil ~ 
metabolism rather than simply on brain anatomy_ The PET scan. therefore, gives 
a picture of the brain <'functioning" rather than simply its shape. 
c. Venereal Disease Research LaboratorylRapid Plasma Reagin (VDRURPR). This 
is a teGt for sypbilis, which can affect brain development if presell.t be:tbre b~ 
and can cause br.Un dam.age and PSyehO$;A$ if acquired later in life. 
d. Thyroid testing. The thyroid controls Metabolism of the body and the brain. 
Thyroid function tests are a routine part of the evaluation of mood and thought 
diso~ and are also used to evaluate high blood pressure. The T3~ T4, 'I7 and 
TSH blood tests are used to evaluate specifi~ aspects of thyroid fUnction. 
e. Five-hour gluCOiC tole.ra.nce test. This glucose tolerance test measures both high 
and low blood sugar. Sugar (glucose) provides the energy for brain functioning 
and ill the brain's only fuel. Hypoglycemia (low blood sUgm') can produce the 
same type of brain damage that deprivation of oxygen would. produce:. or 
deprivation of thiamin which is required for metAboliSllL Hyperglycemia (high 
blood sugar) oan cause a d.ecreued levil of COllSCio'USD.eS8 or confusio~ impair 
cognitive function, cause mood fluctuation, and increase depression and anxiety. 
The five-bour glucose tolerance test is used in diasnosing diabetes and reactive 
hypogl~ It requites the administration of glucose, and multiple blood tests 
over the five hours, to determine how quickly the glucose is cleared from the 
blood. 
f. Complete C-Spine including obliques. This is a series of x-rays of the cerviCal 
spine (the neck area). 
5 - In addition to various materials previously by me as set forth in lnY Secxmd Affidavit, and 
to assist we in better understa:llding Eriok's history, I reviewed the follo\ying family 
member's affidavits: 
a. Affidavit ofDeanna.}ean (McCmckcn) Horrnatl, dated April 10. 2006 
b. Affidav~ of Jean ffall McCra.;ken. dated April 9. 2006 
c. .A:6ida'Vlt of John Au~t Thompson, dated April 9. 2006 
d. Affidavit of Frank «(~ankie") Alvin Charles McCracken, dated April 9 2006 
e. Affidavit of Kimberly A. Bacon. dated April 9, 2006 ' 
f. Affidavit ofKmlneth S. Do~ dated April 9. 2006 
g. Affidavit of Frank Owen McCracken. Sr.~ dated April 7, 2006 
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h_ Affidavit of Tiffaney Lcandra Conner, ~ April 8, 2006 
i. Affidavit of Slla\Vltra MeCn.eken Homnring, dated April 7, 2006 
J. Affidavit ofTamata McCracken, dated April 7, 2006 
k. Affidavit ofSbannon Pambnm. dated September 4, 2007 
METHODOLOGY" PATmNT msTORY 
~005 
6. Hwnan behavior is extremely complex. and is influenced by D.llItle!'OUS factors, including 
genetics. family upbringing, positive and negative lite experience&, and the physical and 
chemical malee-up of the brain. The brain itse1fis higbly complex awl can be damaged at 
any stage of developmtmt and at tmy stage of life. Damage can be overt or subtle, and 
damage will affect behalviQi to ~ dCgrcG3 depending not just upon the extent of the 
damage, but also on the location of the damage. Deformation may exist at birth or may 
be cauaed later by il.lnels, tra.uma, and aloohol or drug usc. Even subtle damage to the 
brain may c&wse significant physical, emotional, psychiatric aDd bch&vioml problems. 
Because of the complexity of the brain and of hulnan behavior. oourology and 
neuropsychiatry must take into account the patient's complete hittory. Specific tests are 
useful. of CO'UI'Se, in discovering specific brain d~e (altb.ou.gh negative teSUlts are not 
always dispositive of lack of damage). However, det~g tho extcmt of the damage, 
the eause of the damage, and the effects of the damage on behavior is a c:on:xplicatcd 
undertaking which requires nClUlologlsts and neu:ropsychiatrists to take into accQUllt 
results from ll1ultipJe tesu. family blWkgroUDd, ~ a patient" s phycicallllld mental health 
history. 
Thus, Brick's personal history is extremely relevant in assessing and interpreting 
his test res.u1ts, includin: the :MRI an~ PET scan results. .History is especially relevant in 
trying to ascett.ai11 the eause of bnnn dmlage. Brick's history is replete with mqwn 
potential Ca1UJeS of or indications ofbrain damage. Erick birth weight was only 4 pounds, 
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14 ounCe$. Based on his family history~ there is reason to believe that Erick's mother 
drank alcohol while pregnant with him. Erick was developmentally delayed. and was 
diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded as a child. He was unable to oope with 
kindergarten, had a very poor attention span. and required constant direction and 
supervision to complete tasks. Brick was _ emotionally di~turbed child, was frail and 
underoQu.riahOO.. He heanl VOiCCi as a child, and his behavior was described as different 
end odd. Brick was repeatedly and severtily pbysically abused as • ehild by multiple 
family members. Brick has a history of alcohol, cocain~ and methamphetamine abuse. 
Additionally, Erick has a history af multiple head injuries, a wen-established 
ea.use ofbx-a.in darna.Se. As a child. Erick fell offbis bicycle, hit the back ofms head and 
lost consciousness. Following that incident and fur several years following the incident, 
Erick complained of severe headacllesl and neck and eye pain. Brick's brother would 
often hit bi:1ll 80 .bard that Erick would be knocked -unconscious. Erick once feU off a roof. 
He landed. in a rose garden. but fell forward and hit his head on a rode gidewalk. He fell 
out of a pickup truck~ and off a hay 'trailer. His siblings and extQJlded fiunily would throw 
rocks at Erick~ s head. 
7. In my professional opinion, 8lld to a reasonable degree of medieal certainty, Erick's 
hiaiory warranted a complete neurological examination. Had I l.>een CQIlSultcd prior to 
Erick's sentencing trial, I would have undoubtedly recommended the same neurological 
testing that I recommended duriug the C'\.11'reUt post-conviction proceedings. 
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NEUROLOGICAL FINDINGS 
8. Mapetic resollaD.ee imaging (MlU) 
The MRI scan! of Brick's brain showed anatomical damage. Specifically, the MRIs 
sbDwed (a) the presence (foci) of white matter byperintMlSity on Brick', brain. (b) 
prominenco of the ventricles of Erick's brain, and (0) an abnonnally thin corpus 
callosum. 
(8) Whitp Matter Hyperintgitv. 
Erick's MRI showod dama.ge to his brain. Specifically it showed the presence of foci of 
white matter hyperintensity, called lesions. The presenoe of 1~ indicates a di~ 
itate, and are particularly troubling when found in a. 36-year-old. 
What is white matte.r hyperlntenslty? Generally, there are two types of brain 
matter, grey matter and white matter. Grey matter Tefer& mainly to the cerebral cortex, 
which is the convoluted, contound exterior of the brain. Grey matter contaiuli the boditi8 
of the nerve cells. White miJUer oormects the various grey matter areas of the brain and. 
eanies nerve impulses between nerve cells in different parts of the brain. White matter iB 
coated. with myelin, a fatty insulation. Lesions of white matter hyperintensity describe a 
condition where the myelin has broken. d<)WD, exposing the underlying white matter. 
White matter is analogoU$ to el~trica.l wiring, with the myelin being the insulation. 
When the insulation breaks down, the wiring beoomes exposee4 and does DOt conduct 
electricity well. Thus, the fact that Erick bas white m.a~ lesiOllSJ indicates that his 
brain's circuitry is not functioning properly) i.e., messages arc not sent efficiently from 
one part of his brain to another. 
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While it is common to see white matter lesions in certain categories of pe1'SOm, it 
is associated with a diBease state. For example, white matter lesions are associated with 
diseases'such as high blood pressur~ vascular disease) and other diseases found in the 
c;ldedy. White matter lesioM C8Jl also the result of l.l1iilni dl:ugs like cocaine or 
methaxnphetaminc. As discussed above, Erick has a bi~ory of using these dIugs. 
The presence ofwmte matter lesions may affect behavior. The behavioral effects 
vary dependlng on the location oftbe lesions and the cause oftha abnormality. In Erick's 
cas~ the white matter lesiQD.S are located in his temporal and frontal lobes. 
The temporal lobe is lQ(i8.ted beneath and behind. the frontal lobe. It is involved in 
the processing of auditory sensation and. perception, and contains the hippocampus. an 
area of the braID asiOCiated with memory formation.. Temporal lobe damage can result in 
(1) distuWance of auditQxy sensation and perception, (2) diatwbancc of selective attention 
'of auditory and \fisual input; (3) c1isorders ofviliual perception. (4) impaired or~on 
and catQgorization of verbal material, (~) disturbance of language comprehensio~ (6) 
impaired long-term memory. (7) altered par1iOtla1ity and affective behavil)r. and (8) 
altered sexual behavior. 
The frontal lobes are OQIlsidex-eO. our lWlotional control center and home to our 
personality. Most importantIYt the frontal lobes are involved in impnlse controL There i£ 
no other part of me brain where lesioI)$ can. cause such a wide variety of symptoms. The 
:6:ontal lobes are involved in motor function, pIOblem solving, spontaneity. memory. 
language, initiation, judgment, impulse control. and social and sexual behavior. Frontal 
lobe damage can result in (1) distUIbed motor function, (2) suppressed. spontaneous facial 
movements. (3) iclJibited or excessivQ sp~ (4) difficulty in interpreting feedback from 
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the env1:roJlInent, (5) perseveration on a response, (6) risk taking, (J) impaired asSOCiated 
leaming. i.e. impaired use of extemal cues to help guide beMvior, (8) dramatic change in 
social behavior, (9) and abnormal sexual behavior. 
This is particularly signi:6.eant in Erick's coso, because of the nature of the 
conviction against him, i.e., a crime involving the sexual homicide of a stnUlger. and 
other past allegations. The damaged regions of his brain are aasoeiated with sexual 
behavior and impullc control. This.finding, especially in conjunction with his family and 
locial history. provides a possible explanation olbis criminal behaviors in this "Me. 
(b) fromin~ of"gntricl~ 
Erick's MRI alab showed damage to his. vmtricular system. The v1m.triculat 
sysrom consists of four oommunicating cavities (ventricles) in the brain that are filled 
with cerebrospinal fluid and are eoJl~UOUS with the central canal of the Spinal cord. 
Eriok~s ventricles are abnonnally prOmlnant. Large ven.tricles ar& caused by either too 
much pteSS1lIt!l inside the brain or atrOphy of the brain. A1rOphy is the loss of brain tissue 
and ea'USe'S impairment. A12heimer's disease, fbr exampto1 is associated with significant 
brain a1rophy, and one would see enlarged ventricles because of the atrophy_ In other 
words, when the btain sht:iI:iks, the fluid cavitieli (ventrioles) becom~ larger. 
In Illy professional. opinion, Brick's ventrieles are enlarged beca~c his brain is 
atrophied. In other words, Erick's ventricles are enlarged because he has lost brain 
tissue. Enlargement of the ventricles can exist at birt:b, occur later in life because of 
disease, or can be the result of head it\juries. Given Erick'i history, it is likely his 
fJIllarged ventricles are the result of head injuries. Damage resulting from head injuries is 
cumulative; meaning, sevc:nl minot head il\Jurie& can have the same result as one major 
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head nyury. Thus, Erick's enlarged ventricles are likely the result of his combined head 
ilJjuries. 
(c) Ihin Conmi Qillosum. 
Erick's MR1 showQfj d.amage to thv QQIpus callo8Utn. The corpus callosum is the 
~t band of :tibel-s connecting the left and right cereb.ral homisphcres of the human 
brain. It is l10mlally the largest white matter structure in the brain, and much of the inter-
hetnispherio eonuntmication:in the brain is conductedacroaa the corpus caU06Wll. 
Erick's COIpus callosum is abnormally thin or narrow. Thin corpus callosa are 
associated with Fcrtal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (,F ABD). F ASD is an Unlbrella term 
describing the range of effects t1uU can ()OCut in an individual who was prenatally 
exposed to alcohol. Prenatal exprurure to alcohol is a w~ll known cause of behavioral, 
cognitive. and psyehologicall'toblems, and i$ also associated with learning disabilities. 
F ASD $)'Illptoms Ir11so incl* poor judgment and poor impulse control. 
FASD is consistent with reports that Erick's mother drank. during her pregnancies, 
Erick'J! low birth weight. E.rick's history of behavioral and mood problems, Brick's 
shortened philtnlIn, and Brick's history of learning disabiliti. and childhood mild mental 
nrtardation. Given Erick'~ history and the results of the MRI. it is my professional 
opinion that Brick FASD is the likely cause QfErick's a.bnormally thin corpua oallosum. 
FASD is c01l8istent with Erick's problems Vl.ith impul$e control and aggressive behavior 
and, again, offern a possible explanation fOf his criminal w;tivity. 
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9. Positron Emission TODlOp'a:phy (PET) 
The PET scan gives a· picture of the brain', metabolic activity lovel (or 
functioning) in the varlous areas of the brain. Eriek's PET scan showed functional 
damagtJ. First, there was a severe decrease in activity in the medial temporal regions 
bilatc.7ally extending to the tips of the t~ poles. Second. there was a moderate 
deereas. in. activity extomling from the insular regions bilaterally into the posterior 
aspects of both frontal lobes. The decreased metabolic activity level in those aI'eQ 
indicates damage to those areas ofErlck:is brain. 
The cause of this decreaso in Erick's brain activity is likely a result olms multiple 
head injuries. Howevet. oxygen deprivation. high ft;vers., iufectiOM or measles can also 
cause these abnormalities. Regm-dles$ of the eause, abnormalities in these areas of the 
brain are associated with aggreuive impulsive behavior. poor executive f\lnetionill& poor 
judgm.ent and low intelligence. The dirnjnisbad. activity in these areas of Rrick>s brain is 
consistent with problems, with impulse eonttol and aggressive behavior, and provides a 
pouible finther explanation for his criminal activity 
10. Syphilis Test 
Mr. Hall tested neptive fO. syphilis. 
11. Tbyroid Tests 
Mr. Hall tc8ted within nonna1limiv. for thyroid. t\mcijl))l., 
12. Glucose Tolerance Testiu& 
Erick tested a:J hyPerglycemic. Further testing for the possibility of diabotos is indicated. 
13. Cervic:al X-Ray 
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There was some mild spondylitic change at C4-S with anterior hypetbtJpbic ostoophytic 
splll'ring. There Wa.! sO:tnc m.i.nima1 posterior osteophytic spurring, but no ruurowing of 
the neural foramina on the oblique views. These may be the result of neck injuries 
associated with Brick's head injuries or other physical trauIlla. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
14. Erick's brain is anatomically and functionally abnormal Erick has anatomical damage to 
his frontal and remporal1obes, and an aJ;JllODI18l1y developed corpus callosum. Erick's 
braiD is also functionally impaired in the temporal lobe regions. It i5 my profes$ional 
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Erick' 5 sexual bohaviOI'I and 
difficultie:; with impulae control and the exercise of good judgment are consistent with 
the brain damage identified by the brain scans. Based on the directive of Mr. Hall' $ 
attorneys, I have not spoken to Mr. Hall about tho eIime itself: However, in light of the 
evidence preiented at trial and aswmln8 8Uilt based on the jw;y's verdict, it is readily 
apparent that the specific da:mage to Brick'lI brain could accuunt for his alleged actions 
that DvlJDin8 and alleged prior oriminal behavior. 
The results oftbe brain scans are consistent with Eriok's bigtory of head injuries. 
pervasive developmental deficits, and other childhood deficits, disorders. and 
mimeatment. Moreover~ Eri"k's background would calU¢ him. to develop mUltiple and 
serious emotional triggers. While persons with undamaaed brains may have those 
triggers and. not react violently, it is much more difficult for a person with brain 
damage-particub.rly brain damage affecting jropulse control-to resist th$ urge to react 
violently. While brain damage do(l$ not excuse Erick's violent behavior, it may explain 
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and mitigate his actions. Erick's brain simply does not function like a healthy adult's 
brain., and his behavillt, therefore, should be judged accordingly. 
-\.,0. )-' ,-DATED this day of September. 2007. 
_. " ,>, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before m~ this 20 day ofSeptembt!Jl:', 2007. 
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Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK 
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Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO 
CO-Defendant(s) : 
Pers. Attorney: 
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Public Defender: 
09:32:46 - Operator 
Recording: 
09:32:46 - New case 
, STATE OF IDAHO 
09:33:29 - Other: OWEN, NICOL 
present on behalf of petitioner as well. 
09:33:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Courtroom: CR501 
Court prepared to sign an order submitted by the Court. The 
Court has had 
09:35:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
orgnized the medical records. The bulk of the records are f 
rom Intermountain 
09:36:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Medical Hospital, and most is discoverable, but whether admi 
tted is subject 
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SessiGn: Neville121907 
09:37:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
to argument and rules of evidence. Court also has a brief 1 
etter from Dr. 
09:37:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Heyrend stating he has no records that his associate has it. 
The Court also 
09:38:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
received letter from social security office and their stand 
on releasing 
09:38:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
records. 
09:39:20 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated spoke with Mr. Ellsberry and talked about 
policies. Ms. 
09:39:55 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Swenson stated that Ms. Oliver could sign a release of those 
records and 
09:40:22 - plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
would request that the Court sign an order to do so. 
09:40:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court responded 
09:41:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated that once receive the medical records fro 
m the Court may 
09:41:43 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
have an idea on whether social security records would be red 
undant or would 
09:42:05 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
be necessary. 
09:42:38 - Judge: Neville r Thomas F. 
The Court was surprised by in house counsel for social secur 
ity would stated 
09:42:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
that privacy would trump a death penalty case. Court stated 
major features 
09:44:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
of the records would be relevent some redactions would need 
to be made. 
09:45:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Going to the PSI for April Sebastian, mostly not relevent. 
09:46:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court would still like counsel to leave open the afternoon 0 
f January 17th 
09:47:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
and the entire day of January 18th for this case. 
09:48:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
The Court notes Motion for limited appearance in the H030062 
4 
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09:48:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson responded re: handling trial counsel to be avail 
able. 
09:50:04 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated will advise Ms. Bennetts that the Court wi 
11 take up Hanlon 
09:50:40 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
matter as well. 
09:50:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
09:50:48 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Mr. Bourne stated have not filed State's response to Amended 
Petition. 
09:51:14 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Believe will be able to file today the response with notoriz 
ed affidavit. 
09:52:03 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Believe that Mr. Ackley may want to respond to that and that 
would cause 
09:52:24 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
State to respond to that. 
09:52:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Might be able to take up some of the claims on that day that 
are not affected 
09:52:58 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
by the medical records. 
09:53:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson stated don't believe would be able to go forward 
to address the 
09:53:28 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Motion to Dismiss. Do not want to piece meal this. Assume 
State's answer 
09:54:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
would be lengthy 
09:54:08 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER 
Close to 100 pages. 
09:54:18 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Would like to set out 6 weeks after disclosure of the record 
s. Will also 
09:54:49 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
need to contact Dr. Merikangas once State has contacted thei 
r expert and 
09:55:08 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
filed the affidavit. 
09:55:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court response 
09:56:49 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
Ms. Swenson responded, would ask that on the documents, an 0 
rder what is 
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09:57:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA 
being disclosed and what is not being disclosed for appeal. 
09:57:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F. 
Court will consider. 
09:58:12 - Operator 
Stop recording: 
01401 
